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The focus of this thesis is on Vietnam‟s “co phan hoa” or equitization process – the 
Vietnamese version of privatization. While Vietnam started transferring partially the 
State ownership in a few state-owned enterprises to the private sector in 1992 in a pilot 
program, equitization was formalized only in 1996 as a nation-wide reform measure and 
became the mainstream reform program by the end of the 1990s. By 2008, or more than a 
decade of equitization, less than twenty percent of State ownership in the state-owned 
enterprises system was transferred to the private sector. In most of equitized state 
enterprises, the State still keeps dominant shares and thus retains largely the control over 
these companies. The overall process of equitization was thus often characterized with 
sluggishness, or “gradualism” as in contrast to “big-bang” cases of privatization. More 
interestingly, the pace of equitization was not monotonous but rather “non-linear” and 
fluctuated over time. In particular, equitization sped up significantly twice, first between 
the late 1998 and 2002 and then between 2003 and 2006. 
 
Instead of just focusing on “gradualism”, the author of this thesis is also interested in 
explaining the “non-linearity” aspect of Vietnam‟s equitization process. Furthermore, 
instead of submitting to the current views that are polarized between policy-driven and 
process-driven arguments, I examine the impacts of both policies and process, as well as 
the interactions between them on the equitization process. In so doing, I introduce the 
dual dynamics model which is composed from the Fragmented Authoritarianism model, 
various theories on government – business interactions, and the Garbage Can theory, to 
  
8 
examine the equitization process at two levels: the inter-bureaucracy politics at the macro 
level and the State patrons-enterprise interactions at the micro level. These two levels 
correspond with the two main stages of a policymaking cycle in equitization: the 
formulation and/or revision of equitization policies and the implementation of 
equitization policies and feedbacks. 
 
The main findings of this thesis are as follows. The process of making equitization 
policies in Vietnam can be characterized with authority fragmentation and instability. 
These characteristics have led to continuous bargaining and negotiations among an 
increasing range of State actors and agencies in order to reach consensus over policy 
changes at the macro level (the macro dynamics). As a consequence, policy changes are 
often slow and incremental, and sometimes unpredictable. Meanwhile, in the stage of 
policy implementation and feedbacks at the micro level, bargaining also takes place 
between the State patrons and their subordinate enterprises due to their different preferred 
strategies of equitization (the micro dynamics). As a result, the actual implementation of 
the equitization mandate at the micro level has been also slow and incremental in order to 
suit the interests of both the State patrons and enterprises. Last but not least, the 
interactions between the macro and micro dynamics have resulted in various twists and 
turns within the equitization process. While the slow implementation of the equitization 
mandate at the micro level triggers new rounds of bargaining among bureaucratic 
agencies at the macro level over possible policy changes to accelerate the equitization 
process; the resultant slow and often ambiguous policy changes, in turns, shape the way 
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Privatization in Transitional Economies: Big Bang versus Gradualism 
The wave of privatization has swept the world for almost three decades. Starting with 
developed countries, privatization now becomes “a widely applied economic policy” in 
transitional economies, ranging from the former Soviet Union members, socialist Eastern 
European countries, Argentina, and a few other Latin American nations, and more 
surprisingly, China and Vietnam.
1
 Privatization, a process of transferring the State 
ownership in the State owned companies into the hand of the private sector, has been 
seen as “a complete reshuffling of the extant interest structure concerning not only 
governments, but also managers, workers, and creditors.”2 According to John Nellis, 
during the last twenty five years, thousands of firms formally owned by the State in the 
above-mentioned transitional economies have been transferred to the private sector, 
bringing about US $400 billion in sales proceeds. Besides the resultant relief for the State 
Budget and other positive macro-economic impacts, improved corporate governance and 




There has existed different patterns of privatization among transitional economies in both 
pace and sequence of reform. Russia and other post-communist Eastern European 
                                                 
1
 John Nellis, “Privatization: a Summary Assessment”, SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 2007, 
pp.21-22 
2
 Guy Liu, Pei Sun, and Wing Thye Woo, “The Political Economy of Chinese-Style 
Privatization: Motives and Constraints”, World Development, Vol. 34, No. 12, pp. 2016-2033, 
2006, p. 2017-18 
3
 Nellis (2007), pp.3-29  
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countries attempted to liberalize the market and introduce private ownership altogether. 
The privatization process in these countries, thus, was a rapid, wholesale transfer of state 
ownership into the private sector within a short period of time. On a contrary, China 
started with market liberalization first and followed with the transfer of State ownership 
into the private sector with a much slower pace and more limited scope.
4
 This is seen as 
contrasting sharply to the big-bang mass privatization approach adopted by the Eastern 
European and former Soviet Union countries.  
 
Although China embarked on SOE reform as early as in the late 1970s, it took almost 
thirteen years for the shareholding system program, the Chinese version of privatization, 
to become a mainstream reform measure in 1997. The idea of the shareholding system 
originated from the rural sector with the very first of joint stock companies dated back to 
as early as in 1979. The establishment of industrial shareholding companies had taken 
place since 1984 on an experimental basis. The evolution of the shareholding system 
option was thus gradual and incremental in nature. The State ownership in the SOE 
system dwindled slowly through two ways: converting the State ownership into 
individual shares and further diluting the State ownership by issuing new shares. The 
share of the State ownership in the SOE system in China remained roughly 50% by the 
                                                 
4
 Sumon Bhaumik and Saul Estrin, “How Transition Paths differ: Enterprise Performance in 





 While small and medium-sized enterprises were allowed to privatize, the 




Another gradualist characteristic that distinguishes the Chinese approach in  privatization 
is the exercise of “dual-track transition”; whereby not only one single reform measure 
(for example, privatization) was attempted at one time, but different programs, including 
both new and old systems, were tried simultaneously until the new reform measure could  
replace the old system completely. In the case of “big-bang” reform as in Russian 




The difference between Russian “big-bang” versus Chinese “gradual” approaches, as 
well as the normative implication of such difference, cast the full attention of observers 
and became a hot topic of debate among scholars in the 1990s. Questions and comments 
regarding the impact of these two transition paths on the firm performance and macro-
economic picture were numerous, such as: 
 
“The noticeable success of the Chinese strategy and the failure of the Russian 
strategy to make non-energy firms and industries a major force in the global 
                                                 
5
 Compiled from Ma Y. Shu, “The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the 
Shareholding System System”, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, Issue 4 (1998), pp. 379-397, and Ma Y. 
Shu, “China’s Privatization: From Gradualism to Shock Therapy”, Asian Survey, Vol. 48, 
Issue 2, pp. 199-214 
6
 Liu et al (2006), p. 2016 
7
 Ma (1998), p. 397, and Ma (2008), p. 212 
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market make a comparison of micro evidence about the impact of these strategies 
on firm performance an interesting exercise.”8 
 
“Does it make any difference that some developing countries have lagged the 
leading privatizers?” 9 
 
Arguments have been made both for and against the two approaches. However, towards 
the late 1990s, it seemed that the more successful picture of the “gradual” approach, 
reflected through the case of China, over the chaotic situation in, say, Russia, won more 
approval for both economic and political reasons.
10
 For most of the 1990s, China 
remained to succeed economically whereas Russia went down the other way. However, 
by the early 2000s, or ten years after the shock therapy were applied, Russia surprisingly 
has experienced rapid and sustained economic growth. Recent efforts of former President 
Putin to re-insert the state control in a number of important industries, such as energy, 
which were privatized and sold off in rush to the so-called oligarchs during the 1990s, led 
to the question if Russia has reversed its “big-bang” approach in privatization.11 
 
                                                 
8
 Bhaumik and Estrin,  p.1 
9




 For further information on the possible reversal of Russian approach in privatization, one can 
refer to Marc Champion, “Threat to Russian Privatization Seen”, The Wall Street Journal, 01 
February 2009; Peter Rutland, “Post-socialist states and the evolution of a new development 
model: Russia and China compared”, paper presented at the International Seminar on 
Globalization and Eurasia, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 9-12 November 2008; or 
Sadrel Reza, “Privatisation and private sector growth in China and Russia: a comparison 




One of the issues in making comparative analysis between the two above-mentioned 
approaches is that the big bang cases so far outnumbered the gradual cases. China seemed 
to be the single gradual case in comparison with a bunch of transitional economies 
following the big bang approach. In this regard, the investigation of other similar cases 
following the same gradual approach of China would be worth doing and promise to shed 
greater lights on the comparative studies/analyses on different transitional paths adopted 
among different transitional economies.  
 
Vietnamese-style Privatization or Equitization 
The above discussion leads us to the case of Vietnam and its co phan hoa or equitization 
process – the Vietnamese version of privatization. Co phan hoa in Vietnam is the process 
of transferring the State ownership in the state enterprise system into the collective of 
State enterprise employees and managers, as well as outside investors. Equitization in 
Vietnam can take the following forms: (1) keeping state shares intact and issuing new 
shares; (2) selling part of the existing state shares in together with issuing new shares; 
and (3) selling off all state shares in together with issuing new shares.
12
 Despite 
numerous attempts by Vietnamese politicians and policymakers to claim the vague 
distinction between equitization in Vietnam and the process of privatization taking place 
elsewhere in the world, equitization in Vietnam is essentially a process of privatization, 
                                                 
12
 Compiled from various Decrees to regulate the equitization process in Vietnam, especially the 
latest Decree 109 in 2007 (Article 4) 
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involving mainly the transfer of state ownership over the production and services 




From the policy perspective, equitization has been one main ingredient within the overall 
package for reforming the State sector in Vietnam. Formal efforts to reform the system of 
state enterprises in Vietnam started as early as in the late 1970s, which, however, were 
confined mainly into granting increased autonomy to managers of State enterprises in 
running their business without changing the ownership structure within the system. The 
issue of transforming the ownership structure in the SOE system was raised only in the 
late 1980s and initially implemented in the form of a trial program in the early 1990s. 
The equitization mandate was then formalized into a nation-wide program in 1996 and 
subsequently regulated under Governmental Decrees. Initially, the program targeted 
mainly small and medium-sized, non-strategic State enterprises. It then expanded to 
cover large State enterprises, including the different State-owned giants- General 
Corporations from the late 1990s  
 
The pattern of transition in Vietnam, in general, fits as a “gradual” case, despite some 
initial remarks over “big-bang” aspects of the reform process.14 As has been discussed, it 
                                                 
13
 For different perspectives about equitization in Vietnam and its relationship with the 
privatization process elsewhere in the world, see, for example, Hoang Cong Thi and Phung Thi 
Doan, Co phan hoa cac doanh nghiep nha nuoc o Vietnam (Equitizing State-owned 
enterprises in Vietnam), Special Information, Institute of Finance Science, Ministry of Finance, 
1992, or Vu Thanh Tu Anh, “Vietnam – The Long March to Equitization”, Policy Brief #33, 
The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, April 2005, p.4.  While debates 
over the definition of equitization are easily found among policymakers, researchers, and 
scholars, so far no Governmental Decrees to regulate the equitization process have attempted to 
provide an official definition for the term.  
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took almost ten years since the term “equitization” was first coined in an official text for 
the measure to be formally legalized and become a mainstream SOE reform measure. 
Also, despite the formalization of the equitization mandate in the mid-1990s, the process 
of converting state ownership in the SOE system into private ownership has moved 
slowly. By 2008, i.e. more than a decade of equitization, less than twenty percent of State 
ownership in the state-owned enterprises system was transferred to the private sector. In 
most of equitized state enterprises, the State still keeps dominant shares and thus retains 
largely the control over these companies.
15
 The overall process of equitization was thus 
often characterized with sluggishness, or “gradualism” as in contrast to “big-bang” cases 
of privatization.
16
 More interestingly, the pace of equitization was not monotonous but 
rather “non-linear” and fluctuated over time. In particular, equitization sped up 
considerably twice, first between the late 1998 and 2002 and then between 2003 and 
2006. After 2006, however, the pace of equitization slowed down significantly.  
 
The Dual Dynamics Model and Vietnam’s Equitization Process 
All of the above-mentioned facts imply that Vietnam, in addition to China, could be an 
interesting case in gradual privatization. However, Vietnam has not yet become a 
noticeable case in comparative studies conducted on transitional economies. In fact, 
Vietnam has been long conflated with China due to the close proximity between the two 
countries, the striking similarities regarding the history, culture, and socio-economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 For further information on whether the reform process in Vietnam is “big bang” or gradual, see 
Adam Fforde, “From Plan to Market: the Economic Transitions in Vietnam and China 
compared”, in Transforming Asian Socialism: China and Vietnam compared, edited by Anita 
Chan, Jonathan Unger, and Benedict Tria Kerkvliet, 1999, pp.43-72 
15
 National Steering Committee of Enterprise Reform and Development (NSCERD)‟s and 
Ministry of Finance (MOF)‟s reports, 2006 
16
 See Vu (2005) 
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structure, and finally the recent similar pattern of transition. Profound studies on the 
equitization process of Vietnam would thus provide necessary background for making it a 
valid case in comparative analysis on different transition pathways.  
 
The current literature on Vietnam points to two polarized explanations about the sluggish 
process of equitization. The rational statist approach assumes that the State of Vietnam is 
a single, coherent actor in making the equitization policies and implementing them 
accordingly, and thus, the slow pace of equitization has been mainly due to policy 
irrationalities and delays. The “reform as a process” approach, at the other end of the 
continuum, disregards the role of the State in the process and instead explains the 
sluggishness of the official equitization process as mainly due to the strong resistance 
from both the local States, including the line Ministries, and SOE managers and 
employees. The main weakness of the above-mentioned approaches, in my opinion, is 
that both of them overlook the following dynamics in the equitization process: (i) the set 
of bargaining and negotiations among bureaucratic units over the formulation and/or 
revision of equitization policies; and (ii) the interaction between the enterprises and their 
direct State patrons over the implementation of the equitization mandate. Therefore, the 
main argument I would like to make in this thesis is that the above-mentioned dynamics, 
the inter-bureaucracy politics and government-enterprise interactions, as well as their 
interactions with each other, are keys in explaining both “gradualism” and “non-linearity” 




In so doing, I develop a dual dynamics model to explain the above-mentioned dynamics 
in the equitization process in Vietnam. The dual dynamics model is built from the 
theoretical framework of the Fragmented Authoritarianism model, various theories on 
state-enterprise interactions, and the Garbage Can theory. The dual dynamics model 
analyzes the equitization process at two levels: macro and micro. The macro dynamics is 
defined as the bargaining and negotiations among different State agencies involved in the 
making of equitization policies. The micro dynamics is defined as the interactions 
between the State patrons and their subordinate enterprises over the actual 
implementation of the equitization mandate at the enterprise level. While the Fragmented 
Authoritarianism model is employed to explain the macro dynamics and various theories 
on state-enterprise interactions are applied to explain the micro dynamics given the 
assumption about a rather stable authority structure at one certain point in time; the 
framework of the Garbage Can theory is used to shed light on the interaction between the 
macro and micro dynamics when the above-mentioned assumption is no longer hold.  
 
The application of the model of dual dynamics in the SOE equitization process in 
Vietnam, however, is not assumption-free and thus having limitations of its own. First, by 
assuming that each organization unit – or State actor has coherent interests in 
equitization, the model does not attempt to look further into the power struggle within 
these organization units. For example, the conflation of the Department of Enterprise 
Finance – the coordinator in making equitization policies within the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) – as representative for MOF would not be always correct. Certain observations 
point to the tension over various, sometimes even opposite, interests within the same 
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body of Ministry of Finance, among which those of the Department of Enterprise Finance 
is just one.
17
 Another example is the ignorance of the inter-bureaucracy politics at local-
levels. The interaction among different functional departments and between them and the 
Provincial People‟s Committee, as well as between the Party and the Bureaucracy at the 
local levels proves to be more dynamic and diverse than often assumed in this thesis. 
Second, due to the limited information access and other constraints, the model also lacks 
an adequate analysis of elitist perspectives over equitization. Preliminarily empirical 
evidences imply, to a certain extent, the significant role of political leaders in the 
equitization process.
18
 Bearing these limitations in mind, the author hopes that follow-up 
research could be effectively conducted given the solid foundations well laid off in and 
important contributions made by this thesis. 
 
A Note on Methodology 
In this thesis, I use a combination of different methods, including extensive literature 
review, interviews, fieldwork, and a multiple case study. Needless to say, literature 
review plays a significant part in making the author of this thesis more familiar with the 
current scholarly on “Doi Moi” in general and SOE reform in particular. Furthermore, a 
broader literature on economic reform in transitional economies, especially the Chinese 
experience, helped me substantially in building up a solid theoretical framework for the 
particular case of Vietnam.  
                                                 
17
 Author‟s interviews with different Departments and agencies within Ministry of Finance during 
fieldtrips in Vietnam in 2007. For examples, the State Securities Committee did have different 
views over different equitization issues from those of the Department of Enterprise Finance; 
however, they complained that sometimes their views were just ignored by the Department of 
Enterprise Finance and they had to raise the issue to their Finance Deputy Minister in charge. 
18




Interviews form another equally, if not more, important part of this research. During the 
period between 2006 and 2007, I conducted about eighty interviews and talks with 
different people in different agencies, organizations, and companies, both in Singapore 
and Vietnam. I tried to take advantage of being full-time resident during my study in 
Singapore to meet up and maintain regular discussions with a number of Vietnam 
scholars as well as the then Vietnam Ambassador in Singapore. Back to Vietnam, having 
the advantage of being a former government officer at Ministry of Finance, I managed to 
meet up with people in the State organs who are directly making equitization policies and 
who are really concerned with the equitization process in Vietnam. Among these State 
agencies and other organizations are, but not limited to, various Departments at Ministry 
of Finance, including the Department for Enterprise Finance, State Securities Committee, 
and State Budget Department, State Bank of Vietnam, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Central Institute of Economic Management, Debt and Asset Trading 
Corporation, and State Capital and Investment Corporation, People‟s Committees of 
Hanoi, Bac Giang Province, and Tuyen Quang Province, including their functional 
departments in charge of finance and/or planning issues, and finally the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank in Vietnam. Discussing with people from these 
agencies and organizations helped me to better form a real picture of equitization in 
Vietnam at the peak level. The information collected from these interviews provided me 
with a solid foundation on how the politics of inter-governmental agencies actually took 




To explore the interactions between enterprises and their direct State patrons in 
implementing the equitization mandate, I conducted a small-scale case study with a 
number of SOEs going through equitization during the early 2000s. Although the case 
study method has a number of limitations
19
, it is still the most suitable approach for the 
author of this thesis due to the following reasons. First, the small scale and limited 
financial support mean that the case study method is the most relevant approach for the 
author to get into an in-depth understanding and analysis of the real-life equitization 
process at the micro-level. Furthermore, formerly being a government officer working in 
the field of finance and possessing necessary background in corporate finance and 
business administration also enable the author to herself conduct interviews with SOE 
managers of different levels and thus to enrich the data collection. Finally, instead of 
focusing on one single case, the author opted to conduct a multiple case study in order to 
avoid the common risk of making false generalization from a single-case study and to 
provide comparative perspectives from the cases.  
 
While conducting the above-mentioned multiple case study in 2007, I was lucky to have 
access to people in a number of SOEs whose equitization experience was so real and so 
vivid by the time I talked to them. Most of people that I interviewed at the firm-level 
were holding some management positions. Some hold the highest positions, the General 
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compared with other research methods such as surveys, experiments, quasi-experiments, 
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Director, Deputies, or Chief Accountant while other were responsible for the personnel 
and remuneration issues, or led the labor union in their companies. I also managed to 
include others in my interviews too, ranging from junior workers to retirees, in order to 
explore their different perspectives about the equitization that took place within their own 
companies. This helped me substantially in selecting the most relevant cases of equitized 
SOEs for the case study conducted in the thesis. Last but not least, I managed to have 
partial access to an official survey data on equitization created by an accredited research 
institute, which I used extensively to verify the findings of the selected cases that I had.  
 
Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter lays the background of the 
privatization process in Vietnam and discusses in specific the equitization process, policy 
developments, main outcomes, and issues. In so doing, the chapter highlights two 
important features of the equitization process in Vietnam – “gradualism” and “non-
linearity”. Chapter II subsequently studies different explanations offered by the current 
literature about Vietnam‟s equitization. It then discusses the main weaknesses of these 
explanations and introduces the dual dynamics model. The dual dynamics model, a 
combination of various theories drawn mainly, but not exclusively, from the Chinese 
experience, analyzes the interactions between different actors involved in the equitization 
process at both macro and micro levels as well as the interactions between two levels. 
Chapter III focuses on the power structure within the equitization process, characterizing 
it with both authority fragmentation and instability. These two features are keys in 
explaining the pattern of interactions at both macro and micro levels in the equitization 
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process. Chapter IV then investigates the macro dynamics, or the interaction among 
various State actors during the stage of formulating and/or revising equitization policies, 
through the case of establishing and restructuring Funds to support the equitization 
process. Chapter V, on the other hand, examines the micro dynamics or the interactions 
between the enterprises and their direct State supervisors over the actual implementation 
of the equitization mandate. Finally, the Conclusion will end the whole thesis with brief 
discussion of the main findings of the thesis and future research agenda. 
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Chapter I  Equitization in Vietnam: an Overview 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview about the equitization process in 
Vietnam. Despite the fact that the term “equitization” appeared in the legal texts of SOE 
reforms as early as in 1987, it took at least five years for the first batch of state 
enterprises to be equitized and another five years for equitization to finally become an 
official reform program. The equitization pace remained very slow even when the 
mandate was formalized in 1996 and only picked up two years later. The number of 
enterprises going through equitization accelerated considerably during the period 
between 1999 and 2006 but slowed down after 2006. The overall process of equitization 
has been, however, sluggish. By 2008, more than a decade of equitization, the State 
ownership in the SOE system reduced only by less than twenty percent. Vietnam‟s 
equitization is thus considered as an illustration of “gradualism” rather than a “big-bang” 
case in privatization. The chapter aims at verifying such statement about “gradualism” in 
Vietnam‟s equitization. For that purpose, the rest of this chapter is organized as follows. 
The first section, Section I.1, analyzes extensively the process of reforming state 
enterprises in Vietnam - the context that gave rise to the equitization program. Section I.2 
discusses the evolution of the equitization policy in Vietnam in details while Section I.3 
examines the equitization outcomes and main issues. Section I.4 ends the chapter with a 




I.1- The Context of Equitization in Vietnam 
I.1.1- History of State Owned Enterprises 
The history of state (owned) enterprises in Vietnam is closely attached to the history of 
the modern state of Vietnam since 1945. Despite national independence claimed by Ho 
Chi Minh, the Communist leader, on 2 September 1945, the country remained divided 
into different regions under the control of different forces. The French and Communists 
struggled over the control of the Northern half, whereas the South fell largely under the 
French control in the disguise of the monarch government. In this context, the very first 
state enterprises were then set up in the late 1940s in Viet Bac – a northern, mountainous 
area of Vietnam, by the resistance government under Ho Chi Minh‟s leadership. These 
state production units, during the resistance war between 1945 and 1954 against the 
French, produced mainly weapons, goods and services for the army and the resistance 
government. A number of enterprises working on mining, mechanics, printing, and 




I.1.1.1- The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Model and Early State-owned 
Enterprises 
Soon after the Dien Bien Phu victory in 1954, the North Vietnam, under the control of the 
Communist Party, imposed the centrally planning mechanism in the economy, commonly 
known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) model. The DRV model followed 
the Soviet approach to industrialization and planning, emphasizing the leading role of 
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State sector and the development of heavy industries with large-scale, capital-intensive 
projects undertaken mainly by state enterprises.
21
 As a result, private economic activities 
were largely banned and private enterprises were nationalized. The annual contribution of 
the private sector to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reduced sharply from more than 
30 percent in the late 1950s to less than 10 percent from 1965 onwards.
22
 It is interesting 
to note that, similar to the case of China, whereas the process of nationalization of private 
businesses in Vietnam took place in a “big-bang” manner, the reversal process of 
privatization has been rather incremental and gradual. 
 
The central state invested in setting up a number of new manufacturing factories and 
industrial zones focusing on heavy industries within the First Five Years Plan (FYP) 
between 1961 and 1965. Investment in industrial sector had resultantly grown at a rate 
three times higher than that of the agricultural sector during the same period. State 
enterprises newly established by the Central State often used imported technologies and 
machinery from the former socialist countries, especially the former Soviet Union and 
China. Due to the technological and capital advantages, these centrally managed 
enterprises quickly dominated most of strategic industries and services sectors in the 
economy. State enterprises established by local governments (provinces and centrally-
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managed municipalities) operated, on a contrary, in the trading and services sectors under 




The share of industrial production in national income increased from 18.2 percent in 1960 
to 24.2 percent in 1974, with most growth occurring prior to 1965.
24
 If the State and joint 
State-private sector accounted for merely 18 percent of the total industrial output of the 
North economy in 1957, they dominated the total industrial output by the early 1960s. 
Similar picture was seen in the agricultural sector with the dominant role of 
cooperatives.
25
 The escalating war with the Southern regime during the next decade 
between 1965 and 1975 caused serious damages to a number of large-scale, central state 
enterprises. However, most of small and medium-sized state enterprises under the local 
governments were rather safe and received investment from the local governments in 
order to meet the local demands. Vu Minh Trai (2000) summarizes the main 
characteristics of the state-enterprise system in the North during this period as: (i) non-
profit orientation, (ii) serving mainly the demand of the warfare economy, (iii) planning 
mechanism, working under the “top-down” system of orders; and (iv) no clear 
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Table 1.1: GDP Composition during 1960-1975 by economic sectors (unit: percent)
27
 
Economic sector 1959 1965 1975 
GDP, of which accounted by:  100 100 100 
- State enterprises and State-private joint ventures  38.4 45.5 51.7 
- Cooperatives 28.2 44.6 40 
- Individuals, Households, Private sector 33.4 9.9 8.3 
 
As mentioned earlier, the DRV model legalized only two economic components: the 
State sector in industrial production and trading and the cooperatives in agriculture and 
related services. In this regard, state enterprises were considered just as production units 
that produced goods and services for the State in accordance with the legally binding 
State plans.
28
 The State, through its top planning apparatus, i.e. Uy Ban Ke hoach Nha 
nuoc or the State Planning Commission (SPC), and its local branches, in fact, set all the 
following targets for state enterprises: (i) total output value; (ii) output of main products; 
(iii) technical advancement; (iv) growth rate of labor productivity; (v) total wage fund; 
(vi) capital investment; (vii) total number of workers; and (viii) main material and 
equipment. State enterprises were, during this period, provided with both fixed and non-
fixed capital directly from the State Budget, and considered as entirely owned and 
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There existed two sorts of inherent weaknesses within such a rigid planning system of the 
DRV model in North Vietnam during the period between 1954 and 1975. First, problems 
were found during the process of formulating the plans. The plans were prepared by the 
State supervising agencies, not by the production units or state enterprises, and thus they 
often did not reflect the real needs and capacity of both the economy and the producers. 
Second and more importantly, the plans, once formulated, were never fully implemented. 
The State was unable to secure the sufficient amount of inputs and materials for its 
enterprises due to various difficulties ranging from the limited financial capacity to the 
destructive impact of the war. In addition, excessive centralized economic planning and 
disregard of market mechanisms led to substantial constraints on the state enterprises, 
repressed their autonomy and initiatives, and created no incentives for them to strive for 
efficiency. As a result, the state enterprises faced the problem of low morale and serious 
inefficiency. In most of the cases, the state enterprises did not meet the legally binding 
output targets set in the plans, or their products and goods were of very low quality.
30
  
   
These inherent weaknesses of the DRV model were deepened by the warfare conditions. 
The impact of the warfare on the Northern economy was multifaceted, but overall, the 
protracted military struggles during the period between 1945 and 1975 contributed 
significantly to Vietnam‟s sharp decline in income per capita and thus its relative position 
in the region.
31
 Within the above-mentioned period, the two wars, i.e. the Resistance war 
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against the French and the war against the Southern, US-backed regime, physically 
damaged the manufacturing factories and other production units in the North to a 
substantial extent and thus imposed hazardous impacts on the Northern socio-economic 
foundations.
32
 During the intensive fighting period from 1972 to 1975, paddy production 
fell from 7.1 million tonnes in 1972 to 5.3 million tonnes in 1975, while labor 
productivity fell by 11 percent during the same period. In addition, during the whole 
period between 1945 and 1975, the North had to concentrate most of its energies on 
military struggles and thus a heavy commitment of resources directed to military 
activities. Investment priorities were given to serve the needs of the war, particularly, to 





Given that environment, in order to survive, SOEs, instead of being merely the 
implementer of the State plans, opted for a number of informal survival strategies, 
including barter and networking among each other, seeking patronage from the local 
governments, or interfaced with informal market arrangements, “cho den” or black 
markets. Interestingly, these survival skills were employed by Vietnam‟s SOEs to even a 
greater extent than those in China, Russia, or other former communist countries, perhaps 
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Markets, or “black markets” in the formally centralized, planning economy of Northern 
Vietnam, were in fact never erased completely but existed illegally to provide consumers 
with goods and services insufficiently produced in the State plans.
35
 Goods sold on 
“black markets”, dominated by illegally tu thuong or private traders, at prices which were 
many times higher than the official prices. Sources of these goods came from either 
illegal smuggling or state enterprises. Due to such huge differences between the official 
prices and the “black markets” prices, there existed a close connection between private 
traders, State officers, and State enterprises to ensure the provision of goods and services 
for the “black markets”. For example, state enterprises, instead of using the inputs 
provided by the state to produce the legally binding output target, sold them to private 
traders at much higher prices than the nominal prices set by the state. Or state enterprises 
also sought to illegally sell their final products on the “black markets”. In either case, 
state enterprises just simply reported to their State supervisors that they could not meet 
the output targets due to some other “objective” reasons. The collaboration between state 
enterprises and their direct state supervisors shielded the state enterprises, in most of the 
cases, from being penalized for not meeting the output targets. The price differences, now 
becoming huge economic rents, were certainly shared among the private traders, state 
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Criteria The State and joint State-private sector 
Percentage of GDP (%) 47.5% 
Percentage of the total industrial output (%) 72.2% 
Total number of state enterprises, of which 1,375 enterprises 
- under central management 337 enterprises 
- under local governments 1,020 enterprises 
 
Due to the combination of the above-mentioned factors, the model of orthodox Marxist-
Leninist, centrally planning economy in North Vietnam was not fully implemented and 
thus “was never effectively subjected to the same level of centralized control as in the 
former USSR and Eastern European centrally planned economies”.38 The net result was 
that, during the wartime, the State proved unable to control economic activities to the 
degree it planned while the state enterprises, instead of being just implementers of the 
state plans, went beyond that boundary to become more decentralized and possess a 
certain degree of managerial autonomy. Such characteristics, together with the flux of 





I.1.1.2- National Re-unification and the State Enterprises  
The North-South war ended in 1975 with the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) claiming 
control over the whole country. The Communists decided to expand the DRV model 
nation-wide, leading to a wave of confiscation and nationalization of Southern private 
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businesses after 1975. The end of the war also fostered the establishment of new state 
enterprises, especially at provincial and district levels. As a result, the number of 
centrally managed state enterprises increased from 620 enterprises in 1976 to 740 in 
1985, whereas the number of locally managed state enterprises jumped from 1,400 in 
1976 to 2,000 in 1980 and 2,700 in 1985.
40
 The private sector existed mainly under the 
form of household business activities, whereas large-scale private businesses were 
banned. The state enterprises had since had monopoly in all important economic sectors 





Table 1.3: State enterprises by levels of management
42
 
Number of state enterprises 1976 1980 1985 
Under the central management of line ministries 620 714 740 
Under the local management of provincial and centrally-
managed municipal authorities 
1,373 2,000 2,742 
Total number of state enterprises  1,993 2,714 3,842 
 
Table 1.4: Growth rate of the State sector, 1976-1985
43
 
Sectors Units of calculation 1976 1985 Annual, 
Average 
Growth Rate 
State owned enterprises and other units 
State owned 
Plantations  




Enterprises  1,913 3,060 6% 
State-owned retail 
outlet 
Shops/retail outlets  6,663 13,087 9.6% 
Gross Domestic 
Products  
VND millions (according 
to 1982 fixed prices)  
76,100 121,200 5.9% 
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 compiled from various sources, such as Vu Minh Trai (2000) and Luong Xuan Quy (2001) 
43




Centrally managed state enterprises were often major manufacturing factories producing 
important goods and services such as oil and gas, electricity, coal, machinery and 
equipment while state enterprises under the management of local governments were 
mainly engaged in producing consumer goods, foodstuff, and farm tools for local needs.
44
 
A form of grouping enterprises in similar sectors – Unions of Enterprises also took place 
in late 1970s with the purpose of preparing sectoral plans and assigning tasks to 
enterprises; however, these Unions played a rather unnoticeable role and did not 




I.1.2- Fence-breaking Activities and the Partial SOE Reform Efforts 
I.1.2.1- Fence-breaking Activities in State Enterprises 
In response to the above-mentioned Soviet-style policies and plans imposed by the State, 
local officers and production units, including the agricultural cooperatives and state 
enterprises, engaged in the so called “pha rao”, or fence-breaking, activities. Pha rao 
activities, dated back to the early 1960s, became increasingly popular in every corner of 
the economy since the late 1970s. By then, aids and grants from the socialist bloc to 
sustain Vietnam‟s warfare economy had been reduced substantially, clearly exposing the 
inherent weaknesses of the DRV model.  
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There has been a variation of views over fence-breaking activities in Vietnam. For some 
scholars, fence-breaking activities were private activities and spontaneous moves towards 
production and trade outside the official channel.
46
 Fforde terms these activities as 
spontaneous adaptations and bottom-up reform processes, referring to the phenomenon of 
agrarian cooperatives and industrial SOEs expanding their own account activities by 
diverting resources into areas that permitted them to access to free markets. The existence 
of fence-breaking activities thus led to the existence and growth of free markets in the 
DRV model and the eroded power of state monopolies. As a consequence, an important 
characteristic of Vietnam before the 1980s is the “coexistence of planned and unplanned 
activities, quite illegally, but nevertheless to a certain extent accepted”.47 Others adopted 
a more statist view about fence-breaking activities, pointing to the very trial nature of 
fence-breaking activities before they were officially sanctioned by the State decrees. 
These scholars, including a number of leading Vietnamese intellectuals and economists, 
asserted that fence-breaking activities or local initiatives in violation with formal State 
rules and regulations, in actuality, were often received some sort of guarantee from some 
top political leaders in the Politburo. There thus existed some “embryonic” collaboration 
between some top political leaders, heads of local authorities, and economic units in 
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Fence-breaking activities started in the agricultural cooperatives as “various models of 
contracts between the cooperative and individual households for output, work points and 
expenses were implemented in different localities”.49 In the North, attempts to get over 
the rigidity of the collective system emerged very early, back to even the 1960s with the 
experiment of a contractual system in Vinh Phuc province. Kim Ngoc, the then 
Provincial Party Secretary, allowed limited family-based production until he was 
disciplined by the central government.
50
 By the late 1970s, the deep reduction in foreign 
aids and grants, the involvement in Cambodia, and the border war with China had 
exhausted the flows of resources coming through the state administrative supply system. 
As mentioned earlier, the inherent weaknesses of the DRV model, namely the resource 
constraints and coordination problems, became the most visible then. Consequently, 
experiments outside the plans, or fence-breaking activities, mushroomed among state 
economic units.
51
 Doan Duy Thanh, Party General Secretary of Hai Phong city, started 
piloting Kim Ngoc‟s contractual system in a village of more than 90,000 hectares of 
agricultural land. The results were so remarkable that in 1980 the practice was allowed to 
be applied to all collectives in Hai Phong. Doan Duy Thanh was later quickly promoted 




As was mentioned earlier, state enterprises in industries and trading businesses tried to 
get around the constraints of the DRV planning system by selling or bartering their 
products among each other or on the “black markets”. They used the raised revenues to 
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buy input supplies which were not sufficiently provided by the State or to pay bonuses to 
their workers. For example, a number of state enterprises in various locations in Northern 
Vietnam attempted to set up direct transactions with either suppliers or customers with no 
intermediaries assigned by the State authorities. Or state enterprises also started working 
out extra activities outside the State plans. As a result of such mushrooming of fence-
breaking activities, state enterprises increasingly “ignored planned allocative mechanisms 
and sought out suppliers and customers, threatening central control over resource 
allocation”.53  
 
Fence-breaking activities were also numerous in the South. In the trading areas, local 
state enterprises also tried to end the state‟s central trade monopoly by developing 
regional trading corporations, especially out of Ho Chi Minh City.
54
 For example, in the 
late 1970s, when farmers refused to sell rice to the State at extremely low State 
procurement prices, the Food Production and Distribution Company in Ho Chi Minh 
City, under the support of the City‟s Party Secretary and Chairman, offered to buy rice at 
the “black market” rates, and thus was able to feed its urban population. Similarly, 
instead of producing according to the State plans, numerous SOEs managed to produce 
goods for the “black markets” and thus, supplemented cash income to their employees.55 
 
I.1.2.2- State‟s Partial Efforts to Reform the SOE System during 1979-1985 
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The State was not totally ignorant of weaknesses within the DRV model. In fact, a pilot 
program to reform the state enterprises already begun in the late 1960s with three State 
enterprises. However, as attentions were re-directed towards the deepened war with the 
Southern regime, reform efforts were not sustained in subsequent periods. Formal reform 
efforts were re-started in 1979 with the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Fourth 
Party Congress which accepted the parallel existence of the private economic sector and 
markets to a certain degree together with the centrally planning mechanism and the 
dominant public economic sector.  
 
The two main ideas of reform endorsed by the Central Committee in August 1979 were: 
(i) the contract system in agriculture which was later announced in Directive 100 in 1981 
to allow farmers to sign contracts with cooperatives and to sell their “leftover” produce 
on the free markets after completing the legally binding output targets; and (ii) the Three 
Plan system stipulated in Decree 25 in 1988, allowing state enterprises to have extra 
activities (Plans II and III) in addition to the legally binding state plans (Plan I). Decree 
25 was, therefore, one among the initial State attempts to sanction “fence-breaking” 
measures in reforming the centralized bureaucratic planning economic system.
56
 The 
result of such partial reform efforts was the recovery in state industrial output in the early 
1980s, especially in sectors and industries which were highly elastic to market demand 
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However, the State retreat its partial reform efforts towards liberalization after 1981 and 
tried to re-insert the planning system back. For example, the Fifth Party Congress in 1982 
initiated a range of reform-repressing activities, including the dropping of the often-
dubbed reformist Nguyen Van Linh, the then Party Secretary in Ho Chi Minh City, from 
the Politburo.
58
 The last straw, the “gia-luong-tien” or centralized price-wage-monetary 
reform in 1985, pushed Vietnam into one of its most severe financial and economic crisis 
in the twentieth century. Instead of abolishing the two-tier price system and let the 
markets play their roles in setting the prices of goods and services, the State decided to 
adjust the official prices of key commodities at “acceptable” levels, aiming at both 
reducing the State subsidies for state enterprises on the one hand and avoiding any 
sudden increases in the prices of consumer goods and services on the other hand. The 
price adjustment was accompanied with wage increases and the issuance of new 
currency. However, problems existed both in the formulation of such policy as well as its 
implementation, causing disastrous impacts on the economy. Within a very short period 
of time, state enterprises suddenly found themselves keeping inadequate cash. They thus 
needed to borrow more in order to finance their continued production activities. Prices, 
wages, capital supply, and government deficits all suddenly increased rapidly, creating 
powerful inflationary pressures and destroying the value of the Vietnamese dong. At its 
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I.1.3- “Doi Moi” and the SOE Reform Agenda 
Responding to the crisis, in the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the then newly-
selected Party General Secretariat Nguyen Van Linh announced the implementation of 
“Doi Moi” strategy, or reform and renovation. Doi Moi sought to renew the DRV model 
and open up the economy to the private sector and the outside world. Year 1986 was then 
often hailed by most Vietnam researchers and scholars as “a turning point in the reform 
process”.60 It indeed marked one of the most important moments in the modern history of 
Vietnam. The significance of the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 was reflected through the 
fact that: although the transitional process and reform efforts did take place earlier, it was 
the Sixth Party Congress that confirmed the dominance of market-oriented reforms. 
During the first half of the 1980s, back and forth efforts to reform the state enterprises 
system were seen in different, sometimes opposite, directions with high possibility of 
returning to the rigid planning system. However, from the late 1986 onwards, the 




Although Doi Moi is often regarded as Vietnam‟s own reaction to its domestic crisis, it, 
by all means, took place in a rather “favorable” international politico-economic context. 
At the time Vietnam started to reform its centrally-planning system, the trend for reform 
had already emerged and well-established on the global scale.
62
 This trend, for the post-
communist countries, was meant to solve the systemic crisis within the socialist 
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mechanism, and thus had different impacts on Vietnam over different stages of Doi Moi. 
It would be fair to say that Vietnam, in the beginning of its Doi Moi process, was mainly 
influenced by what happened in the then former Soviet Union until the late 1980s, 
although it also kept a close watch on the Chinese experience in reform. However, since 
the early 1990s when the former Soviet Union collapsed while the Sino-Vietnam 
relationship was re-normalized, the trajectory and content of reform in Vietnam have 
shared explicitly similar features with those of China, especially in the field of SOE 
reform.
63
   
 
I.1.3.1- The Evolving Agenda of “Doi Moi” 
The early reform program initiated by the Sixth Party Congress in late 1986 sought “to 
stabilize the economy and to continue to construct the prerequisites needed for socialist 
industrialization in the next stage” through three key programs of development of staples 
and non-staples food production, consumer goods production, and exports. In addition, 
the reform program also sought to shift the economic activities towards more commercial 
basis, allowing voluntary exchanges based upon calculation by both parties of the 
economic costs and benefits involved. Doi Moi tried to strengthen the State and collective 
sectors on the one hand while grasping the potential of other economic components on 
the other hand.
64
 To realize these targets, a series of decrees between 1987 and 1988 were 
issued to improve the operation of internal markets, conferred greater freedom upon state 
enterprises and gave back much economic power to farmer families in cooperatives. 
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Policy towards the non-state sectors was also liberalized, though in practice very little 
changed. Since 1986, the reform package had been evolving over time, covering agrarian 
decollectivization and price liberalization, SOEs and banking reforms, trade 
liberalization, facilitating the development of a private sector, attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), fiscal decentralization and taxation reform, public administration, and 
other areas.  
 
Doi Moi proved to be a remarkable economic success. From one of the poorest countries 
in the world, Vietnam has become one among the fastest growing economies in the 
region as well as in the world. Economic achievements started to be noticed since 1989, 
when Vietnam, for the first time, produced food excess and exported rice. Once suffered 
from serious food shortage and famine, Vietnam rose to one of the top rice exporters in 
the world, just in the matter of a few years. The revival was not only witnessed in the 
agricultural activities but also industrial and services sectors during most of the 1990s, 
coupled with massive inflows of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) pouring into the 
country. As a consequence, Vietnam reached consistently high GDP growth rates during 
the first half of the 1990s at around 7 to 8 percent on average. The GDP growth rate 
dropped during the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1998, but not lower than 4 percent 
per annum. The economy revived by the late 1990s and maintained at about 6 to 7 
percent rate of growing in the early 2000s. Macroeconomic conditions have been kept 
stabilized with controlled inflation (often below 10 percent as compared to the peak of 
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I.1.3.2- SOE Reform in “Doi Moi” 
For state enterprises, reform measures can be grouped into the following categories: (i) 
commercialization; (ii) re-registration, re-arrangement, liquidation and mergers; (iii) 
corporatization; and (iv) equitization.
66
 The former two measures were mainly carried out 
during the first ten years since the launch of Doi Moi in 1986. Commercialization aimed 
at subjecting state enterprises towards a more commercial basis through granting 
increased autonomy and subsequently correspondent responsibility to State-owned 
enterprises over their financial performance. Re-registration, re-arrangement, liquidation, 
and mergers meanwhile sought to streamline the SOE system by requesting enterprises to 
re-register with their State supervisors. Through this exercise, inefficient and loss-making 
SOEs were forced to close down or merge with profitable and often bigger enterprises of 
the same sectors. Corporatization and equitization, after a few years of trial period, 
became official measures to restructure the state enterprises system in 1994 and 1996, 
respectively. Corporatization sought to form large-scale state-owned conglomerates 
through grouping existing enterprises of same sectors and purposes. In essence, the first 
three reform measures deal mainly with the “operational” principles of the central-
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planning economy in Vietnam, which was to grant increased autonomy to the managers 
in state enterprises, reduce the interventions by different State agencies in their daily 
operations, trim down the number of state enterprises, and carry out organizational 
restructuring in these state enterprises to make them more efficient and market-oriented. 
The last measure, equitization or transfer of the public ownership in state enterprises into 





1987-1990: Commercialization of state enterprises 
During the period between 1987 and 1990, the Ministers‟ Council issued Decision 217 in 
1987, Resolution 50 in 1988 to revise and amend Decision 217, and finally Resolution 27 
in 1989 on the Statute of State Enterprises.
68
 These legal documents tried to deal with 
various issues in the management of the state enterprise system, including the planning, 
inputs and outputs, cost-accounting practices, prices and pricing, credits and subsidies, 
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distribution, labor, salary and recruitment, and state management in state enterprises.
69
 
State enterprises during this period were basically classified into two main categories: (i) 
state enterprises producing strategic goods and services grouped under the thirty five 
unions of enterprises, and (ii) non-strategic enterprises. The former group accounted for 
about half of the total industrial output produced by the whole state-enterprise sector. 
These thirty five enterprise unions covered a wide range of areas, from coal, electricity, 
steel, chemicals, and fertilizer, transport and communications, to textiles, paper, 
household goods, and electronic products. As a result, the State still kept its tight control 
over this group of enterprises through three legally binding target: (i) quantity and quality 
of strategic products distributed to specific purposes stipulated by the State (State 
Planning Commission), including the defense and export purposes, (ii) total output/sales 
value, including the export volume, and (iii) contributions to the State Budget. For the 
remaining, non-strategic enterprises, only one legally binding target- the contribution to 
the State Budget – was now assigned.70 All in all, the reduction of the number of legally 
binding targets from nine in the early 1980s to three for state enterprises in strategic 
sectors and one for the remaining enterprises marked a substantial step towards 
abolishing the planning mechanism.  
 
In addition, state subsidies to state enterprises, including the price subsidies through the 
dual pricing system, were abolished. The prices of most of goods and services, except 
some certain strategic products, were allowed to be determined by the markets. New cost-
accounting practices were applied in the system of state enterprises in replacement for the 
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previous accounting system. Prior to 1987, an enterprise‟s profits were often pre-
determined as a percentage markup on approved input costs and thus higher costs 
automatically implied higher profits for the enterprise. In the new cost-accounting 





Enterprise managers were also given increased autonomy in making decisions related to 
production and investment, inputs procurement, output distribution, and recruitment. For 
example, regarding the recruitment issue, in contrast to the previously rigid plan on the 
number of workers and the value of their wages imposed by the State superiors, state 
enterprises were now able to recruit as many workers as they wished provided they 




Decision 217 also decentralized the State authority to local governments to a substantial 
degree by allowing them, including the district and communal authorities, to set up their 
own SOEs. Such decentralization resulted in a rapid increase in the total number of SOEs 
from slightly above 3,000 in 1985 to more than 12,000 by the end of the 1980s, among 
which 60 per cent were state enterprises under the management of provincial and district 
authorities. The majority of these enterprises was of very small capital scale and often 
experienced financial troubles after a few years of operation. Most of local state 
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enterprises established by local governments were not capitalized by the State Budget but 




Assessments of SOE reform efforts in the late 1980s therefore paint a mixed picture. On 
the one hand, the increased autonomy granted to state enterprises helped a number of 
them to operate more efficiently and profitably. However, a majority of state enterprises, 
especially the local ones, turned into inefficient and made consecutive losses. The 
industrial output produced by the state sector recorded a negative growth rate in 1989, 




Table 1.6: Industrial Output Growth (%), 1989-1993
75
 
Year/Timeline 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Industry: share of 
GDP 
 19.0 19.8 21.7 21.5 
Total industrial output -3.3 3.1 10.4 17.1 12.1 
State industry -2.5 6.1 11.8 20.6 13.3 
- Central state 
enterprises 
5.9 15.3 15.5 23.1 14.1 
- Local state 
enterprises 
-36.1 -20.0 -41.6 -31.1 -2.3 
Private (non-State) 34.5 10.4 26.7 16.9 10.2 
 
By 1988, it was evident that partial reform through decentralization and management 
improvement in the state enterprises was not sufficient. About 4,600 out of 12,000 state 
enterprises in 1989 were making losses.
76
 At the end of 1991 the overdue debts owed by 
state enterprises to state banks and among each other were estimated at about 10 trillion 
VND (or US$ 900 million), equal to 11 percent of the country‟s gross social product and 
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nearly equivalent to Vietnam‟s total 1990 export earnings. About 12,000 state enterprises 
still held 75 percent of the country‟s assets and used 86 percent of the bank credit, but 
they generated only 26 percent of gross domestic product and could provide jobs for less 
than one-third of the country‟s labor force.77 In addition, Vietnam‟s inability to obtain 
sufficient amounts of foreign aid and the demise of Soviet assistance in the early 1990s 
also made the task of further reforming the state enterprises more urgent.  
 
1991-1994: Re-registration, re-arrangement, liquidation and mergers of state enterprises 
Re-registration, re-arrangement, liquidation and mergers thus started in 1991 in order to 
tackling the issue of restructuring state enterprises. To provide guidelines for this process, 
the Ministers‟ Council issued a number of decisions and decrees, among which Decision 
315 in 1990 and Decision 388 in 1991 were the most noticeable.
78
  By 1994, the number 
of state enterprises was brought down to around 6,300, after 2,000 were forced to close 
down and 3,000 to merge with each other. Another wave of re-arrangement was 
promulgated in 1994, which further brought down the number of state enterprises to 
5,500 by the late 1997. This measure also boosted the average capitalization scale for 
SOEs from VND 3.1 billion before 1990 to VND 11.5 billion by end 1997, while 




Despite the above-mentioned results, the reform measures applied during the early 1990s 
still failed to improve the efficiency of the state enterprises to a substantial extent. By the 
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mid 1990s, only about 20 to 25 per cent of the state enterprises, most of which were 
central enterprises, managed to make profits whereas at least 40 percent were making 
losses. For those able to make profits, the ratio of profit to fixed capital reached the 
average rate of only seven per cent and merely three percent for industrial production. 
Overall, state enterprises during this period could only operate at less than half of their 
expected capacity. Meanwhile, loss-making enterprises accounted for almost 40 percent 





The question of how to improve the efficiency of the state enterprises thus was not 
simply solved by commercializing and trimming down the state enterprises. The thorny 
issues of in reforming state enterprises, i.e. the unclear ownership structure and 
inefficient corporate governance, remained untouched.
81
 For example, one of the most 
urgent problems with the state enterprises was attenuated ownership. State enterprises 
were officially owned by the State, all the assets and capital were provided by and 
belonged to the State. However, in reality, the ambiguous owner, the State, did not point 
to anyone in specific, leading to basic problems of the principal-agent relationships. Most 
of State assets and capital provided to enterprises were not maintained and exploited 
properly. Misuses and losses of state assets and capital became common. One of leading 
research institutes in Vietnam makes the following comments on the use of State assets 
and capital in state enterprises during this period:  
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“The situation of rolled-over debts, non-performing loans and payment defaults 
was very popular and serious among state enterprises. During the past few years, 
many enterprises took the advantages of certain loopholes in the new management 
system, which was incomplete and incomprehensive, in order to buy and sell the 
same state assets several times to get illegal profits, to make false revenues 
claims, to distribute goods improperly within the enterprises in order to benefit a 
few individuals at the loss of state assets… Enterprise finance and state assets 
thus had never been so mis-managed …”82  
 
In addition to the misuse of state assets and capital, state enterprises also collaborated 
with local cadres and local branches of state-owned banks to secure bank loans in 
replacement for dwindled state subsidies. As was mentioned earlier, the overdue debts 
owed by state enterprises to state banks and among each other reached 10 trillion VND 
(or US$ 900 million) by the end 1991, equal to 11 percent of the gross domestic product 
and nearly equivalent to Vietnam‟s total 1990 export earnings.83 
 
Corporatization 
Given the increasingly urgent context of reforming state enterprises by the mid 1990s, the 
State made its move first with the official mandate of corporatization. The Prime Minister 
issued Decision 90 and 91 in 1994 to transform former unions of enterprises and General 
Corporations as well as to establish new General Corporations in strategic sectors. The 
main purpose was to up-scale strategic state enterprises into a model similar to the South 
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Korea‟s chaebols.84 The new model of General Corporations and business groups (for the 
purpose of the thesis, which are thereafter referred under the common name of General 
Corporations) could be placed under the direct management of the Prime Minister (91-
GCs) or line Ministries and local governments (90-GCs).
85
 State enterprises grouped 
under those GCs become their dependent members, reporting directly to the GCs. GCs 
were headed by a Board of Management, daily run by a Board of Directors, and 
supervised by an Inspection Board. Most of these executive positions were appointed by 
the Prime Minister for 91-GCs and line Ministers and the Provincial People‟s Committee 
(PPC) Chairmen for 90-GCs.
86
 By late 1990s, there were seventeen 91-GCs and more 
than seventy 90-GCs in Vietnam, with nearly 2,000 enterprise members across the 




The Millennium turn marked a second wave of corporatization, in which GCs were 
required to transform into business groups or holding companies (also called “mother-
child” model in Vietnam). The mother companies – transformed from GCs – would make 
financial investments in their child companies (subsidiary and/or associate companies) 
based on sound feasibility studies, instead of providing capital subsidies to their SOE 
members as GCs often previously did based on administrative priorities and orders. The 
mother-child model was set as the preparatory stage for GCs to transform fully into 
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 By mid 2006, seven 91-GCs completed the transformation into 
economic groups and six other 91-GCs and thirty-eight 90-GCs were allowed by the 




Table 1.7: Number of state enterprises until the mid-2000s
90
 
Number of SOEs  2001 2005 
Central SOEs n-a 307 
Local SOEs n-a 1160 
91 GCs (members) 17 (591) 17 (301) 
90 GCs (members) 79 (1014) 79 (408) 
Note: n-a: data non available 
The numbers of 90-GC and 91-GC members in the bracket dropped due to equitization and other 
transformation measures such as merger and acquisition, closure, etc. 
 
I.2- Equitization Policies: Origin and Evolution 
I.2.1- The Pilot Equitization Program: 1987-1995 
Intentions to equitize SOEs were initially mentioned in the blueprints of the Vietnam 
Communist Party (VCP) as early as in late 1980s under such terms as “transformation of 
forms of ownership”, “transformation into other forms of ownership (including leasing to 
collectives or individuals”, or “allowing collectives or individuals to lease or buy”91. Pilot 
equitization program was then proposed by the Government in its first official decree to 
reform the state enterprises system during the Doi Moi period, Decision 217 in 1987.
92
 
However, no state enterprises were equitized then. Explaining the reason why such a 
                                                 
88
 Interview with Dr. Tran Tien Cuong, Head of the Board on Enterprise Reform and 
Development Studies, Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) by VnExpress on 
August 2004, access online at http://www.vnexpress.net/GL/Kinh-doanh/2004/08/3B9D5ADC/ 
89
 NSCERD report, 2006 
90
 compiled from various sources, including MOF (2006) and NSCERD (2006) 
91
 Various resolutions of the Sixth VCP Congress meetings during 1986-1990, access at Vietnam 
Communist Party‟s website: www.cpv.org.vn 
92
 Article 22, Decision 217, 1987 
  
54 
policy failed to take off during the period, two scholars from Ministry of Finance, Hoang 
Cong Thi and Phung Thi Doan, point to the following three reasons: (i) by late 1980s, the 
need to equitize was not such urgent due to a still considerable extent of state subsidies 
provided to state enterprises to cover up the inherent weaknesses of the system; (ii) lack 
of thorough understanding from the top leaders towards local cadres about equitization, 
or privatization in fact, and how to do it in the context of Vietnam; and finally, and (iii) 
lack of a consensus within the Communist Party and the society over the necessity of 




As a result, such a pilot equitization policy, hailed by the two Ministry of Finance 
officers as mature reform measure by then, was stalled. The pilot equitization program 
was once again mentioned in the Decision 143 by the Ministers‟ Council in May 1990. 
This legal text went further than Decision 217 by specifying in details the objectives and 
procedures to equitize state enterprises. However, again, after two years of issuance, the 
implementation of this legal document remained on paper only. Meanwhile, as observed 
by some scholars and policymakers, during this period, a spontaneous process of 
equitization did take off at a number of state enterprises in various forms, causing 
problems for the authorities in giving proper treatment to these “spontaneously equitized” 
companies.
94
 Hoang and Phung, again, point to a number of factors that lead to such 
reality: (i) the lack of consensus and commitment among the Party and State leaders; (ii) 
inadequate propaganda and explanation, leading to misunderstanding or lack of 
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understanding about equitization at local levels; and (iii) resistance at local levels due to 




The fact that an equitization program, albeit on an experimental scale, could finally take 
off in late 1991 and early 1992 was due to a combination of factors. The domestic factors 
included an inefficient State sector worsened with the cut-off of foreign aids as well as 
the emergence or already existence of a private ownership pattern requiring the State 
acceptance and recognition. The external factors consisted of the fall of the former Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the reform process taking place in 
China, and the attention and advices given by international communities and international 




The take off of the pilot equitization program was originated from, first and foremost, the 
pressure caused by an inefficient state-enterprise system on the State Budget. As Fforde 
and de Vylder asserted, “the question of privatization was thus not only, or even 
primarily, an ideological issue in Vietnam, but “budgetary considerations appeared to be 
more important”.97 Although officially the state enterprises contributed up to almost two 
thirds of the budget revenues, only a few of them did so while the rest were either at 
losses or making no profits. Vu Thanh Tu Anh also confirmed that the government 
perceived equitization as necessary due to the need to reduce “the fiscal burden imposed 
by inefficient SOEs” as well as to improve the performance of the state enterprises which 
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also reflected “the credibility and legitimacy of the government”. 98 As mentioned earlier, 
by the end of 1991, the overdue debts owed by state enterprises to state banks and to each 
other were estimated at about 10 trillion VND (or US$ 900 million), equivalent to 11 
percent of the 1990 GDP and nearly equivalent to Vietnam‟s total 1990 export earnings. 
About 12,000 SOEs still held 75 percent of the country‟s assets and used 86 percent of 
the bank credit, but they generated only 26 percent of gross domestic product and could 
provide jobs for less than one-third of the country‟s labor force.99 
 
External factors also contributed substantially to the take-off of the pilot equitization 
program in the late 1991. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and consequently 
former socialist bloc in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s generated a mixed impact on 
Vietnam. On the one hand, the reduction in aids from the former Soviet Union and the 
COMECON bloc, and later the total cut-off in the early 1990s pushed Vietnam to further 
reform their cumbersome and loss-making SOEs with heavier measures, including 
equitization.
100
 On the other hand, the rapid collapse of the former Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s as a result of “big bang” reform measures, including a wave of massive 
privatization did send a strong warning to Vietnam‟s political leaders against any 




The role of international financial institutions, especially the International Monetary 
Fund, was also likely to be important, although their formally advisory role was not yet 
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recognized during this period. Allegedly, some IMF senior consultants, including one 
Vietnamese, had provided consultancy to the then Deputy Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, 
who was in charge of economic matters.
102
 Equitization, or privatization, was no doubt 
always given high priority on the IMF‟s consulting table. A researcher at the Central 
Institute of Economic Management, one among the key think-tanks advising the 
Ministers‟ Council during the late of the 1980s and the early of the 1990s, recalled that 
seminars and workshops were held and sponsored by foreign sources on the topic of 
privatization, presenting experiences from various transitional economies, including 




Advocates for equitization among liberal thinkers and intellectuals were also clearly 
reflected in research papers and studies during the period. For example, a policy paper by 
Professor Le Dang Doanh, the then Head of the above-mentioned Central Institute of 
Economic Management (CIEM) in 1991 also discussed rather in details and confidently a 
“privatization” program when the measure was just nurtured and not yet announced by 
the centre-party state.
104
 The main rationale for an equitization process to take off in 
Vietnam, according to Professor Le, was due to the fact that there were “no big capitalists 
in Vietnam, so that privatization of state owned enterprises will mainly take the form of 
shareholding companies”. 105  
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Another paper by Do Duc Dinh provided an excellent summary of different stands on 
solutions to the problem of the state sector in Vietnam in general, and the SOE system in 
particular between the end of the 1980s to the early of the 1990s. There seemingly existed 
a coincident consensus among well-known Vietnamese scholars and observers during 
that period over the necessity of transferring (a major) part of the state enterprises into 
shareholding companies, which was also strongly advocated by Do, after a specific and 
persuasive critique on the poor performance of state enterprises. It is worth noting that 
Do did mention the experiences of other developing countries, including that of China, as 




Do‟s paper reflects the heated debate by the end 1980s and early 1990s, not only confined 
within the academic circle or bureaucratic agencies, but cross-agencies and institutes as 
well, over the necessity and possibility of privatization in Vietnam. And while the 
academia, to some extent, reached unanimous consensus, the party-state apparatus 
seemed reluctant and sought modified explanations or alternatives that might serve their 
benefits better. In this context, the Party‟s acceptance to implement a pilot equitization 
program in 1991 might be signs of a compromise made by the State under the pressures 
from various factors pushing for privatization. 
 
The Second Plenum of the Seventh Party Congress in December 1991 thus endorsed the 
pilot program of equitization. In this plenum, the Party tried to clarify such terms as 
“equitization” and “transformation of 100 percent state-owned-enterprises into 
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shareholding companies”, laying the grounds for the then Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet to 
issue Decision 202 in 1992 to enforce the experimental equitization process. Occasional 
pushes for acceleration of equitization mandate were made during the trial period from 
1992 to 1996, but the focus was still on small- and medium-sized, non-strategic 
enterprises and on the equitization of parts of these enterprises only. The attempt to form 
large conglomerates (including banks and other financial institutions) following the 
Korean‟s chaebol model since 1994 and their consequent reforms into economic groups, 
holding companies, or parent-child models further strengthened such perception among 
these enterprises.
107
 The common perception during this period among not only state 
enterprises but also their supervisors and other State agencies was that the scopes of the 
two reform measures, equitization and corporatization, were mutually exclusive, covering 




I.2.2- Formalization of the Equitization Mandate: 1996-1998 
Despite sluggish implementation, equitization was included in the agenda of the Eighth 
Party Congress in 1996 and subsequently formalized as an official mandate in the same 
year. However, the tone of the Ninth Party Congress‟ political report was still 
conservative, considering equitization mainly as “the policy to equitize part of SOEs in 
order to mobilize capital and create incentives for these state enterprises to exploit and 
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develop the State assets in their enterprises efficiently”.109 Such conservative stance 
against a massive process equitization was then well reflected in the Governmental 
Decree 28 issued later in 1996 to enforce the nation-wide implementation of the 
equitization mandate.  
 
Decree 28 in 1996 was rather simple and not much different from the legal document that 
regulated the trial equitization process, Decision 202 in 1992. It stated two objectives for 
the equitization process, which were to mobilize capital from the private sector and to 
improve the management in the system of state enterprises. In so doing, the equitization 
mandate was applied only on the whole body or parts of small and medium-sized state 
enterprises which the State did not need to retain 100 percent ownership and which were 
profitable at the equitization time.
110
 Only Vietnamese citizens and legal entities were 
allowed to buy shares from equitized companies; whereas the pilot sales of shares to 
foreigners should be subject to the Prime Minister‟s approvals in case-by-case basis. The 
division of responsibilities among relevant state agencies regarding the equitization was 
as follows: (i) the direct State supervisors, i.e. line Ministries for central state enterprises, 
Provincial People‟s Committees for local state enterprises, and General Corporations for 
their members, were in charge of selecting companies for equitizing and approving their 
equitization plan for enterprises of less than VND 3 billion in capital; (ii) the Prime 
Minister was in charge of approving the equitization plan for state enterprises of between 
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3 and 10 billion dongs in capital; and (iii) Ministry of Finance was in charge of approving 
the pre-equitization valuation of the equitizing enterprises. The proceeds collected from 
the equitization process, after deducting all the costs, would be centrally managed by the 
Ministry of Finance. Equitization proceeds would be used for non-current expenditure 




I.2.3- Equitization as a Main Reform Measure: 1998-2001 
Policy changes to accelerate the equitization process were introduced in the mid 1998. 
Resolution 04 of the Fourth Plenum of the Eighth Central Party Congress in 1998 marked 
a milestone in the making of equitization policies in two ways. First, it sought to push the 
sluggish equitization process with a number of changes to the equitization policy. 
Second, the Resolution, for the first time, made rather detailed and specific requirements 
regarding these revisions.
112
 Subsequently, the Government issued Decree 44 to follow 
up with the Party‟s Resolution in late 1998. Decree 44 marked both the continuity with 
and break-away from Decree 28 in 1996. Basically, the equitization process still aimed at 
mobilizing the private capital and improving the corporate governance system among 
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state enterprises. However, the scope of equitization was expanded to cover virtually all 
state enterprises regardless of their capital scale. In particular, state enterprises of more 
than VND 10 billion in capital could go for equitization if they did not belong to the 
category of state enterprises which the State needed to keep 100 percent ownership. The 
authority to select, approve, and supervise the equitization process in state enterprises 
was also decentralized, allowing State agencies to have more autonomy and influence 
over the fate of the enterprises under their patronage. The incumbent State supervisors in 
state enterprises, i.e. line Ministries, local States, or GCs, were also allowed to represent 
the State in managing the remaining State capital in equitized enterprises. Most 
importantly, the local governments were allowed to use the proceeds collected from the 
equitization process for the following purposes: (i) training and retraining for workers at 
state enterprises, (ii) subsidizing for redundant workers in equitized state enterprises, (iii) 
supplementing capital for existing state enterprises operating in prioritized sectors, and 




I.2.4- An Accelerated Process: 2002-Present 
It was the Ninth Party Congress where the tendency to bureaucratize Party‟s work of 
setting equitization policies has been clearly noticed. In Resolution 03 of the Ninth 
Central Party Congress on continuing the re-arrangement, reform, development and 
enhancement of the efficiency of the SOE system in 2001, all reform measures regarding 
the system of state enterprises, including equitization, were mentioned in a very specific 
manner. In particular, the Resolution stipulated in details the objectives of equitization, 
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scope, methods of equitization, IPO methods, and many other issues.
114
 Further changes 
to the equitization policies were also made at the Tenth Party Congress in 2006 and its 




To realize these changes in the Party policies, the Government subsequently issued 
Decree 64 in 2002 to replace Decree 44 in 1998, and later in 2004 Decree 187 to replace 
Decree 64. The latest document text to regulate the equitization process was Decree 109 
issued in June 2007. In fact, Decree 64 did not differ itself much from its previous legal 
text, Decree 44 in 1998. The scope of equitization stayed almost unchanged, although the 
hope about an official inclusion of such large-scale enterprises as General Corporations 
and State owned Commercial banks into the realm of equitization was then widely 
expressed.
116
 Only until the launch of Decree 187 in 2004, the specific mentioning of 
GCs and their members within the scope of equitization was made. The tendency to be as 
specific as possible in stipulating the coverage of the equitization mandate, starting in 
2004, perhaps was to prevent state enterprises from avoiding the equitization mandate by 
switching to other reform measures such as transforming themselves into 100 percent 
state-owned limited liability companies.  
 
Also by 2004, basically there has been an important shift in the objectives of the State in 
implementing the equitization mandate: if early on the State just wanted to get rid of their 
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loss-making enterprises which were mainly small, non-important, and non-strategic, it 
later discovered that the process had been in fact profitable. The equitization proceeds 
seemed to reach remarkable levels by the mid 2000s and the State actually started to 
make the most profits in the recent phases of equitization. In a move to gain more from 
the equitization process, the State began to include the value of land use rights in the pre-
equitization value of a number of cases. This issue was actually raised in the early 2000s, 
after a number of cases in which SOEs possessed strategic locations but were 
undervalued for equitization, causing losses to the State during the equitization process. 
However, Decree 64 in 2002 just responded passively to this phenomenon by stipulating 
that only enterprises conducting businesses in the field of real estates and other 
infrastructural services were required to include the land use rights over the land they are 
renting or being assigned by the State into their pre-equitization value. Decree 187 in 
2004 moved one step further by classifying if the state enterprises rented or were 
assigned with the land without paying the rents and required the land use right to be 
included in the pre-equitization value of the enterprise in the latter case. The latest 
Decree, Decree 109, moved the furthest by considering whether the equitized enterprise 
rented the land on yearly basis or on the long-term basis. State enterprises renting the 
land on the long-term basis are thus required to include the land use right into their pre-
equitization value too and the local governments/states would be the one who decide or 




Enterprise valuation is the most salient issue in the equitization process and has triggered 
the most contentious conflicts and bargaining between and among the enterprises and 
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their supervisors. The state policy over the pre-equitization valuation has also changed 
significantly over time, reflecting efforts to match the rules and regulations to the reality 
of implementation. For example, by the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the direct State 
supervisors (line Ministries, local governments, and GCs) were in charge of determining 
the value for enterprise of less than VND 10 billion in State capital whereas MOF was 
responsible for SOEs of more than VND 10 billion. However, between 2002 and 2004, a 
Valuation Committee was set up to include representatives from the controlling agencies, 
MOF, and the enterprise to determine the pre-equitization value for the SOE due to 
widespread complaints from enterprises and others about the imprecise assessment of the 
enterprise assets and value made responsible State agencies. Since 2004, the Valuation 
Committee has then been disbanded. Instead, enterprises of less than VND 30 billion in 
value have been allowed to self-evaluate and report to their State supervisors for 
approval, while the valuation for state enterprises of more than VND 30 billion in value 




Before 1998, the proceeds collected from the equitization process were centrally 
managed by MOF for non-current expenditure purposes of development and investment. 
However, this changed during the period between 1998 and 2004, when a system of 
Equitization Funds were established at three levels of central State, local States, and 
General Corporations to collect and use the equitization proceeds. In particular, local 
States and GCs were allowed to keep the equitization proceeds collected from equitizing 
their SOEs and members and use them to pay various costs incurred in the SOE re-
arrangement and equitization process in their localities on the one hand and to invest back 





into their state enterprises on the other hand. The alleged misuse of the local Equitization 
Funds was used by the Central State in late 2004 as the main reason for its attempt of 
recentralizing these Funds into one central Equitization Fund managed by MOF, whereas 
GCs were still allowed to keep the Funds to pay for expenses incurred in the process of 
equitization and re-arrangement in their members. Decree 109 in 2007 transferred the 
management of the central Equitization Fund from MOF to the State Capital and 
Investment Corporation (SCIC), a corporation established in 2005 as a product originated 
from MOF but continuously seeking autonomy from MOF since then. 
 
For the first time, Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) issued by equitized companies, since 
2004, have been required to auction openly if at least 20% of their legal/charter capital 
are sold to outside investors based on their auctioning prices. Before 2004, shares were 
sold based on their administratively-fixed prices, which hardly reflected the true value of 
the enterprises due to the problem of asymmetric information. Consequently, equitized 





Before 1998, MOF was the sole State representative in managing the State capital in 
equitized companies. From 1998 to the mid 2000s, the incumbent supervisors in state 
enterprises were allowed to represent the State in managing the State capital share in 
equitized companies. This, however, started to change with the establishment of the State 
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Capital and Investment Corporation (SCIC) in mid-2005. In principle, SCIC would 
eventually replace line Ministries and local governments to represent the State in 
managing the State capital in equitized, independent state enterprises, including the 
equitized GCs and economic groups. The relationship between SCIC and equitized 
companies under its management thus aimed towards the commercial-oriented and 
investment-based direction, replacing the mainly administrative-based as it used to be 
between the State supervisors and enterprises.
120
   
 
Between 1996 and 2007, equitized SOEs and their employees were granted preferential 
treatments, especially during equitization and within the first two years after equitization, 
as incentives for them to be more receptive to equitization. For example, equitized 
companies were allowed to enjoy corporate tax exemptions up to 50% within the first two 
years after equitization. They were also allowed to benefit from both Equitization Funds 
and Worker Redundancy Fund to pay for costs incurred in the re-arrangement and 
equitization process. Since 2004, equitized SOEs choosing to list their shares on the 
Stock Exchanges were also granted certain preferential treatments in accordance with the 
Securities Law. State enterprises‟ employees, besides generous redundancy packages, 
were also entitled to buy shares at discounted prices. However, since the issuance of 
Decree 109 in 2007, many above-mentioned benefits have been substantially revised 
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I.3- Equitization Outcomes and Issues 
I.3.1- Equitization Outcomes  
By the end of the trial period in 1995, only five state enterprises were equitized. All these 
five companies were small in scale and belonged to unimportant sectors of the economy. 
Interestingly, these five equitized companies were not initially selected by Ministry of 
Finance and their direct supervisors for equitization, but volunteered to do so after all 
initially selected candidates refused to equitize. However, the equitization process in 
these five companies did not go smoothly. Regarding the case of equitizing the 
Refrigerator Engineering Enterprise (REE) – one among the above mentioned five 
equitized companies, MOF officials in charge recalled that they were summoned time 
and again by some top Party leaders.
122
 Or the process of equitization in HiepAn Shoe 





Table 1.9: Equitization outcomes in the first three equitized companies
124
 
Enterprises Transport Complex 
Agency (Cong ty dai 




Enterprise (Cong ty 
co dien lanh-REE) 
HiepAn Shoes 
Enterprise 
(Cong ty Giay 
Hiep An) 
Date of Equitization 1993 1993 1994 
Post-Equitization Capital Structure 
-State shares 18% 30 30 
-Shares kept by 
managers and 
employees  
72 50 35 
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Enterprises Transport Complex 
Agency (Cong ty dai 




Enterprise (Cong ty 
co dien lanh-REE) 
HiepAn Shoes 
Enterprise 
(Cong ty Giay 
Hiep An) 
-Shares kept by 
outside investors  
10 20 35 
Revenues Growth 
Rate  
146% (1994 to 1993) 
372% (1994 to 1992) 
167% („94 to „93) - 
Profit Growth Rate  181% (94 to 93) 
375% (94 to 92) 
118% („94 to „93) - 
Growth rate for 
Budget Contribution  
157% (1994 to 1993) 
263% (1994 to 1992) 
117% („94 to „93), - 
Share price increased 
by  
2-3 times 2-3 times - 
 
Only twenty five more state enterprises were equitized since the mandate was officially 
formalized in 1996 to the mid 1998. The pace of equitization, however, took off rapidly 
since the late 1998 with the average number of enterprises that went through equitization 
reaching up to 200 annually during the period between 1999 and 2002. The process was 
further accelerated with more than 700 enterprises completing equitization in each of the 
years 2004 and 2005.
125
 The number of equitized SOEs, however, dropped sharply since 
late 2006, to just slightly above 100 in 2006 and 2007, and even to merely 70 in the first 
11 months of 2008. Regarding the target to complete the equitization process for about 
950 enterprises by the latest 2010, Governmental sources recently indicated in the latter 
half of 2008 that this target might be no longer feasible.
126
 By the mid 2008, the number 
of equitized SOEs reached 4,500 enterprises and dependent units, accounting for 75 
percent of the total enterprises going through re-arrangement during this process. Among 
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these almost 4,400 equitized SOEs and dependent units, slightly above 58 percent were 
local, independent SOEs, 30.3 percent were central, independent SOEs, and the 




Table 1.10: Summary of equitization outcome until mid-2008
128
 
Timeframe By end 2003 By mid 2006 By mid 2008 
Total number of equitized state 
enterprises, among which 
1,557 Over 3,000 4,500 
Central state enterprises n-a 2,150 30.3% 
Local state enterprises 70%  58% 
90-GC members 20% 500 11.6% for both 
91-GC members 6% 270  
 
Table 1.11: Annually equitized SOEs, 1992-2008
129
 
Year/Period Number of equitized SOEs 
1992-Mid 1996 5 
Mid 1996-Mid 1998 25 











Note: * by early December 2008  
 
Regarding the capital scale, by end 2005, the total amount of State capital in equitized 
SOEs was only VND 40,237 billion (or approximately USD 2.7 billion), reflecting the 
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fact that those enterprises were mainly small. Note that the State planned to equitize up to 
VND 163,935 billion or about 60 percent of the total investment capital in the SOE 
system by 2005. Furthermore, only half of the ownership in equitized companies was 
sold to employees and outside investors (26 and 25 percent respectively) while the State 
still retained the rest (roughly 49 percent).
130
 By mid 2008, the State retained 50 percent 
of the total legal capital in the equitized SOEs which was worth VND 53,926 billion, 
while the employees accounted for 12 percent, worth almost VND 13,000 billion, 
strategic investors accounted for 4 percent, worth VND 4,435 billion, while other 




Table 1.12: Capital structure in equitized SOEs 
Criteria/Timeframe End 2005 Mid 2008 
Nominal Value of State capital in equitized SOEs (VND 
billion) 
40,000 108,000 
Equitized State capital, as percentage of nominal State capital 
in equitized SOEs (%), among which 
51 50 
(i) kept by SOE managers and employees (%) 26 12 
(ii) kept by outside investors (%) 25 38 
The remaining State share, as percentage of the total State 
capital in equitized SOEs (%) 
49 50 
Total capital share (%) 100 100 
 
From a sectoral perspective, most of equitized SOEs were in non-strategic sectors of the 
economy. The highest number of enterprises going through equitization was in the trade 
and services (mainly hotels, restaurants, and tourism) and construction sectors. Other 
sectors, such as transportation, mechanics and engineering, electronics, shipping, 
electricity, gas and oil did have equitized SOEs; however, those enterprises were often of 
                                                 
130
 MOF (2006) and NSCERD (2006) 
131
 Quang Chính (2008)  
  
72 
very small capital scale and provided only supporting services to the industries rather 
than producing the main products. The State, so far, still retains its dominance, and in 
some cases monopoly, in most strategic sectors such as oil refinery, steel, fertilizers, 
aviation, telecommunications, and banking services. A large bulk of agricultural farms 




The equitization process in most of provinces and big cities in Vietnam mainly took place 
during 1999-2004, in which almost all local enterprises were equitized. The remaining 
local SOEs that have not equitized so far are located mainly in two biggest cities of Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City.
133
 Although a few GCs members went through equitization since 
2001, the equitization process for most of 90- and 91-GCs mainly started in late 2004 
when the mandate was officially stipulated in Decree 187. The norm is often that GC 
members completed their equitization process first, and the whole GC would go through 
equitization later. This process is taking place concurrently with the second wave of 
corporatization. The current Prime Minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, announced official 
deadlines for GCs as well as any of their newer forms, and State-Owned-Commercial-
Banks (SOCBs) and State-owned financial groups to complete their equitization.
134
 
However, the process is rather slow so far with most of assigned GCs and SOCBs seem 
unable to meet their deadlines.
135
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Regarding the post-equitization operation, most of the recent surveys on equitized SOEs 
show a positive picture, in which a majority of post-equitization companies achieved 
improved performance, higher turnover, increased profits and wages. Popular among 
them are the two surveys conducted by the Central Institute of Economic Management in 
coordination with the World Bank in 2002 and 2005. The results indicate that in general, 
equitized SOEs taking part in these two surveys have performed better. For example, 
post-equitization companies surveyed in 2005 have an average increase of 44 percent in 
charter capital, 23.6 percent in revenue, and 139.76 percent in profit. However, the main 
causes for those positive changes remained ambiguous, as the most expected factor – the 
emergence of corporate governance (reflecting though the renovation of technology and 
management personnel) – was largely not observed in most of equitized companies. 
Equitized SOEs seem to have the same management team and invest just little into 
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upgrading their technologies. Some argued that the better performance of equitized 
companies so far was due mainly to the reduction in the employment size and certain 
administrative formalities/procedures.
137
 However, cautions against the deteriorated 
performance of post-equitization companies have also made recently, requesting 
measures to deal with post-equitization problems. Data collected by the author on the 
performance of post-equitization enterprises also revealed a rather mixed picture. Many 





I.3.2- What Needs to be Explained?  
I.3.2.1- Favorite Policy Measure, but Slowly Implemented 
Although equitization has been the hot topic for debate among a wide range of 
intellectuals, policymakers, and advisors in Vietnam, and finally becoming the favorite 
key reform measure, the actual implementation of the mandate has been overall sluggish, 
lagging much behind the State‟s plans and targets. The number of SOEs that were 
actually equitized annually lagged far behind the targets set in Government‟s annual 
Action Plans as well as Five-Year-Plans.  
 
During the pilot program of equitization only 5 SOEs actually went through the process 
and these 5 equitized SOEs were not any among the initial 19 SOEs targeted/registered 
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 Later, the target for 1998 - when the formal equitization process 
already took off for two years – was 150 SOEs being equitized while the actual number 
of equitized SOEs in the first half of 1998 was merely 12, and by the end of the year, 
around 100. Also, according to the Five-Year SOE reform plan announced by the 
government in March 2001, during 2001-2003, about 1,400 SOEs were subject to 
equitization, whereas actual number of SOEs going through equitization during this 
period reached merely 900. The target for 2004 was from 850-1000 while the actual 
number of equitized SOEs was only 750. The target for 2005 was 1200 while the actual 
number was only slightly above 700. Three large GCs (SEAPRODEX, VINACAFE, and 
VINATEX) were also subject to pilot equitization with annual milestones over 2001-
2002 for improving corporate governance and overall competitiveness; however, none of 




The picture gets even worse since 2006, as the pace of equitization fell significantly. The 
numbers of equitized SOEs for 2006 and 2007 were just slightly above 100, while that of 
2008 was about 70, lagging much behind the State targets of about 600 for both 2006 and 
2007, and 200 for 2008. Last but not least, the equitization process for most of GCs, as 
announced by the Prime Minister in Decision 1726 in late 2006, has been delayed 
substantially, making the target of 2010 as the final deadline for all equitization cases 
certainly impossible.  
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Table 1.13: A snapshot about equitization in Hanoi in 2004’s first ten months141 
Planned target for 2004 54 SOEs 
First 10 months‟ implementation  23 SOEs 
Implementation to planned target 43% 
SOEs to be equitized in the remaining two months 31 SOEs 
 
The pace of equitization looks even slower if the volume of equitized capital is taken into 
consideration. By end 2005, after 10 years of formal implementation of the equitization 
mandate, the State capital in equitized SOEs accounted for merely 15.5% of the total 
capital in the overall SOE system. And, as mentioned earlier, only about half of that State 
capital was actually sold to the private sector while the State retained its ownership of the 
rest.
142
 That picture has not changed much in 2008, making the objective of introducing 
diversification into the ownership structure of the SOE system also unmet.  
 




Criteria Timeframe Planned Actually equitized 
Number of equitized SOEs 1998 150 ~ 100 
2001-2003 1,400 900 
2004 850-1,000 750 
2005 1,200 ~700 
2007 ~600 116 
2008 262 73* 
Cumulative State capital in 
equitized SOEs (VND billion) 
End 2005 164,000 40,000 
Mid 2008 - 108,000 
Note: * figures for the first 11 months of 2008, - : data non-available 
 
Equitization has not yet succeeded in mobilizing capital from the private sector either. By 
end 2005, the total capital mobilized from the private sector through equitization was 
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about VND 21,000 billion or USD 1.4 billion, a rather modest amount if compared with 
the size of remaining 100 percent State-owned enterprises in the process. This amount is 
also particularly small in comparison with the volume of investment in the private sector 
in Vietnam within the same period. The private investment in the newly established 
private sector in Vietnam reached up to about USD 12 billion during the period between 
1992 and 2003. Within only four years after the enactment of the new Enterprise Law in 




Finally, as mentioned above, little improvement in equitized SOEs‟ corporate governance 
has been observed. Most of equitized SOEs are still governed by the old management 
mechanism and personnel. Investment in technology, research and development remained 




Regarding the objective of harmonizing the interests of the State, SOE employees, and 
outside investors, it is observed that the State has still retained half of the capital share in 
equitized SOEs, while the share held by SOE employees has reduced significantly from 
26 percent by mid 2005 to only 12 percent by mid 2008. Meanwhile, the share held by 
outside investors has gone up considerably from 25 percent to nearly 38 percent during 
the same period.  
 
The recent tendency of increased inequality in the composition of shareholding among 
different shareholders in equitized SOEs towards reducing the share kept by SOE 
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employees might be caused by the following reasons. First, the development of the 
rudimentary stock market in Vietnam took off since late 2005, creating a trading fever for 
both listed and over-the-counter shares. This might cause SOE employees to sell their 
shares in order to take the opportunities from the bull market. However, the other more 
important reason might be the phenomenon of “insiders‟ trading” in equitized SOEs, 
where often SOE managers and their relatives or associates seek to buy shares from SOE 
employees who have not yet been able to afford the buy even at preferential prices and 
who at the point of equitization and a few years after that have found that they need cash 
in their pockets rather than some “valueless” paper called shares or stocks. According to 
a recent survey, the ratio of preferential shares kept by eligible SOE employees reduced 
to 75 percent one year after equitization, 63 percent after two years, and merely 54 




In summary, the equitization process has yet achieved any of its objectives stated in the 
State policies, either being the shedding of the State capital to the private sector in order 
to seek higher economic efficiency and improved corporate governance or ensuring the 
harmonization of the State‟s, employees‟, and investors‟ interests to avoid “close-door” 
privatization and insider-trading of shares. 
 
I.3.2.2- Dynamics within the Equitization Process 
The equally important feature of the equitization process in Vietnam is that, despite its 
overall slow pace, the equitization process has not always linear. Instead, it embraces the 
dynamics reflected through different ups and downs. In particular, the number of 
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equitized SOEs was extremely low during the pilot period between 1992 and 1995 as 
well as within the first two years of formal implementation since 1996. Only by end 1998 
and early 1999, the process picked up with about 200 state enterprises going through 
equitization every year. The pace of equitization went up again in 2003, pushing the 
number of equitized enterprises up to 600-800 per annum. However, the process slowed 
down substantially since end 2006, with an average of only 100 SOEs going through 
equitization annually.  
 
Meanwhile, a look at the volume of the equitized State capital over time also reveals 
important developments. By end 2005, the total amount of State capital in equitized 
SOEs was only VND 40,237 billion (or approximately USD 2.7 billion) and only half of 
this was sold to SOEs‟ employees and outside investors (26 and 25 percent of the total 
equity respectively) while the State still retained the remaining half.
147
 By mid 2008, the 
total State capital in the equitized SOEs went up to almost VND 110,000 billion, of 
which the State still retained half while SOE employees‟ shared reduced substantially to 
merely 12% and the remaining 38% now were in the hand of outside investors.
148
 This 
fact, in combination with the changes in the number of equitized SOEs over time, has 
brought to our attention the following tendencies. First, if equitization during the first 
decade mainly targeted small and medium-sized SOEs, the equitized SOEs in the last 
three to four years have been larger in the capital scale, causing a substantial increase in 
the volume of the total State capital in equitized SOEs as well as of the actually equitized 
State capital. And second, the share of SOEs managers and employees in equitized SOEs 
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has reduced significantly in comparison with those of the State and outside investors 
during the past few years.   
 
Closely related to the actual implementation of equitization is the dynamics of policy 
making process, reflecting through consecutive changes in the legal framework 
regulating SOE equitization. Equitization policies can be considered as the most 
changeable ones, with 5 Decrees (Decree 28 in 1996, Decree 44 in 1998, Decree 64 in 
2002, Decree 187 in 2004, and Decree 109 in 2007) launched during the past ten years to 
regulate the process. Each new Decree often came up with new stipulations in 
replacement to the old ones. The legal framework to regulate the equitization process in 
Vietnam then could be considered as the most shaking one so far. 
 
I.4- Summary 
Vietnam‟s privatization, or equitization, did demonstrate important characteristics of the 
gradualist approach in economic reform in Vietnam. It took at least five years since the 
word “equitization” was first coined in a governmental policy paper for a few state 
enterprises to go equitizing under a pilot program, and another five years for the policy to 
become an official reform measure adopted by the VCP. During these ten years, other 
reform measures, ranging from giving greater autonomy to the managers of state 
enterprises to corporatizing state enterprises into different General Corporations, were 
also carried out concurrently with the pilot equitization program. Equitization finally 
became an official reform measure in the mid 1990s and a mainstream reform program 
by the late 1990s simply due to the fact that other reform measures failed to solve the 
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SOE problems. However, the overall pace of the equitization process remained slow and 
incremental even when the equitization mandate was formalized. Another gradual 
characteristic of the equitization process in Vietnam, similar to the Chinese privatization, 
was that other reform programs/measures were also carried out simultaneously with 
equitization. In particular, corporatization, in various forms, has been conducted on state 
enterprises concurrently during both the pilot equitization program and the 
implementation of the official equitization mandate. In addition, within the equitization 
process alone, different programs/treatments/policies have also been adopted for different 
groups of enterprises simultaneously in order to minimize the number of losers as well as 
their losses due to the implementation of the equitization mandate. However, the evolving 
process of equitization in Vietnam is certainly not all about “gradualism”. Although the 
overall pace of equitization is sluggish, the process has not been linearly gradual but 
featured with different ups and downs. After almost a decade of implementation, the pace 
of equitization picked up twice between 1998 and 2006 and slowed down again since 
then. This “non-linearity” of the equitization process in Vietnam, in addition to 
“gradualism”, has motivated the author of this thesis to pursue a research on the topic. 
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Chapter II Equitization in Vietnam and the Dual 
Dynamics Model 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to devise a theoretical framework to explain both 
“gradualism” and “non-linearity” in the equitization process in Vietnam as claimed in 
Chapter I. In so doing, this chapter begins with a review of the current literature on 
Vietnam‟s SOE reform in general and moves on with the specific scholarship on 
equitization. The main weakness of the current literature, as will be pointed out, is that it 
misses out on two important dynamics in the equitization process, the inter-bureaucracy 
politics at the macro level and the government-enterprise interaction at the micro level. 
Therefore, in the third part of this chapter, I propose the application of the dual dynamics 
model, a combination of the Fragmented Authoritarianism model, theories on state-
business interactions, and Garbage Can theory, in exploring the above-mentioned 
dynamics. The central argument in applying the dual dynamics model is that the two sets 
of bargaining at the macro and micro levels, as well as their interactions, are keys in 
contributing to both characteristics of “gradualism” and “non-linearity” of the 
equitization process in Vietnam.  
 
II.1- Economic Reform: a Top-down or Bottom-up Process?  
There have been two main approaches to explain the politics of economic reforms in 
Vietnam, which can be termed the state-led approach and the society-led approach. A 
state-led explanation for Doi Moi focuses on the role of the State of Vietnam and its 
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policies and institutions during the process. Meanwhile, the society-led approach argues 
that it is the Society, not the State, who initiates, directs, and completes reforms in 
Vietnam. Both approaches provide detailed accounts of the State and the Society of 
Vietnam in Doi Moi process. Fitting nicely into this dichotomy is the literature exploring 
the process of transforming state enterprises into joint-stock companies, or equitization. 
This section begins with a lay-out of the contemporary approaches on economic reforms 
in Vietnam and moves on with a detailed description of various stands on equitization - 
the key reform measure for the State sector. A discussion about main weaknesses of the 
contemporary approaches will end the section.  
 
II.1.1- Society-led Reforms  
The society-led approach is popular among a wide number of scholars, mainly 
independent foreign researchers as well as local researchers. It interprets reform in 
Vietnam as a process in which the State has played a passive role in response to the 
society‟s demand. The reform process, therefore, should not be regarded as a policy 
package imposed from above but rather as the outcomes of the interactions between 





The society-led approach has been widely applied, for example, in explaining the origin 
and evolution of the agrarian reform in Vietnam. Decollectivization, initially started as 
illegal fence-breaking activities in a few locations, was formalized partially in 1981 and 
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fully in 1988 mainly as the State response to “the weakening and eventual collapse from 
within of the collective farming cooperatives into which people had been organized”. In 
this sense, decollectivization was bottom-up and was largely initiated by villagers while 
national policy just reacted to this process. The actual, informal decollectivization had 





According to theorists following the society-led approach, the State played a responsive 
rather than proactive role in the reform process. State policies, or “initiatives from 
above”, could be very bold sometimes, but often contradictory, reactive, and reactionary. 
As a consequence, they were never implemented properly.
151
 Implications about the role 
of the State of Vietnam in the reform process are also found in comparative studies 
between China and Vietnam. The processes of agrarian reforms in both countries reflect 
the interaction between the bottom-up pressures for changes and the responses from 
above to endorse these local initiatives. However, it seems that the State in Vietnam 
played a weaker and less intrusive role than its counterpart in China, and thus, the reform 
achievements in agricultural sector were also less remarkable.
152
   
 
The society-centric explanation is powerful in the sense that it captures the dynamics and 
vibrancy of the reform process in Vietnam. The approach has provided us with numerous 
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examples on how the bottom-up initiatives, most of the time coming from the lowest 
levels of the administrative ladder such as communes and villages, can have certain real 
and great impacts on the making of national policies, given the authoritative and 
repressive State in a communist regime. With this in view, the State is no longer a strong 
state working mainly within its own internal circle and able to get the society followed. 
The State is fragmented, pushed and pulled to different directions and by different 
societal forces.  
 
However, the issue that many take with the society-led theorists is that by paying 
attention entirely to the society, society-led theorists just simply deny any role of the 
State in the reform process in Vietnam. Fence-breaking activities did come from bottom-
up, but their legal recognition and institutionalization by the State-Party in 1986 also did 
a remarkable job for the reform process. If bottom-up reform efforts lasted for almost half 
a century, the State acts proved to shorten the reform process and helped making the 
complete shift in the agricultural sector in only about one decade. This is not to say that 
grass-root initiatives are not important, but the State ability to listen and understand the 
society‟s need is also equally important. Secondly, although society-led theorists claim 
the role of society in reform in Vietnam, their analysis seems inadequate. Most of the 
society-led literature still counts on the development of State policies and explains 
reforms in macroeconomic terms. An adequate analysis on the society, its forces, 
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II.1.2- State-led Reforms 
The state-led approach explains the reform process in Vietnam as mainly a Government 
program rather than a bottom-up process. There are two variants within this approach. 
The first variant assumes that the State of Vietnam is a strong State where “major 
decisions are made entirely within the bureaucracy and are influenced by it rather than by 
extra-bureaucratic forces in society”154. Given such self-contained governing system of 
the State, social forces are regarded as making insignificant impacts. The State rules and 
the people just follow. All the major decisions on economic reform were made by only a 
small circle of Party elites and enforced among the population by a vast and penetrating 
party-state apparatus at all levels ranging from the grass-root up to the central.  
 
The second variant within the state-led approach allows the possibility of societal impact 
on the State operation, the phenomenon termed by Kerklviet as “corporatist fashion”.155 
The State is assumed to have its own agenda and successfully create relevant social 
institutions and organizations to help advance that agenda. According to Turley, the 
society in Vietnam is still weakly developing in comparison with the power and 
legitimacy of the State-Party after winning the war.
156
 As a result, the society did have 
influence on the policy making process, but such influence was only realized through the 
state-sponsored organizations and channels. 
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To explain the economic success of the agricultural reform in Vietnam, Harvie and Tran 
hail it as the result of “the decision by the government to implement the major economic 
reforms… with the objective of transforming the economy from being centrally planned 
to a market economic system”.157 For state-led theorists, although the root of reforms can 
be traced back to as early as the 1960s, the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 is still the most 
important moment for the Doi Moi process as it reflects “a thorough change in 
government attitude toward the private sector” and for the first time, the official 
commitment towards “a comprehensive reform program, with the objective of 
liberalizing and deregulating the economy”.158  
 
Beresford and Dang Phong accept a rather soft version of “state-led” approach in 
explaining the politics of economic decision making in Vietnam. They assert that “the 
fundamental legitimacy of the Vietnamese state and the broadly accepted need for 
consensus within the political system” is one among important factors influencing the 
reform process in Vietnam. However, their portray of the State of Vietnam is in favor of a 
more democratic model than the totalitarian or bureaucratic authoritarian models often 
adopted by the state-led theorists. Dang Phong supports this argument by characterizing 
the political culture in Vietnam as “the highest leaders have had to respect, and that is not 
to press against, the interests of the people”.159  
 
The state-led approach, by focusing mainly on the role of the State in the reform process, 
has underestimated the power of the societal forces in the reform process. As Beresford 
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and Dang admit, “what are largely missing from the picture are the responses of the 
population to major policy decisions and the way in which these responses provided 
inputs to the decision-making process itself”.160 The Vietnamese society, Kerklviet and 
Selden argue, is not permissive, as compared with, say, the Chinese, and always finds its 
own way to develop well, even during the most repressive time in history.
161
 Lacking an 
acknowledgement of the power of the Vietnamese society in Doi Moi would be a mistake 
as serious as ignoring the State role in the same process. 
 
In summary, the current literature on economic reform in Vietnam has been weighing 
between two ends of a continuum. On the one hand, the top-down approach mainly views 
reform as an affirmative course of actions conducted by the State of Vietnam, based on 
the assumption that the State of Vietnam is more or less a unitary actor with coherent 
interests and acts. Contrasting to the rational statist approach, an increasing number of 
Vietnam scholars recently voice their caution against the assumption that “change 
processes regarding SOEs are best seen in terms of a metaphor of policy and policy 
implementability”.162 These scholars, instead, focus on the actual happenings, especially 
at local and enterprise levels, in getting around with the State policies. Lying in between 
these two ends have been various stances weighing between different degrees of State 
control and bottom-up forces over the process of making and implementing reform 
policies.  
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II.2- The Dichotomy and the Equitization Process in Vietnam 
Fitting nicely into the above-mentioned categorization of various approaches on reform 
in Vietnam are different perspectives about the SOE reform and equitization. A number 
of researchers, in pursuing the notion “reform as a process”, assert that there existed a de 
facto process of privatization in Vietnam during the 1980s and early 1990s, which led to 
the formal equitization mandate as the State response to such de facto privatization. The 
slow pace of equitization thus reflected the resistance of those benefited from the de facto 
privatization process, namely the managers of State enterprises and a wide range of 
different State supervisors. The rational statist theorists, commonly among policy makers 
and advisors, largely ignored the issue of de facto privatization raised by the “reform-as-
a-process” approach. Instead, those following the “top-down” approach mainly pay 
attentions to the contents of the equitization policies and how to make them “right”. The 
slow implementation of the equitization mandate has thus been the result of inadequate 
and irrational policies. The prescription for accelerating the equitization process in 
Vietnam is therefore to revise the equitization policies, i.e. governmental decrees to 
regulate the equitization process, in order to make them suitable/rational to the actual 
context of Vietnam. 
 
II.2.1- De facto Privatization and the Formal Equitization Mandate 
It is observed by a number of theorists following the bottom-up approach that a process 
of de facto privatization did take place in Vietnam from the late 1970s to date. Different 
scholars characterize this de facto privatization differently. Fforde comes up with the 
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transformation of state enterprises into “Virtual Shareholding Companies (VSC)”.163 
These virtual shareholding companies were actually owned by a few virtual shareholders 
at the local levels, including the local cadres, the managers of the state enterprises, and 
some other stakeholders. However, Fforde finds that there was a re-concentration of the 
state ownership during the 1990s. The ownership of the state enterprises was no longer 
concentrated upon mainly SOE managers and other within SOEs, but had been taken 
away from them through the two emerging sets of structures, namely the re-enforcement 
of MOF and the re-establishment of former unions of enterprises as well as the 




Through the case of Ho Chi Minh City, Martin Gainsborough also finds that an informal 
process of privatization had taken place during the 1980s and 1990s in two popular 
patterns. The first pattern is “local elite privatization”, or a process in which “those 
running state enterprises gradually, by stealth, assume greater control over company 
assets, with the result that they eventually exercise a much fuller set of rights than what 
consistent with the property regime pertaining to the reformed state enterprises.” 165 The 
second informal form of changing property arrangement is the “siphoning off of public 
funds or assets into newly established enterprises, which operate as private firms”, or 
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In this context, the official equitization mandate was thus a State response to seek 
changes in the existing structure of these VSCs. However, that officially sanctioned 
reform had played a rather unnoticeable role due to the effectively collaborative 
resistance from local interests and SOEs.
167
 In other words, conflicts have arisen within 
the formal equitization process, as “precisely because those running state enterprises have 
become used to viewing them as their own assets” and now see themselves effectively 





Discussing the acceleration of the formal equitization process since the late 1990s, 
Gainsborough attributes that to both the “push” factor of “less hospitable conditions in 
the state sector” and the “pull” factor of “improving private sector climate” since the late 
1990s which helped replacing the dominant view among SOE managers that the state 
sector still represented the best place to be located in, in order to do business 
successfully.
169
 Adam McCarty is also aware of the recent re-gained momentum of 
equitization in small and medium SOEs. Equitization, in his view, is not literally about 
changing the actually ownership of incumbent SOEs but rather about “clarifying the 
ownership of those stakeholders already in control, and then moving towards some more 
meaningful solution to the universal principal-agent problem: making managers work for 
owners, and stopping owners from managing”. In other words, it can be considered as a 
kind of “deal” stroke between the State and SOEs or “formal ownership is exchanged in 
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return for cutting the ties to the state”. According to McCarty, equitization has become 
more attractive to the informal owners of SOEs and thus was accelerated recently mainly 
due to the fact that “the cost-benefit analysis swings in favor of equitizing.”170  
 
In summary, researchers following the “reform as a process” approach posit heavier 
weights to the role of local states and SOEs and a less significant role to the central State 
and its policies. Most of them agree, though to different extents, that an actual process of 
privatization had taken place before the formal equitization mandate was enforced, and 
thus the success of the formal equitization program must be seen with caution as it 
depends substantially on the capacity of the central State to go against the resistance of 
local states and SOEs who used to be the de facto SOE owners and thus would lose their 
stakes if equitization succeeded. What remains the key problem with the “reform as a 
process” approach is that it largely ignores the role of the State and its policies in the 
formal equitization process. This would be certainly problematic in the case of Vietnam 
due to the relatively penetrating role and high degree of control exercised by the State of 
Vietnam over the economy. 
 
II.2.2- Equitization as a Rational Policy Search by the State 
Parallel to the “reform as a process” approach, a number of Vietnam scholars and 
researchers from the late 1980s have tried to explain the process of SOE reform in 
Vietnam through the lens of State policies and their implementation. The normative 
assumption here is that reform is a top-down process of command and control which 
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should come from a coherent, unified party leadership and state management towards the 
smallest units at local levels.
171
 The rational statist approach has been widely accepted 
among researchers working for the International Financial Institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP), or other international donors to Vietnam, and 
Vietnamese policy makers.
172
 Martin Painter gives a good description of this approach as: 
 
 “There is a strong presumption that reform is a “top down” process of command 
and control. Economic reform is often considered as a “steering” activity by high 
level state actors who make strategic choices based upon expert advice. The 
working of the top down process is perceived as follows: Official party ideology 
insists on the veracity of the image of coherent, unified party leadership and state 
management. Under the norms and practices of democratic centralism, the party 
demands (and normally obtains) a monopoly of the formal processes of political 
mobilization, representation and decision making. Moreover, there is a 
predisposition towards technocratic modes of policy making, with a plethora of 
research institutes and well trained economic experts undertaking analysis and 
advice that feeds very immediately into top policy making circles.”173  
 
The rational statists basically view the equitization process in Vietnam as a government 
program in which the State retains its control over the economy through ownership in 
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large-scale state enterprises while releasing small and medium-sized, non-strategic state 




To an extent, rational statist theorists have made certain efforts to investigate the complex 
nature of the State of Vietnam. For example, the fact that in Vietnam, one State agency 
might be responsible for many SOEs while one SOE can be under the management of 
various State agencies at the same time, causing the emergence and development of a 
system of “polycentric power sharing” within the State machinery.175 However, 
according to the rational statist theorists, the State, despite its complex web of different 
and sometimes even contradictory components, still remains dominantly unified and 
coherent in setting the pace for equitization. The gradual pace of equitization, together 
with the still dominant role of the State in equitized SOEs, according to Sjoholm, reflect 
the State‟s various purposes in the process rather than just the achievement of economic 
efficiency. Among these purposes are mobilizing private capital, easing the pressure on 
the State Budget, and meeting the demand from political-business interest groups.
176
 The 
normative implication for the State of Vietnam is thus to get the policies right. In 
particular, the State needs to formulate an overall, coherent reform strategy for the whole 
state enterprises system under strong political commitments from the top leadership.
177
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In summary, Vietnam researchers following the rational statist approach view the formal 
equitization program as a rational act conducted by the State of Vietnam in response to 
the SOE problem. The equitization process, in this sense, is mainly considered as a search 
for the best policies and the most rational policy outcomes accordingly. Policy 
irrationalities, resistances and delays are also found in the process, but overall, the 
rational statist approach still posits a strong and dominant role for the rather unified and 
coherent State of Vietnam. What remains the key problem with this approach is that, in 
assuming that the State of Vietnam is a unitary actor with coherent interests at certain 
points in time, it ignores, to a substantial extent, the politics in making equitization 
policies reflected through the recent dynamics in Vietnam‟s equitization process.  
 
II.3- The Dual Dynamics Model 
Contemporary approaches to explain the equitization process in Vietnam seem to 
overlook its dynamics over the past decade. First, the equitization program has essentially 
become a more bureaucratically-routinized process since the latter half of the 1990s, with 
the increasing role of the bureaucracy in policy-making and a wider range of actors 
participating in the process. If the rise of Ministry of Finance and the restructuring of 
state enterprises towards the models of General Corporations and economic groups were 
the highlights of the 1990s, as Fforde and some other scholars noted, the establishment of 
a number of supporting institutions to Ministry of Finance in the early 2000s and the 
consolidation of General Corporations and their variants‟ financial strength through 
equitization have been keys in determining the recent trajectory of equitization. Second, 
despite the strong advocate paid by researchers following the “reform-as-a-process” 
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approach to the role of local States and SOEs in the reform process, inadequate studies 
have been conducted on the actual interaction between the direct State supervisors and 
SOEs in implementing the official equitization mandate. It appears that a strait-type of 
efforts to collaborate between the SOEs and their direct State supervisors to go against 
the implementation of the official equitization mandate have been widely assumed by 
those following the “reform-as-a-process” approach.  
 
With this in mind, the author of this thesis aims to fill the gap by analyzing the 
equitization process from the perspectives of both interactions among different 
governmental agencies and between the State agencies and their subordinate SOEs 
through a model of dual dynamics in equitization. In particular, the model investigates 
the equitization process in Vietnam at two levels: (i) the inter-bureaucracy politics at the 
macro level and (ii) the government-enterprise interactions at the micro level.
 178
 These 
two levels of analysis are also correspondent to the two main stages of a policy-making 
cycle in equitization. The inter-bureaucracy politics plays its role mainly at the stage of 
policy formulation and/or revision; whereas the government-enterprise interactions take 
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Graph 4.1: The dual dynamics model in SOE equitization in Vietnam 
 
 
To understand the inter-bureaucracy politics at the macro level (the macro dynamics), the 
framework of the Fragmented Authoritarianism (FA) model will be applied in order to 
explore the increased fragmentation of authority in the process of making equitization 
policies. This fragmented authority is found to result in increased bargaining, 
negotiations, and resource exchanges among different bureaucratic units in order to build 
consensus for policy changes. However, the framework of FA model would not work 
when investigating the interaction between state enterprises and their state supervisors 
over the implementation of the equitization mandate at the micro level (the micro 
dynamics). Various theories on the government-business interactions will therefore be 
used to explore this dynamics. The most interesting feature of the dual dynamics model is 
that instead of investigating the above-mentioned sets of bargaining separately, it 
employs the framework of the Garbage Can theory to link them together. Whereas the FA 
model and theories on government-business interactions are both static in nature, 
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theory helps us to unravel the dynamism at both levels and thus provide possible ways to 
discover the interactions or linkages between the two processes within the same 
equitization process in Vietnam.   
 
II.3.1- The Macro Dynamics 
II.3.1.1- The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Applicability in the Case of 
Vietnam 
The Fragmented Authoritarianism model has been applied extensively to explain the 
bureaucracy politics in China. The model argues that “authority below the very peak of 
the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed” and this “fragmentation is 
structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures”179. 
The Fragmented Authoritarianism model thus seeks to “identify the causes of 
fragmentation of authority among various bureaucratic units, the types of resources and 
strategies that provide leverage in the bargaining that evidently characterizes much 
decision making, and the incentives of key individuals in various units in order to gain a 
better grasp on the ways in which bureaucratic structure and process affect Chinese 
policy formulation, decision making, and policy implementation.”180 The main finding of 
the model, in the case of China‟s energy policy, was that Beijing‟s structure of authority 
was fragmented with a wide range of variation in perspective and the locus of decision, 
thus requiring consensus building in each and every stages of the policy making process. 
As a result, the policy process is protracted, disjointed, and incremental. Instead of being 
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cohesive and consistent, the energy policy in China up to the 1980s was “subdivided into 
sectoral and particular issues” and thus “a decision itself is composed of a series of 
reinforcing decisions”, otherwise, a decision, even a central one made by the top leaders, 




Although scholars applying the FA model in the case of China do not point to the direct 
causal relationship between the authority fragmentation and the Chinese gradualist 
approach in reform, the fragmented authoritarianism and its consequently increased 
bargaining and negotiations among various bureaucratic agencies in order to achieve 
consensus and support for reform to move forward, clearly imply gradualism.
182
 The 
fragmentation of authority, due to various attempts to reform the administrative 
machinery and decentralize the fiscal authority to sub-national governments and the 
reduced use of coercive measures to enforce reform policies, has created room for 
increased bargaining and negotiations over resources among bureaucratic units and 
encouraged a search for consensus among various organs in order to initiate and develop 
major projects.
183
 All these, in turn, imply that the formulation and implementation of a 
reform policy in a context of fragmented authority would be more gradual and 
incremental than in the case of power concentration. More time would be needed to 
bargain and negotiate, as well as to reach consensus among various actors. Delays, 
therefore, are also expected to be common. Compromises are often made as a result of 
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183
 Lieberthal (1992), pp. 8-9 
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the consensus building efforts, leading to the “dual-track transition” phenomenon in the 
case of Chinese reform, or the simultaneous application of different measures in order to 
minimize the number of losers due to reforms.  
 
The similarity in the politico-economic system, social and cultural root, as well as in the 
pattern of recent reforms taken by both China and Vietnam, highly suggests the 
applicability of the FA model in explaining the inter-bureaucracy politics in Vietnam. In 
fact, this idea has been repeatedly mentioned in the literature on the political economy of 
contemporary Vietnam. For example, Vasavakul, in mentioning the limitations of the 
current approaches in studying Vietnamese socialism, points to Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg‟s study on Chinese energy policy, implicitly referring to its applicability in 
understanding relations within the administrative State of Vietnam.
184
 Gainsborough also 
finds the similarity and relevance in using Lieberthal and Oksenberg‟s “fragmented 
authoritarian regime” in studying the case of Vietnam. His research on Ho Chi Minh City 
shows that the state of Ho Chi Minh City bears very little resemblance to a 
“developmental state”, which he defines as “wherein the idea of change occurring as a 
result of conscious state intervention rather than by a spontaneous process is uppermost”, 
as well as it appears to “have little in common with the conception of local state 
corporatism, wherein local officials, often led by the party secretary, are seen as acting 
like a board of directors, performing a coordinating role between local institutions”. In 
Gainsborough‟s words, Lieberthal and Oksenberg‟s model of fragmented 
authoritarianism “would appear to have salience in relation to Ho Chi Minh City” or 
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 Hisaaki Mitsui also observes the existence of a fragmented 
authority structure over SOEs in Vietnam as “Vietnamese SOEs were owned and 
managed by around 400 different public institutions separately, including various branch 
ministries in the central government as well as various line departments in the local 
governments at both provincial and district level”.186 As mentioned earlier, Sjoholm 
echoes the same view about the fragmentation of the bureaucracy system in Vietnam over 
the control and supervision of the SOE system.
187
 Perhaps Painter is the one who 
provides us with the most detailed picture of fragmented authority in Vietnam, which he 
terms “power scattering”. He attributes that power scattering to both historical reasons 
and the recent process of Doi Moi: 
 
“Vietnam is governed through a highly decentralized, fragmented and sometimes 
incoherent set of state institutions. Administrative structures in both central 
government and provincial governments tend to be structurally fragmented, with 
flat hierarchies and relatively weak centers. Main sources for such fragmentation 
are institutional traditions and norms such as “double subordination” and fiscal 
decentralization, as well as the dismantling of the Soviet-style administrative 
controls of the command economy from the 1980s.”188 
 
What remains missing in the current literature on the equitization process in Vietnam is a 
thorough investigation of the authority fragmentation in recent policy making attempts. If 
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the “reform as a process” theorists largely ignore the role of the State and its machinery, 
the policy-driven scholars tend to assume that the Party-State centre is still able to 
overcome such fragmentation in the State authority with its legacy of unity, supreme 
legitimacy, and political culture of consensual decision making to come up with “a more 
or less consistent, long term view that balances political priorities with economic 
considerations”.189 To fill that gap, the application of the FA model would help us 
understand better the structure of power within the bureaucracy in SOE equitization, and 
thus, denies a simple view of a formally integrative mechanism that allowed equitization 
process to evolve as a natural search for a rational policy. The FA model also clearly 
attributes a significant role to the inter-bureaucracy politics in equitization rather than the 
“reform-as-a-process” approach would admit. Moreover, the FA model provides us a 
mechanism to structure the bureaucracy and predict the outcomes of inter-bureaucracy 
bargaining and exchanges.  
 
II.3.1.2- Fragmented Authority in Equitization 
One among the main arguments of the dual dynamics model is that there has been a 
considerable degree of authority fragmentation among various bureaucratic units, at 
primarily but not limited to the central level, over the making and revising of equitization 
policies. Therefore, in the dual dynamics model, the author of this thesis disaggregates 
the State of Vietnam into different State actors at two levels: the central State and the 
local governments. The State actors at each level are further disaggregated into different 
specific actors with specific interests and power in the equitization process. In particular, 
state actors at the central level include, but not limited to, the Prime Minister and his 
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assistants, the National Steering Committee of Enterprises Reform and Development, the 
Ministry of Finance, and line Ministries, and other central institutions involved in the 
making of equitization policies. For local governments in provinces and centrally-
managed cities/municipalities, the author of this thesis investigates the role of the 
People‟s Committee and its assistant Departments in the equitization process. An 
assumption about a rather coherent local State actor in these localities should be noted 
here. To determine the structure of power along the central-local state dimension, I use 
the typology of local state actors, their resources, and thus relationship with the central 
state as proxy measurements.  
 
The macro dynamics in the equitization process is therefore defined as the bargaining and 
negotiations among and between different State actors at both central and local levels 
over various issues during the stage of formulating and revising equitization policies. The 
power fragmentation in equitization originated mainly from the partial reform efforts 
before Doi Moi and more importantly, the Doi Moi process itself. As will be mentioned 
in the next chapter, the authority to make equitization policies, once centralized at above-
ministerial levels, has been decentralized downwards and fragmented among various 
ministries, including Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA), and line Ministries, as well as some main local governments mainly due to 
the public administration reform and fiscal decentralization carried out during the 1990s 
as parts of the whole Doi Moi package.  
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II.3.2- The Micro Dynamics  
The second main argument in this thesis is that the interactive relationship between the 
state enterprises and their direct State supervisory agencies has not yet been studied 
adequately in the contemporary literature on SOE equitization in Vietnam. To deal with 
such inadequacy, we seek reference from the existing literature on the Chinese 
experience and find profound and diversified perspectives about the changing nature of 
interactions and bargaining between the State supervisory agencies and the State-owned 
enterprises and factories during the transitional process from a planning economy 
towards a market-oriented economy in China during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
II.3.2.1- Theories on Government-Business Interaction: the China Literature 
First and foremost, if the FA model works well at the macro level, it does not seem that 
fit in the picture of local politics, as a number of China researchers assert. For example, 
Andrew Walder argues that bargaining activities at the local level, between the local State 
patrons and their enterprises does not stem from the fragmentation of power as the FA 
model suggests. The key feature of the local politics picture in China is the concentration 
of budgetary power and resources but within an uncertain environment of rules and 
regulations. Such uncertainties about prices, resource endowments, rules and regulations 
facilitate negotiations between the local governments and their state enterprises with the 
purpose of minimizing individual responsibilities and risks while balancing the 
expenditures and revenues of the local budgets. Walder thus concludes that it is more 
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important to understand the characteristics of the environment that structure bargaining 




One of the core feature of such environment during the 1980s and 1990s, as found by 
Huang Yasheng, is a “hybrid system that still retains some of the fundamental features of 
a command economy, albeit on a more decentralized basis, and fuses the economy with 
profit incentives and limited market functions”. The mix is reflected through the fact that 
the responsibility of making decisions in the appointment of managers, determination of 
output targets, arrangement of input supplies and output sales, and finally control over 
financial resources in the three broad areas of profit retention, wages and bonuses, and 
investment was shared between the local State actors and the SOEs.
191
 This hybrid 
system produced a more complex web of interests between the local State patrons and 
their subordinate SOEs than what is often captured by the literature.
192
 The collusive, 
reciprocal and interactive relationship between bureaucrats and managers of state 
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enterprises at the local level, consequently, created both economic and political obstacles 




From another perspective, O‟Brien finds that not all factories in China managed to 
bargain and persuade their supervisory bureaucracies to accept their interests.
194
 In fact, 
the directors of larger, higher-ranking factories often felt they were more successful in 
preserving autonomy and gaining exemptions and concessions from their supervisory 
agencies on salary and bonus pools and distribution, tax rates, and cadre personnel 
decisions. This finding, according to O‟ Brien, explains why large, bureau-level factories 
achieved an advantageous bargaining position and reveals that many politically 
significant directors wish to maintain protected, dependent relationship with their 
supervisors and were hesitant to support radical ownership reforms that would decisively 




II.3.2.2- Government-Enterprise Bargaining in Equitization 
As mentioned above, the China literature provides us with good sources of reference to 
the parallel case of SOE reform and equitization in Vietnam. The pattern of collaborative 
behavior between the local States and SOEs in seeking resistance to the mandate from the 
Central State, or “fence-breaking” activities, has been widely acknowledged by the 
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contemporary literature on State-society relationship in Vietnam before and during the 
transitional period. Regarding the equitization process, in fact, there have been numerous 
arenas and stages for negotiations between the SOE and their State supervisors. In 
particular, during the preparatory period of the overall equitization plan of a line 
Ministry, a province, or a GC, bargaining often take place between these State agencies 
and their SOEs over the equitization mandate and timing. Once the equitization mandate 
is clear and the timeline for implementation is fixed, bargaining would occur between the 
SOE and the State supervisors during the formulation of the equitization proposal over a 
number of issues, most notably the SOE valuation, the method of equitization, and the 
assignment of State representative in the post-equitization companies if applicable. The 
negotiations/bargaining might take place in direct meetings between involving parties, or 
through various indirect means such as back-and-forth flows of memoranda or phone 
calls. In the literature on contemporary Vietnam, however, there has not yet any concrete 
study about the interactions between the State patrons and SOEs over the implementation 
of the official mandate of equitization, leaving no answers to the questions of how the 
interactions have taken place, what factors shape them, and finally what are their main 
outcomes. 
 
In this thesis, I plan to explore the micro politics of government-enterprise interaction in 
equitization through investigating the relationship between the state enterprises and their 
direct State supervisors. In so doing, the dual dynamics model explains the pattern of 
negotiations and bargaining taking place between the enterprises and their direct State 
patrons over the implementation of the equitization mandate through both macro and 
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micro constraints. Macro constraints are defined as the overall legal framework imposed 
on the direct State supervisors and state enterprises. In the case of equitization, macro 
constraints are characterized with a high degree of uncertain and unclear rules and 
regulations regarding various issues in equitization, due to the fragmented authority in 
making and revising equitization policies and thus intermittent bargaining and 
negotiations to reach consensus over policy changes at the macro level. The pattern of 
government-enterprise interactions is also directly shaped by the preferred strategies of 
both the enterprises and their State patrons in implementing the equitization mandate. For 
example, for state enterprises, what lies centrally in their calculation would be the trade-
off between their autonomy from and closeness with their State superiors. If the 
enterprise and its managers prefer autonomy from the State patron to its closeness with 
that same superior, it would opt for an equitization strategy with the lowest percentage of 
remained State ownership. On a contrary, if the enterprise prefers closeness to autonomy, 
it would seek an equitization strategy, if necessary, that allows it to retain the most its 
closeness with the State patron. Meanwhile, what shapes the preferred strategies in 
equitization of the local governments, line ministries, or General Corporations is mainly 
their fiscal stances given the uncertain environment imposed from the macro constraints 
and the closeness between them and their subordinate enterprises. Differences do exist in 
the preferred strategies in equitization of the direct State patrons and their enterprises, 
also resulting in bargaining and negotiations between them at the micro level over the 




II.3.3- Macro-Micro Interactions   
As mentioned above, the FA model helps us understand the structure of power in SOE 
equitization in Vietnam at the macro level whereas theories on the government-enterprise 
interactions shed light on the complex web of negotiations and bargaining taken place at 
the micro level between state enterprises and their State patrons. However, the weakness 
of both the FA model and theories on government-enterprise interactions is that they are 
both static in nature, assuming the existence of a stable structure of power over a certain 
period of time within which bargaining and negotiations could take place. For example, 
one common critique of the FA model, as noted by some scholars in the China context, is 
that “it does not offer a dynamic framework that could anticipate and explain structural 
change”, and thus the model just provides us with a “snapshot” rather than a “movie”.196 
This critique is also true to the context of SOE equitization in Vietnam - which has 
evolved along the line with an increasing range of participants and variation in 
perspectives and interests.  
 
In order to capture various dynamics in the equitization process in Vietnam, the author of 
this thesis incorporate the Garbage Can theory in her theoretical framework. The Garbage 
Can model of organizational theory was developed in the early 1970s by Cohen, March, 
and Olsen as part of a critique of rational and neo-rational models of public 
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 The model was applied later by John Kingdon and some other theorists 
to describe the making of public policies as a process featured with organizational 
anarchy. The process of policy making in such an increasingly anarchical environment 
consists of multiple streams, namely the problem stream, the politics stream, and the 
policy stream. Cohen, March, and Olsen defined the problem stream as revolving around 
agenda-setting processes, the political stream as revolving around contention over 
alternatives and reflects public opinion, interest groups, experts, elections, partisan 
forces, and legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, and finally the policy stream as 
revolving around defining policy solutions. The important implication is that 
administrative decisions cannot be understood in purely rational terms. Rather, decisions 
must be understood in the context of the three process streams which determine the 




Painter is one among the first scholars to explore the applicability of the Garbage Can 
model in the case of public administration reform in Vietnam. He notices the partially 
“anarchical” characteristic of the policy making process in Vietnam, reflected in “the 
somewhat random and serendipitous attachment of ready-made solutions - including 
foreign transplants” and the increasing “intensity of solution advocacy as an independent 
stream of activity in such a situation”. Painter then provides an analysis on the public 
administration reform program in Vietnam through the lens of the Garbage Can model in 
order to decipher the subtle interplay of local agendas and foreign transplants. Painter is, 
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however, aware of limitation of applying this approach into the context of Vietnam, one 
among which is the ignorance of the existing political factors at play.
199
 David Koh also 
notes, albeit briefly, some anarchical characters of the policy making process in Vietnam, 
as “the final content of numerous policies is being negotiated or tolerated, rather than 
spoon-fed or imposed by the party-state and accepted in full by society” and 
“negotiations usually take place at a lower level and in a disorganized and dialogical way, 
in an ebb-and-flow pattern”.200 
 
II.3.3.1- The Garbage Can and the Three Streams in Equitization 
In order to capture such dynamics in the equitization process, the model of dual dynamics 
therefore employs the framework of Garbage Can theory in identifying the shift in the 
political, problem, and policy streams in the equitization process at both macro and micro 
levels. At the macro level, the emergence of new institutions and new resources led to 
unintended consequences and created power struggles and imbalances in the static power 
structure. Using the framework of the Garbage Can theory could help us disentangle this 
dynamism through investigating how both existing and newly-established institutions 
take the advantage of different streams to defense or gain their power in the equitization 
process. Similar approach will also be applied in investigating the interactions between 
the enterprises and their direct state supervisors over the implementation of the 
equitization mandate.  
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By incorporating the Garbage Can theory into the dual dynamics model, I would like to 
argue that the authority instability in the equitization process has led to a shift in the 
dynamism from the macro level to the micro level. The tendency of bureaucratization and 
routinization in the equitization process, reflected through the setting up of new 
institutions to deal with new issues, has resulted in an enlarged bureaucracy involved in 
the equitization process.
201
 New institutions, however, required power and resources to 
survive and thrive. In so doing, they often manipulate among different streams of 
political influences, policy, and problem. Such manipulations have paradoxically led to 
increased instability in the power structure. In other words, while bureaucratization and 
routinization aimed at rationalizing the policymaking process; they, in fact, further 
complicated the bureaucracy reform cycle as well as the nature of issues. In such a 
complex and unstable environment, policy outcomes are often no more predictable. To 
elaborate this point further, in the following paragraphs, I will first define briefly the 
three streams, i.e. the political stream, the policy stream, and the problem stream, in the 
particular case of equitization in Vietnam. A discussion on how the dynamism shifts from 
the macro level to the micro level will then be presented, covering the macro-micro 
interactions and their implication on the equitization process in Vietnam. 
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The problem stream was mainly concerned with problems arisen in the process of 
equitization. Problems were raised by different groups through different maneuvering 
channels in order to appear in the agenda of the top politicians and policymakers. For 
example, the determination of Initial Public Offer (IPO) share value rose into a critical 
issue only after 2002 and was addressed in Decree 187 in 2004 through an open 
auctioning system in replacement of the existing administratively-pricing mechanism. 
The policy stream revolved around the range of alternative policies/solutions available for 
the problem. The solution proposals could come from various sources, ranging from the 
bureaucratic units themselves, outside advisors (either domestic or foreign), intellectuals, 
media, enterprises, or the populace. For example, regarding the issue of determining the 
IPO share value, the Ministry of Finance proposed and discussed the two following 
solutions before the issuance of Decree 64 in 2002: (i) the share value was to be 
administratively-fixed at its nominal value of VND 10,000 or VND 100,000 per share, or 
(ii) it was to be determined by the market forces through open auctioning in the stock 
exchange. MOF first opted for the former solution in Decree 64, and then for the latter 
solution only in 2004 when a new Decree, Decree 187, was issued to replace Decree 
64.
202
 The last stream in the Garbage Can model, the political stream provides room for 
different political actors involved in the equitization process, ranging from the key Party 
leaders, Prime Minister and his aides, economic and line ministries, local governments, 
towards General Corporations and state enterprises, to exercise their influences. These 
groups of political actors have used different channels, either formal or informal, to lobby 
for the solutions that benefit them the most. For example, as will be mentioned later in 
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Chapter IV, in order to push the issue of managing Equitization Funds, which used to be 
under Minister of Finance unarguably, onto the reform agenda, the State Capital and 
Investment Corporation (SCIC) managed to win the support from Deputy Prime Minister 
Nguyen Sinh Hung, who used to be the Finance Minister. The intervention of DPM 
Nguyen, therefore, helped SCIC to gain the right to manage the Equitization Fund, albeit 
under the guidance and supervision of MOF. 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the increased instability emerged in all three streams was due 
to the enlarging range of actors involved and their diverse interests in the process of 
making equitization policy and the creation of new resources attached to the equitization 
process, i.e. the proceeds collected from selling the State shares in equitized SOEs. The 
emergence of new institutions and resources related to the equitization process has taken 
place at both macro and micro levels, although to different extents. More central 
institutions were newly established than those at the local governments and enterprises. 
New resources, on a contrary, were mainly created at the micro level and partially 
channeled upwards to the central State. These two parallel, albeit unequal, processes 
played the role of main sources for anarchy in the making equitization policies in 
Vietnam and were reflected through the different dynamics of the political, policy, and 
problem streams at the macro and micro levels. Therefore, my argument is that there has 
been a shift in the dynamism from the macro level to the micro level, reflected through 
changes in the main contents of each stream at both levels. In other words, the content of 
each stream varies according to its level. For example, at the macro level, the fragmented 
authority has caused the political stream to revolve around two main themes: consensus 
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building on the one hand and power politics on the other hand. However, at the micro 
level, the political stream revolves around the client-patronage relationship between the 
local governments and their enterprises. For the local government, it is more about their 
fiscal situation and fiscal relationship with enterprises that shape the political stream in 
the equitization process. Similarly, the concern of the political stream for state enterprises 
is the trade off between their autonomy from and closeness with their State patrons in the 
equitization process. Similarly, the policy stream at the macro level revolves around such 
issues as different policy alternatives to ensure the harmonization of different interests of 
the State, the SOE employees, as well as outside investors. Meanwhile, more specific 
questions are dealt with in the policy stream at the micro level, for example how many 
percents of State ownership should be retained whereas how many percents should be 
sold to the employees and outside investors. 
 
Table 2.1: Contents of the three streams at macro and micro levels: Examples 
 
Level Problem stream Political stream Policy stream 
Macro  How problems are defined? 
Are they defined along the 
line of fiscal or developmental 
purposes? Or are they defined 
by the dogmatic/ideological 
divine?: Often problems 
within the bureaucracy are 
increasingly defined along the 
fiscal line, but within a 
broader context of VCP 
strong control over the 
equitization process. 
- Who raises the problem and 
how?: Issues are often raised 




negotiations, and resource 
exchanges in order to 
achieve both (i) consensus 
building, and (ii) power 
building, maintenance and 
development.  
Range of policy options is 
increasing, including both 
domestic solutions and foreign-
origin alternatives. This thus 
has different implications on 
the speed, contents, and forms 
of equitization. 
 
Micro  The issue that who initiates 
the equitization mandate at 
enterprise level is central. We 
suspect that the equitization 
outcome would differ 
depending on whether the 
- For State patron: patron-
client relationship with 
enterprises and fiscal stances 
- For enterprises: 
preferences between 
corporate autonomy and 
- Policy options vary, 
depending on who initiate the 
equitization mandate. There has 
been a wide range of 
alternatives for specific issues, 
such as which enterprise to 
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State patrons or state 
enterprises initiate the 
equitization. 
closeness with the State 
patron. 
privatize, how to restructure the 
assets, or how much of State 
ownership to let go or to retain 
 
II.3.3.2- Macro-Micro Interaction in Equitization 
After finding that the three streams at the macro and micro levels revolve around 
different issues/contents, the next question I try to deal with is how these two dynamics 
link to each other and how their interactions influence or shape the equitization outcome. 
On the macro-micro interactions in policy changes in Japan, Steven Vogel, through his 
model on Institutional Changes, finds that:  
 
“The Japanese model generates relatively predictable patterns of corporate 
adjustment and policy reform. But the actual trajectory of change over the longer 
term is complicated by the fact that the two levels interact. As the government 
enacts policy reforms, these reforms create new opportunities and constraints for 
further corporate adjustment; and as firms adjust to new challenges, these 
adjustments modify firms‟ policy preferences and thereby affect future policy 
reforms.”203 
 
The author of this thesis would like to argue that a similar pattern of macro-micro 
interactions is also observed in the equitization process in Vietnam. The macro dynamics, 
or the bargaining and negotiations among bureaucratic agencies over the formulation and 
revision of equitization policies, certainly constitute the legal environment for the latter 
dynamics, the bargaining and negotiations between the enterprises and state superiors 
                                                 
203
 Vogel (2006), p. 18 
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over the implementation of these policies at the micro level, to take place. In particular, 
the slow and unpredictable policy changes resulted from the macro dynamics have 
fostered the pattern of negotiations and bargaining between the State patrons and their 
enterprises over their different preferences in equitization. Such micro dynamics, in turn, 
leads to slow and incremental implementation of the equitization mandate at the micro 
level in order to suit the interests of both the State patrons and their subordinate 
enterprises. The micro dynamics, therefore, produces both constraints and incentives for 
the bargaining and negotiations to take place at the macro level over possible adjustments 
in equitization policies. For example, the legal framework for equitization during the late 
1990s and early 2000s did not stipulate the inclusion of land-use rights and other 
intangible values into the pre-equitization value of the enterprises, thus resulting in the 
so-called “underpricing” and “insider-trading” within equitized enterprises. This 
phenomenon, in turn, shaped the agenda of policy revisions during the early 2000s at the 
macro level. 






The contemporary literature on Vietnam‟s equitization has been polarized between 
policy-driven and process-driven arguments. As such, it misses out on two important 
dynamics of the equitization process, i.e. the inter-bureaucracy politics at the macro level 
and the government-enterprise interaction at the micro level. To fill in the gap, in this 
thesis, I examine the impacts of both policies, process, and their interactions. In so doing, 
I introduce the dual dynamics model which is composed from the Fragmented 
Authoritarianism model, various theories on government – business interactions, and the 
Garbage Can theory, to examine the equitization process at two levels: the macro 
dynamics and the micro dynamics. The macro dynamics is defined as the bargaining and 
negotiations among various bureaucratic agencies over various issues in the equitization 
policies. The micro dynamics, on the other hand, revolves around the bargaining and 
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negotiations between the state enterprises and their State patrons over the actual 
implementation of the equitization mandate. These two dynamics correspond with the 
two main stages of a policymaking cycle in equitization: the formulation and/or revision 
of equitization policies and the implementation of equitization policies and feedbacks. 
The central argument in applying the dual dynamics model in investigating the 
equitization process in Vietnam is that: the above mentioned sets of bargaining and 
negotiations, i.e. the macro dynamics and micro dynamics, and their interactions with 
each other, are keys in explaining both “gradualism” and “non-linearity” features of the 
equitization process in Vietnam.  
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Chapter III  Authority Structure in Equitization  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to disentangle the State machinery in the process of making 
equitization policies in Vietnam and thus to understand the power relationship among 
these various state actors involved in the process. Given the increasing tendency of 
bureaucratization in the making of equitization policies, the focus of the chapter is 
essentially confined to the policymaking process carried out by the State administrative 
ladder and does not discuss the role of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). 
 
The main argument I would like to make in this chapter is that the process of making 
equitization policies in Vietnam has been characterized with both authority fragmentation 
and anarchy. While fragmented authority has led to different sets of bargaining and 
negotiations over contentious issues in equitization at different levels, anarchy has 
resulted in a shift in dynamism among these levels. Firstly, the power in making 
equitization policies, similarly to other economic reforms, during the Doi Moi period, has 
been fragmented, due to various reform efforts, such as public administration reforms and 
fiscal decentralization. This fragmentation of power has led to bargaining, negotiations, 
and resource exchanges among different bureaucratic units in order to seek consensus 
over policy changes and their accordingly implementation. At the macro level, bargaining 
and negotiations mainly take place among different bureaucratic units in charge of 
formulating and revising equitization policies. At the micro level, bargaining and 
negotiations are between the direct State supervisors and their subordinate enterprises 
over the implementation of the equitization policies. Another feature of the process of 
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making equitization policies in Vietnam is the increased instability of the power 
structure, due to, paradoxically, the tendency of bureaucratization and routinization, or 
the tendency to set up new institutions/bureaucratic agencies to deal with new problems 
arisen during the process. As was mentioned in Chapter II, the emergence of these new 
institutions or agencies has resulted in greater authority instability in making equitization 
policies and consequently increased unpredictability of policy outcomes.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section, Section III.1, discusses the impact 
of Doi Moi with various reform measures on the authority structure in making 
equitization policies. In particular, the section focuses on the public administration 
reforms and fiscal decentralization efforts carried out during the 1990s. Section III.2 
discusses the tendency of institutionalization in the equitization process and its impact. 
Section III.3 provides a description of the formal power relationship among various State 
actors involved in the making of equitization policies while section III.4 details out how 
these relationships and actors actually fit into different stages of the policymaking 
process. Finally, Section III.5 ends the chapter with a brief discussion about authority 
fragmentation and anarchy in the process of making equitization policies in Vietnam.  
 
III.1- Beyond the Coherent Image of the State 
III.1.1- Public Administration Reforms and Implications 
III.1.1.1- Disbanding of the State Planning Commission  
One among the most notable administrative reforms carried out in the early 1990s was 
the disbanding of the Ministers‟ Council (Hoi Dong Bo Truong) and a number of supra-
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ministerial State Committees (Uy Ban Nha Nuoc) during the first half of the 1990s.
204
 
This restructuring gave increasing power to the remaining actors which included the 
Prime Minister and his aides, various Ministries and para-ministerial agencies, at the cost 
of supra-ministerial coordinating committees. Concerning the economic sector, one of the 
key Committees abandoned during this period was the State Planning Commission (Uy 
ban Ke hoach Nha nuoc) or SPC. Prior to Doi Moi, the SPC was the chief economic 
designer for the central planning economy of Vietnam. SPC was given a supra-ministerial 
status, headed by a Deputy Prime Minister cum a member of the Politburo, while the 
person in charge of its daily management was given quasi-Minister rank. Regarding the 
organizational structure, SPC consisted of various Departments which had their 
equivalent in a ministry as well as different research institutes. The SPC was probably the 
most powerful agency in the Vietnamese bureaucracy due to both its planning and 
distributional functions in the planned economy in the 1970s and the 1980s.
205
  Both 
partial economic reforms during the late 1970s and the early 1980s and the official 
reform program- Doi Moi, all came from the SPC. The idea of equitization was thus also 
originated from the SPC, or the Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), its 
think-tank institute, in particular. CIEM was the person who prepared the text of Decision 
143 in 1990, Decision 202 in 1992, as well as subsequent legal documents regulating the 
pilot equitization program.
206
 However, together with the disbanding of SPC in the early 
1990s and the merger of CIEM unto the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the 
                                                 
204
 For an overview about the public administration reforms in Vietnam, one can refer to the 
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Development, Number 46, Volume XXV, No. 2, Second Semester, 1998 
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job of formulating equitization policies has been no longer with CIEM, but in the hands 
of Ministry of Finance, other economic and line Ministries, para-ministerial agencies, 





III.1.1.2- Authority Fragmentation in Equitization 
The redistribution of State authority in making equitization policies among the remaining 
State actors due to such restructuring was, however, not equal. In the equitization 
process, the rise of the Ministry of Finance was observed with a relative loss of power for 
the remaining Ministries. In particular, the responsibility to manage the State capital in 
state enterprises was re-assigned to Ministry of Finance as means to weaken the 
collaboration between the line Ministries and SOE managers in manipulating the use of 
State capital and assets for their local benefits. These efforts were pushed forward under 
the slogan of minimizing the bureaucratic interventions of line Ministries into the daily 




As such, a General for Management of State Assets and Capital in Enterprises (Tong cuc 
Quan ly Von va Tai san Nha nuoc tai Doanh nghiep) was established under MOF in 1994 
as a key measure to strengthen the capacity of this Ministry in monitoring the use of State 
assets and capital in state enterprises since then. Before 1994, the direct State supervisors, 
being either line Ministries or local government, played both roles of owner and regulator 
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 Ibid., and author‟s interviews with CIEM and MOF officials during fieldtrips in Vietnam in 
2007 
208
 Martin Painter, “Public Administration in Vietnam: Problems and Prospects”, Public 
Administration and Development, Issue 23, Vol.3, August 2003, pp. 259-271 
  
124 
for their state enterprises. The establishment of the General Department thus aimed at 
reducing towards eliminating entirely the involvement of line ministries and local 
governments in the management of State capital and assets in enterprises. The General 
Department, or MOF in general, now represented the State in managing the State assets 
and capital in state enterprises, or playing the role of their owner; whereas line Ministries 
or local governments played the role of State regulators in these enterprises. The actual 
process of forming the General Department at MOF and its branches at local 
governments was, however, the product of “merging several pre-existing overlapping 
agencies and departments in the government performing essentially similar tasks of 
monitoring and supervision”.209 The General Department was entitled with a number of 
rights and responsibilities previously exercised solely by the direct State supervisors. For 
example, the General Department took part in proposing and considering the 
appointments and dismissals of management positions in state enterprises. Most 
importantly, the General Department was in charge of supervising financial performance 
of state enterprises, including the use and liquidation of state assets and capital in these 
enterprises. In addition, the Department was also in charge of introducing a new 
accounting and auditing system for SOEs, which has been implemented on a pilot basis 
since January 1995. Finally, as part of the task to manage the State assets and capital, the 





                                                 
209





In order to carry out the above-mentioned tasks, including the formulation of equitization 
policies and supervision of their implementation, the General Department was 
subsequently restructured vigorously in order to streamline the cumbersome bureaucratic 
machine, to cut down the staff size, and to improve the service quality. In particular, the 
General Department was rescaled into Department of Enterprise Finance (DEF) in 1999 
reportedly due to numerous complaints about excessive red tape and interventions of this 
General Department in the operations of state enterprises.
211
 DEF was further re-
structured in 2004, following Decision 27 of the Minister of Finance. According to this 
Decision, DEF categorized the state enterprises along the sectoral lines and managed the 
State capital and assets in these enterprises accordingly. For example, DEF consisted of 
four functional Boards that manage the finance of SOEs in the sectors of industries, 
transportation and construction, agriculture and fishery, and services, one General 
Division, and one Administration section. The General Division was in charge of drafting 
the equitization policies based on regular consultation with the four functional Boards 




III.1.1.3- Failed Efforts of Re-centralization 
Another consequence of the above-mentioned public administration reforms during the 
1990s is that any efforts to re-organize supra-ministerial Committees in following periods 
largely failed, causing difficulties in coordinating the policymaking process. The 
establishment and operation of Ban Chi dao Quoc gia ve Doi Moi va Phat trien Doanh 
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 Author‟s interviews with MOF officials during fieldtrips in Vietnam in 2007. The rules and 
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nghiep or the National Steering Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development 
(NSCERD) in the equitization process is a typical example. The making of equitization 
policies demanded the participation across the bureaucracy, in which MOF was mainly in 
charge of formulating the policies while the responsibility to implement the policies laid 
with line Ministries, local governments, and state enterprises. Any mismatch between the 
two stages of policy formulation and implementation would thus certainly jeopardize the 
process. The Central State, aware of this coordination problem, attempted to set up 
NSCERD as a supra-ministerial Committee to oversee the whole process of making 
equitization policies.
213
 However, due to various reasons that we will discuss below, 
NSCERD failed to live up to these initial expectations. Consequently, NSCERD, albeit 
its very existence, almost disappeared in the text of the latest legal document regulating 
the equitization process in Vietnam-Decree 109 in 2007.  
 
NSCERD had a rather long history of establishment, which dated back to the beginning 
of the equitization process in the early 1990s. NSCERD‟s predecessor, the National 
Committee of SOE Management Reform, was established in 1998 as the result of the 
merger between the National Steering Committee of Enterprise Reform formed in 1993 
and the National Steering Committee of SOE Equitization formed in 1996.
214
 In 2000, the 
National Committee of SOE Management Reform was renamed as NSCERD. By the end 
of the 1990s, NSCERD‟s main task was “to draw up strategies, direct, guide, and monitor 
implementation, coordinate with the competent agencies in making submissions and 
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214
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propose solutions to remove difficulties” in the SOE reform in general and the 
equitization process in particular.
215
 The Committee received direct assistance from the 
Department of Enterprise Reform at the Office of Government. Also, Boards of 
Enterprise Reform and Development (BERDs) were formed at the ministries, local 




Since 1998, instead of being headed by a quasi-Minister as before, the Committee has 
been chaired by one Deputy Prime Minister (often the one in charge of economic-
financial issues) with two standing Deputy Chairs and a number of non-standing 
Members from MOF and line Ministries. Despite the permanent nature of the post, the 
two standing Deputy Chairs of the Committee, as appointed from the Office of 
Government, were often also responsible for other matters in the Office. The most 
committed Standing Deputy Chair of the Committee so far was Dr. Pham Viet Muon who 
used to be vocally pro-reform and make bold statements in the media to accelerate the 
equitization process.
217
 However, after he got promoted to the post of Vice-President at 
Office of Government, he seemed to be much less vocal and did not appear in the media 
as frequently as before. The other standing Deputy Chair of the Committee, Dr. Ho Xuan 
Hung has now moved to a new post of Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Rural 
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 For example, in one interview with the media, Dr. Pham vigorously asked for efforts to push 
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not yet realized so far, implicitly indicating the powerless of NSCERD in coordinating Ministries 
in the equitization process.  
  
128 





Other ambiguities regarding NSCERD‟s role and capacity in the equitization process 
were also prevalent. There existed a common perception that the Committee was “a force 
for prevarication as much as an engine of reform”.219 Spotting that weakness in the 
coordinative mechanism in the equitization process, International Financial Institutions, 
especially the International Monetary Fund in Vietnam, requested the Government to 
grant NSCERD with actual enforcement power. However, this move was contradictorily 
resisted by the staff of NSCERD themselves as they saw it as a loss of independence and 
status rather than a gain in coordinating power.
220
 Since 2001, NSCERD has also 
received a number of technical assistances (TAs) from the community of international 
donors in a bid to enhance the capacity of this organization.
221
 One significant TA among 
them was from the World Bank in 2002 to help NSCERD build up a comprehensive 
database on SOEs and their equitization process thereof. The purpose was to boost up the 
NSCERD‟s capacity in supervising state enterprises in their equitization process and 
providing proper advices to the Prime Minister. However, it seemed that no analysis and 
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reporting from this database had been publicly available.
222
 Meanwhile, when being 
asked about the NSCERD‟s capacity in providing credible information and data on the 
SOE equitization process in Vietnam, most of related MOF officials stated frankly that all 
the data and reports under NSCERD‟s name came mainly from MOF or the Department 




III.1.2- Central-Local Relationship  
III.1.2.1- Fiscal Decentralization and Impacts 
Vietnam has a long history of decentralization which dated back to its feudal time when 
the popular tradition that “phep vua thua le lang”, or the power of the King stopped at the 
village‟s gate, implying the weak position of the Central State in comparison with 
regional and local powers. The power of the feudal Central State was further weakened 
when it failed to prevent the country from falling under the French colonial rule in the 
early twentieth century. Efforts were made by the Communist Central State to 
consolidate its power in North Vietnam during the war period from 1954-1975; however, 
the war conditions and needs forced the Centre to allow a great extent of regional and 
local autonomy.
224
 What a majority of scholars observed in Vietnam during this period is 
the coexistence of both the centralized planning system of allocating and redistributing 
resources and a highly decentralized local administrative machine, or a coexistence of 
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both decentralization and re-centralization tendencies or of both planning and market in 




However, the context changed in the late 1970s when the war was over. As mentioned 
earlier, pha rao activities, having their roots as early as right in the onset of the wartime, 
started to boom at local levels. These activities, in fact, became informal but important 
financial sources, besides the waning transfers from the State budget, for a number of 
local States. These fence-breaking activities thus led to the consolidation of power for 
local administrative agencies at the expense of the politico-economic power of the 
Central State.
226
 The subsequent periods thus witnessed a number of the Central State‟s 
efforts to reconsolidate its fiscal power over the local governments. These efforts were 
ironically masked under the propaganda of officially granting more autonomy to them, or 
fiscal decentralization.
227
 In fact, both revenue and expenditure assignments were 
designed to retain the control power in the hand of the Central State.
228
 However, as part 
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of incentives for local States to increase the Central revenue collection, changes in the 




One important change to be noted was the passage of the 1996 Law on State Budget. The 
1996 Law granted provinces and centrally-managed municipalities increased autonomy 
over local expenditure and, more significantly, set up “a system of residual claimancy” 
whereby provincial and para-provincial governments could retain their revenues surplus 
once they fulfilled their committed centrally-negotiated revenue assignment. This reform 
process not only provided local governments with incentives to “minimize their revenues 
targets while maximizing actual revenues once the three-year targets had been set”, but 
also “created a strong patron-client relationship between reform minded party leaders and 
political leaders in the provinces”.230  
 
However, the increased local autonomy due to fiscal decentralization varied to a great 
extent from one province to another. Big and prosperous provinces and cities such as 
Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City would find it easy to fulfill the revenue assignments from the 
Central State. These localities thus possessed more leverages in negotiating with the 
Central State over the sharing ratios of revenues. Other provinces, on a contrary, faced 
real difficulties in meeting the revenue assignments and thus relied to a great extent on 
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the transfers from the Central State Budget. There thus existed an asymmetry in increased 
autonomy enjoyed by different regions, provinces, and cities due to fiscal 
decentralization in Vietnam throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s.
231
 If big cities and 
provinces often take the advantage of fiscal decentralization to enhance their own 
positions in the national map; smaller local governments still had to rely considerably on 
the State Budget and thus had little room to maneuver in the central-local bargaining. 
This has posed significant impacts on the central-local relationship in the equitization 
process. Big cities and provinces with greater autonomy would certainly have more 
advantages in central-local bargaining and negotiations over contentious issues in 
equitization policies than small, more fiscally dependent provinces. 
 
III.1.2.2- Dual Subordination and Re-centralization Efforts 
Besides adjustments in the fiscal relationship, the Central State also carried out vigorous 
administrative reforms in order to “build a viable and centralized political and economic 
bureaucracy”.232 For example, a series of new and revised laws regulating the functioning 
of the State machinery had been enforced since the late 1980s, aiming at increasing the 
role of the bureaucracy, especially the Central State, in the management of the economy 
at all levels. In particular, at the local levels, People‟s Committees have been separated 
from People‟s Councils and moved to integrate into the national State administrative 
system, forming a single state apparatus. People‟s Committees now represent the central 
government in the localities and implement the central government‟s orders within their 
territories. In addition, the central State has been granted increased power in revoking 
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decisions made by people‟s committees and people‟s councils which are contradictory to 
those of the central state. The status of a number of functional Departments which used to 
be under the local governments‟ authority, except those organizations serving local 
objectives under people‟s committees, has been revised to enhance their ties with the 
central state.  Finally, key positions in committees or boards guiding enterprises, organs, 
organizations, and state professional units (including SOEs) have now been considered 
state officials and appointed by the relevant supervisory State agencies, despite the fact 




Concerning the specific issue of equitization, as part of the Central State‟s efforts to 
ensure the uniform and coherent implementation of the equitization mandate at all local 
levels, a specialized Board - Board of Enterprise Reform and Development (BERD) or 
Ban Doi Moi va Phat Trien Doanh Nghiep, was formed in each line Ministry, local 
government, or General Corporation. These BERDs were subjected to the principle of 
dual subordination, which means, they were responsible to report to both their direct 
State supervisors, i.e. line Ministries, local governments, or General Corporation, on the 
one hand, and NSCERD on the other hand.  
 
BERDs at line Ministries were often established in a permanent basis with own personnel 
and resources. As an example, BERD at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) was established in 2005 with major responsibilities in preparing 
and implementing policies regarding SOE restructuring, re-arrangement, and equitization, 
as well as reforming the corporate governance in state enterprises and others in the 
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agricultural and rural development sector, in addition to exercise the State management 
over these enterprises. Before 2005, these responsibilities were shared among a number 
of Departments within MARD, namely Department of Personnel Organization, 
Department of Planning, Department of Finance, Department of Cooperatives and Rural 
Development, and Department of Inspection.
234
 It is noted that there is a high rate of staff 
turnover (joining or leaving) at BERDs as staff often seek better and more stable 
positions elsewhere in the formal bureaucracy and its extended parts. This is due to the 
widespread uncertainties about roles, functions, and even the survival possibilities of 
these BERDs, especially after the equitization mandate is completed. For example, by the 
late 2007, the Head of BERD at MARD, Dr. Doan Dinh Thiem, moved to become the 
Chairman of the Board of Management of Vinacafe, a 91-GC – the biggest coffee 




Local BERDs, on the other hand, could be set up on either permanent or ad-hoc basis, led 
by one Deputy Chair of the PPC with the assistance of representatives from various 
functional Departments. Permanent Boards had their own personnel and office at the 
PPCs. Ad-hoc Boards, on the other hand, convened only on ad-hoc basis, with members 
working mainly for different functional departments. As mentioned above, the two core 
Departments in charge of equitization were Department of Planning and Investment (So 
Ke hoach va Dau tu) and Department of Finance (So Tai Chinh). Depending on the 
specific context of the province/city, one in these two Departments would take the lead in 
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coordinating the implementation of equitization mandate. For example, Hanoi‟s BERD 
was formed on an ad-hoc basis, in which the Department of Finance or the Bureau of 
Enterprise Finance in particular, oversaw the overall process of equitization. BERD in 
Tuyen Quang, a small province located in the North of Hanoi, was also established on an 
ad-hoc basis but led by the Department of Planning and Investment.
236
 To implement the 
equitization mandate, BERDs were also formed at GCs to select their SOEs member for 
equitization, issuing further directives and guidelines on equitization for their members, 
forming Equitization Boards at these SOEs, endorsing their equitization plans, and so on.  
 
Graph 3.1: NSCERD and BERDs- Organizational chart and Dual Subordination 
 
Note:  
* abbreviations: (i) BERD: Board of Enterprise Reform and Development; (ii) BOE: Board of Equitization 
 *  arrow reflects the directional flow from the superior level to the subordinate level 
    --> arrow reflects the reporting flow from the subordinate level to the superior level 
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As mentioned earlier, BERDs were subject to the principle of double subordination. In 
particular, BERDs at line Ministries were officially responsible to report to both line 
Ministers and NSCERD. Local BERDs, similar to those at line Ministries, are responsible 
to report to both the PPCs and NSCERD. BERDs in 91 GCs reported directly to 
NSCERD while BERDs in 90 GCs reported to BERDs in line Ministries and local 
governments. However, in fact, the design of dual subordination between NSCERD at the 
central level and BERDs at local levels aimed at ensuring unanimous conformity from 
the top level of the State structure down towards the lowest levels of the State structure in 
implementing the equitization mandate. However, the reality is not that simple as “the 
upper levels of government are often unable to direct or order the lower levels to do as 
told, because of the multiple chains of command that the lower officials are able to 
manipulate to counter orders they are not happy with”.237 BERDs at line Ministries, local 
governments, and General Corporations often found their interests more closely attached 
to their direct State supervisors than to NSCERD or MOF or any other central State actor 
sitting at the top of the system. In the end of the day, these BERDs‟ staff came from their 
direct State patrons, being them line Ministries, local government, or General 
Corporations. It is thus natural that these BERDs would seek to cater the demand of their 
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III.1.3- Authority Fragmentation in Equitization  
As was discussed above, Doi Moi, through various public administration reform efforts 
and fiscal decentralization, has transformed the authority structure in making equitization 
policies in Vietnam. Instead of being centralized at the supra-ministerial committees and 
above, the power to formulate and implement equitization policies has been fragmented 
among various Ministries, para-ministerial agencies, local governments, and even state 
enterprises. Decentralization is not, however, the only game in town. During the same 
period, efforts have also been made by the central state in order to re-centralize the power 
in making equitization policies. The establishment and restructuring of NSCERD 
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, as well as the set-up of BERDs at line 
Ministries, local governments, and GCs under the dual subordination mechanism with 
NSCERD are typical examples for such tendency. However, so far all these re-
centralization efforts failed to meet their purposes. All in all, a pattern of power 
fragmentation in the equitization process has emerged among various waves of 
decentralization and re-centralization within the same Doi Moi period. This fragmented 
authority structure would lead to, as I will argue later in this chapter, bargaining, 
negotiations, and resource exchanges among various State agencies over contentious 





III.2- Power Instability in Equitization 
III.2.1- Bureaucratization and Routinization in Equitization: A DRV Legacy 
In fact, the tendency of bureaucratization and routinization in Vietnam, or the 
establishment of new institutions in order to deal with new issues, especially in the 
equitization process, is not stemmed from the recent Doi Moi process, but rather part of 
the DRV legacy. The tendency to set up new institutions and programs in order to solve 
problems within the system has been observed during the existence of the DRV model, 
originating from “an underlying commitment on the part of the Vietnamese leadership to 
a form of state organization that could be termed “rational-bureaucratic” in the Weberian 
sense of imposing rationality on the affairs of man through complex organization and 
scientific management.”239 According to David W. P. Elliot, the DRV attempted to 
follow the Soviet-style legal system, instead of the China‟s Maoist “reign of virtue” 
model, since the 1960s and reinvigorated it further after the reunification in 1975. For 
examples, in order to accelerate the socialist transformation of the South, two new 
institutions, namely the Private Capitalist Industry and Commerce Reform Department 
and the Committee on the Reform of Agriculture in the Southern Provinces, were set up 
with unique structures to serve their particular missions. Another feature of 
institutionalization tendency is that often a number of institutions, rather than just one 
single institution, were set up to solve the same problem, under the hope that their 
cumulative impacts would do the job better than any individual impacts.
240
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The tendency of establishing new institutions to cope with problems in the equitization 
process can be detected clearly during the 1990s and the early 2000s, with the set-up of 
NSCERD at the central state level and BERDs at line Ministries, local governments, and 
GCs to solve the coordination problem in implementing the equitization mandate, as well 
as the Debt and Asset Trading Corporation (DATC) under MOF and State Capital and 
Investment Corporation (SCIC) by the Prime Minister to deal with both pre- and post-
equitization issues. As was discussed above, the emergence of NSCERD and BERDs 
failed to re-centralize the authority in making equitization policies and therefore seemed 
unable to substantively transform the current structure of power fragmentation. However, 
I would like to argue in the following sections that the establishment of new institutions, 
such as DATC and SCIC, would likely pose certain impact on the authority structure in 
making equitization policies. In so doing, I will discuss in specific the origin and 
evolution of DATC and SCIC and their implications in the context of equitization in 
Vietnam. 
 
III.2.2- Debt and Asset Trading Corporation 
Cong ty Mua ban No va Tai san Doanh nghiep, or the Debt and Asset Trading 
Corporation (DATC), was established under MOF in 2003 with the purpose of solving 
bad debts and non-performing assets suffered by the system of state enterprises- which 
have been so far considered as the biggest barrier for the equitization process in 
Vietnam.
241
 In so doing, DATC has been capitalized by MOF with a legal capital of 
about VND 2,000 billion. Regarding the organizational structure, DATC had the structure 
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of a typical General Corporation, with a Board of Management, Board of Directors, 
Inspection Board, and a number of functional and administrative divisions, two local 
branches, and one Transaction Center. The corporation‟s Board of Management and 
General Director were all appointed by Minister of Finance. It was staffed mainly with 
people from the Department of Enterprise Finance. Both DATC‟s current Chairman of 





Table 3.1: Overview of DATC’s main activities during 2004-2008 
Timeline Indicators 
End 2004 - Total stock of bad debts for the whole SOE system: VND 28,000 
billion (increased by VND 7,000 billion or 33% as compared with that 
figure in early 2000)
243
 
Within 2004 - DATC received bad debts and idle assets of 63 SOEs with total 




- These SOEs were directed to sell their bad debts and assets to DATC 
2005-2006 - DATC worked with the 4 State-owned-commercial Banks (SOCBs) in 
order to find solutions for the huge stock of bad debts of these big 
Four, preparing the conditions for their re-arrangement and 
equitization process up to 2010
245
  
End 2007 - DATC had received VND 2,680 billions of bad debts and assets from 
equitized SOEs and SOEs going through other measures of ownership 
transformation. 
- Among which, 1,212 companies have processed their bad debts and 
assets, and returned VND 306 billions from their bad assets and VND 
6.4 billions from their bad debts to DATC.
246
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Mid 2008 - DATC received bad debts and assets from 2,190 SOEs with total 
value of VND 4,121 billion. 
- DATC reclaimed VND 306 billion, the ratio of reclaimed capital to 




DATC has so far underperformed and failed to meet most of its targets. The volume of 
bad debts and assets hold by the company is just a small percentage of the total stock for 
the SOE system. Two years after its establishment, the company focused mainly on 
working out the restructuring plans with the system of State-owned-commercial-banks 
instead of dealing directly with enterprises. The company was often discredited by its 
staff team which came mainly from the Department for Enterprise Finance at MOF. For 
that, the company is often dubbed as another “bureaucratic” DEF, not a commercially-
oriented entity. The reputation of the company is also affected by the current rumor about 
the internal conflicts between the Board of Managements and Directors over the vision, 




Table 3.2: Snapshot on DATC’s financial performance in 2007249 
Indicators Value 
Total revenues, in which VND 628 billion 
Revenues from processing the bad debts and assets already bought 
from SOEs 
VND 23.43 billion 
Revenues from selling bad assets and reclaiming the bad debts VND 419.6 billion 
Pre-tax profit, among which VND 154.2 billion 




 Đầu Tư Chứng Khoán, “Mua bán nợ: công cụ tài chính giải quyết khủng hoảng và tái cấu 
trúc DNNN” (Debt Trading: Financial Masures for SOE Restructuring), 11/10/2008, access 
online at http://tintuc.timnhanh.com/kinh_te/20081011/35A85BBF/ 
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Profit from processing bad debts and assets VND 2.5 billion 
Others (interests earned from investment and depositing unused 
charter capital) 
VND 151.7 billion 
Contributions to the State Budget VND 135.4 billion 
 
III.2.3- State Capital and Investment Corporation 
Tong Cong Ty Dau Tu Von Nha nuoc, or the State Capital and Investment Corporation 
(SCIC), was established in mid 2005 by the Prime Minister, upon the proposal of 
Ministry of Finance, as a special Corporation replacing line Ministries and local states in 
representing the State in SOEs. The establishment of SCIC was aimed at reducing State 
interventions in the daily operations of state enterprises and creating a professional body 
to manage the State capital in these enterprises. Regarding the equitization issue, SCIC 
was entitled to manage the remaining State capital in post-equitization companies.
 250
   
 
Starting its operation in early 2006, SCIC, by end 2007, managed the State capital in 
more than 800 SOEs with total booked value of more than VND 7,500 billion and market 
value estimated at VND 20,000 billions (which used to be doubled at the peak of the 
stock market in late 2006). SCIC has categorized these 800 companies into three groups. 
The first group consists of about 10 large-scale, efficient companies which are suitable 
for its long-term investment strategy. The total capital in these 10 companies has 
accounted for already 70 percent of SCIC‟s total capital. The second group consists of 
medium-scale but efficient companies, at least in short terms. SCIC has assisted this 
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group of companies to list on the stock exchange. SCIC plans to partially divest its stakes 
in this group of companies in the long-term. The last group consists of the rest 600 SOEs, 
most of them are of very small scale and SCIC‟s strategy is to quickly divest the State 




SCIC has a typical GC structure with a Board of Management, Board of Directors, and 
Inspection Board. The Board of Management used to be chaired by Madame Le Thi Bang 
Tam, Deputy Minister of Finance from mid 2005 to end 2007. Starting from 2008, the 
Minister of Finance is appointed by the Prime Minister to be SCIC‟s Chairman in 
replacement for Madame Tam. There are two non-standing Members from Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce and Ministry of Planning and Investment in the Board of 
Management. The General Director is also appointed by the Prime Minister, currently a 
Deputy Minister of Finance. Both of his Deputies come from MOF, one is a former Head 
of the Department of Enterprise Finance and one is a former Deputy Head of the 
Department of Insurance. The Boards of Directors is supported by a number of functional 
and administrative divisions to manage its SOE members and associated companies. 
SCIC also established one branch in Ho Chi Minh City in 2007. 
 
III.2.4- Implication on the Equitization Process 
As the result of the bureaucratization and routinization tendency in the equitization 
process, the authority structure was not only unevenly fragmented among existing actors, 
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but also dispersed into newly established institutions and agencies. For example, the 
establishment and transformation of NSCERD, especially in the early 2000s, drew 
attentions and resources from both the State Budget and international donor. The 
establishment of a separate BERD at each line Ministry and some of local States with its 
own personnel, office, and resources was also costly. The expansion of the scope of 
equitization to cover virtually almost all SOEs into the process in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s has made equitization really matter to important SOEs, especially GCs and 
their variants, as well as the State-Owned-Commercial Banks and other State-owned 
financial institutions. Finally, the recent establishment of the two special arrangements, 
DATC and SCIC, as were discussed above, further scattered the existing and future 
resources saved for and created within the equitization process among an increasing 
range of actors. Although these two special corporations were closely linked with MOF, 
they were, on the other hand, continuously seeking autonomy from MOF. The difference 
between these two institutions and the previously established institutions, such as 
NSCERD, is that they are possessing real resources, or “real money”, in their hands. For 
example, by 2009 SCIC has been fully capitalized with VND 15,000 billion in legal 
capital while keeping shares in hundreds of equitized enterprises with the total investment 
portfolio worth up to at least VND 20,000 billion, let alone being the dominant 
shareholders in many among these companies. As termed by one financial specialist at 
MOF, SCIC is currently and potentially the most powerful General Corporation among 
all GCs in Vietnam.
252
 DATC, although still relies to a great extent on MOF and has not 
yet performed well so far, is also potentially powerful in the process, as it deals with the 
most important pre-equitization policies for enterprises, bad debts and non-performing 
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assets. Above all that, the tendency of setting up new institutions in order to deal with 
new problems arisen from the equitization process has resulted in an increasing range of 
actors and interests in the process. Once a new institution is established, it will start its 
new life, have its own interests, and seek ways to find its own resources. This is 
completely true for the case of DATC and SCIC in the process of equitization in 
Vietnam. And as I will prove it in the case of establishing and restructuring various Funds 
to support the equitization process in the subsequent chapter, the phenomenon of “new 
institutions, new power” would bring about the maneuvering of these new institutions 
over the three streams of politics, problems, and policies within the Garbage Can 
framework in order to get their interests satisfied in the process.  
 
III.3- Power Relationship in Equitization 
As with other reform measures, the key principle in the making of equitization policies is 
democratic centralism.
253
 By democratic, the process should be open for everyone to 
participate and contribute. By centralism, the process should ensure that the uniform line 
of authority is run smoothly top-down. In other words, the submission of lower levels to 
the superiors, and eventually, to the top State leaders, including the head of the State and 
the Party must always be maintained. Consensus issue has been thus taken seriously in 
the process. In order to maintain both the democratic as well as centralized aspects in the 
process of making equitization policies, the following key interagency relations are 
formally institutionalized: (i) the top-down or directive relationship and (ii) the 
coordinative and consultative relationship, and (iii) the dual subordination at local States. 
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The former two applied to all levels of the State, while the latter was specified 
particularly for local States (from the provincial governments downwards). 
 
III.3.1- Directive or Top-down Relationships 
The top-down or directive relationships are formed between superior and inferior State 
agencies. In the ladder of State structure, the top leaders‟ commands, written in the 
Party‟s Resolutions, are the highest mandates that all lower-level State agencies must 
follow. Along the line, the Government issued Decrees to legalize the equitization 
policies approved by the Party. MOF and other functional Ministries issue Circulars to 
provide general guidelines. The line Ministries, in the SOE equitization process, perform 
both the role of partially making rules and regulations on the one hand and implementing 
the mandate on the other hand. Upon the issuance of the Governmental Decrees 
regulating the equitization process and MOF‟s core circulars to further explain the 
Decrees, line Ministries issue their own legal documents (Minister‟s Decisions or 
Directives) to guide the implementation in their specific sectors/areas. Legal 
documents/policies issued by lower State agencies are often expected to be in conformity 
with those issued by higher State agencies. In other words, line Ministries‟ and local 
States‟ directives on guiding the equitization mandate in their localities should not be in 
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III.3.2- Consultative and Coordinative Relationships 
Coordinative and consultative relationships exist between parallel State agencies and/or 
with lower-level State agencies. For example, regarding the preparing highest legal 
document within the Bureaucracy to regulate the equitization process - the Governmental 
Decrees, MOF was the coordinator, responsible for drafting the main text and sending out 
to line Ministries, local States (usually the governments of big provinces and centrally-
managed, strategic municipalities), and even some big GCs and economic groups, for 
comments and feedbacks. MOF would look into these comments and feedbacks, and 
might include them into the final submission to the Prime Minister for approval. In case 
MOF disagrees with line Ministries over their inputs, MOF needs to report such 
disagreements and propose solutions to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister often 
plays the role of making final decision in case consensus has yet been achieved among 
MOF and line Ministries.  
 
Consultations among MOF and other relevant State agencies also exist when MOF 
prepares its Minister‟s Decision to provide further guidelines to the implementation of the 
Governmental Decrees; however, it is the Minister of Finance who decided whether to 
accept the inputs from other agencies or not. Meanwhile, the process of preparing legal 
documents to guide the implementation of the Governmental Decrees and MOF‟s 
guideline Decisions in each sector, industry, or location mainly takes place among 
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III.3.3- Dual Subordination 
The dual subordination mechanism requires that certain functional Departments under the 
local governments to report both horizontally to their local governments and vertically to 
the central Ministries in charge of its sector/industry. Such dual subordination is aimed at 
ensuring the conformity of lower-level State agencies to the mandate of the Central 
State.
256
 As was mentioned earlier in Section III.3.1, as part of the Central State‟s efforts 
to ensure the proper implementation of the equitization mandate, a specialized Board - 
Board of Enterprise Reform and Development or Ban Doi Moi va Phat Trien Doanh 
Nghiep or BERD in short, was formed in each line Ministry, local government, or 
General Corporation. These BERDs were also subjected to the principle of dual 
subordination, which means, they were responsible to report to both their direct State 
supervisors, i.e. line Ministries, local governments, or General Corporation, on the one 




III.4- A Typical Cycle of Policymaking Process 
In the framework of this chapter and the Thesis in general, the process of making 
equitization policies is categorized into two main phases/stages. The first phase is to 
initiate and formulate new equitization policies, or revise existing equitization policies. 
The second phase is to implement the equitization mandate according to the newly-
formulated for revised policies and to provide feedbacks.  
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III.4.1- Policy Initiation, Formulation and/or Revision 
The Party set the guidelines and general directions for the equitization process mainly 
through its political reports produced in Party Congresses and their in-between meetings, 
termed the Party‟s Resolution. The Bureaucracy/State is subsequently responsible for 
realizing these guidelines and directions by issuing relevant legal documents. In 
particular, Head of the Government, the Prime Minister dictates the targets of equitization 
in the Government Action Plans every five years and/or every year. He also signs 
Decrees to regulate the equitization process. Supporting the Prime Minister, in the case of 
equitization, are the National Steering Committee of Enterprise Reform and Development 
and, one level below, the Department of Enterprise Reform, both belonging to the Office 
of Government. As mentioned earlier, equitization entered officially into the VCP‟s 
agenda in early 1990s when the seventh Central Party Congress opened and since then 
has been continuously renewed and revised to cover new issues in the subsequent 
Congresses. The recent efforts to push forward the equitization process have been 
associated with the three successive Prime Ministers, Vo Van Kiet during the period 
between 1992 and 1997, Phan Van Khai during the period between 1997 and 2006, and 
Nguyen Tan Dung since 2006.  The measure has been formalized by the top leaders as a 
nation-wide reform measure since 1996 and set as the main SOE reform measure by the 
end of the 1990s.
258
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The formulation of the detailed decrees to regulate the equitization process, however, was 
with the Ministry of Finance. In particular, MOF, in cooperation with NSCERD, has been 
assigned with the task of devising equitization policies and specifying the implementation 
procedures from the very beginning in 1992. In particular, MOF has drafted both 
Governmental Decrees and its own follow-up Decisions to regulate SOE equitization in 
details. Within MOF, Department for Enterprise Finance (DEF) – Cuc Tai Chinh Doanh 
Nghiep, or the former General Department for Management of State Capital and Assets in 
Enterprises - Tong Cuc Quan Ly Von va Tai San Nha Nuoc tai Doanh nghiep, coordinates 
the job. A consensus is often expected among different Departments within MOF before 
DEF submits the final drafted policy to the Minister. Next, MOF conducted consultations 
with other Ministries and para-ministerial agencies, some strategic local governments 
such as Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, and big GCs over the content of the drafted Decrees. 
A consensus is similarly expected at this stage before a final draft of the decree is to 




As mentioned earlier, the Prime Minister was in charge of approving and signing the 
Governmental Decrees to regulate the equitization process. The Office of Prime Minister 
and NSCERD were supposed to provide technical assistance to the Prime Minister during 
the process of approving the drafted decree submitted by MOF. MOF and other related 
State agencies involved in the drafting of the decrees were also expected to be available 
                                                                                                                                                 
trong cai cach doanh nghiep nha nuoc (Equitization: Important measure in SOE reform), 





to the Prime Minister for consultations and meetings to resolve any possible disputes 
arisen during this process. 
 
Graph 3.2: Actors involved in Stage 1- Policy formulation and revision 
 
Note: Examples of economic Ministries are the State Bank of Vietnam or Ministry of Planning and 
Investment. MOLISA stands for Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs while MOF stands for 
Ministry of Finance;  
 arrow points to directional, top-down relationship; --> arrow points to consultative and coordinative 
relationship 
 
III.4.2- Policy Implementation and Feedback 
Once a newly drafted or revised Governmental Decree to regulate the equitization 
process is launched, various Ministries (including line Ministries and functional 
Ministries), local governments, and state enterprises are responsible for enforce its 
implementation for state enterprises and members under their authorities. In so doing, 
these implementers of the equitization mandate need to issue their own legal documents 
(often in forms of Ministers‟ Decisions or Directives, PPC Chairman‟s Decisions or 
Directives, or GC Chairman‟s Decisions or Directives) to guide the implementation in 

















their specific sectors/areas. They are subsequently responsible for enforcing the 
equitization process in their each and every SOE that is subject to the mandate. Normally, 
Ministries, local governments, and General Corporations discuss with their SOEs over 
the plan and timeframe for equitization and submit a schedule of equitization for the 
whole industry/sector/region within a period of time (e.g. up to 2005, 2008, or 2010) to 
the Prime Minister for approval, and subsequently enforce the implementation in their 
SOEs mainly on yearly basis.
260
 Within ministries, local governments, and GCs, BERDs 
coordinate the job and represent these State patrons in dealing with enterprise members, 
as well as supervise the implementation of the equitization plans in enterprises. 
 
During the process of implementing the equitization mandate, feedbacks were also 
collected from the enterprises, the lowest rung of the administrative ladder cum the final 
implementer of the equitization mandate, upwards to their State supervisors such as line 
Ministries, local governments, and General Corporations. Feedbacks for urgent issues 
could be channeled immediately to MOF and thereafter the Prime Minister for making 
necessary and immediate revisions; whereas a majority of the feedbacks were 
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Graph 3.3: Actors involved in Stage 2- Policy implementation and feedback 
 
Note: Ind. stands for independent state enterprises;  points to directional, top-down flows/relationship  
 
III.5- Summary 
The power structure within the bureaucracy proves to be more sophisticated and multi-
dimensional than the official, strait-jacket, image of an integrative, top-down 
authoritative State of Vietnam in the overall SOE reform process. Notably, whereas the 
Party still keeps a strong grip of the reform process, the making of equitization policies 
seems to be increasingly bureaucratized, indicating the strengthened role of the 
bureaucracy/government in the area of economic management. As was discussed above, 
various attempts to reform the administrative system and fiscal relationship between the 
central state and local governments during the Doi Moi period resulted in a fragmentation 
of power in making equitization policies since the early 1990s. Instead of being 
centralized at supra-ministerial committees and above, the authority to formulate and 



















ministerial agencies, key local governments, and enterprises, including the GCs. Efforts 
by the central state to re-centralize such authority into a supra-ministerial committee such 
as NSCERD have been largely failed. Similarly, although it seems that MOF gained 
power at others‟ losses in the formulation and revision of equitization policies, MOF is, 
by no means, able to determine every aspect of the policy. As a consequence, in order to 
ensure the principle of “democratic centralism” in policymaking, bargaining, 
negotiations, and resource exchanges have been very common among the above-
mentioned bureaucratic at each and any stage of the policymaking process in order to 
achieve consensus over policy changes, as well as the implementation of these changes.  
 
To complicate the picture further is the tendency of establishing new institutions and 
agencies in order to solve “new” problems arisen in the equitization process. Since the 
equitization mandate was set as an experiment back to the late 1980s until present, a 
number of new institutions were established to deal with different issues arisen from the 
process. For example, NSCERD and BERDs were established in order to deal with the 
coordination problem. Especially, as the equitization process accelerated in the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s, a range of new problems emerged in both pre-equitization and post-
equitization period, resulting in the set-up of DATC and SCIC with the purpose of 
solving these problems. These new institutions, albeit the fact that some are weak, some 
are stronger, start having their own life, expressing their own interests, and seeking their 
own positions in the equitization process by maneuvering around different channels, such 
as, the three streams of politics, policies, and problems in the Garbage Can framework. 
Instability, in addition to authority fragmentation, therefore becomes another feature of 
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the equitization show. In the next two chapters, we will discover how these two 
characteristics of the equitization process shape the inter-bureaucracy politics at the 




Chapter IV The Politics of Establishing and Re-structuring 
Funds to Accelerate the Equitization Process  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the interactions among various State actors 
involved in the process of making and revising equitization policies. The interactions are 
studied for the case of establishing and restructuring the two Funds to support the 
equitization process in Vietnam, namely the Quy Ho Tro Sap Xep Doanh nghiep va Co 
phan hoa or the Funds for Supporting SOE Re-arrangements and Equitization and Quy 
Lao dong Doi du or the Worker Redundancy Fund. In so doing, I would like to make the 
following arguments. First, instead of the rational image of the bureaucratic machinery in 
making equitization policies in search for the most rational policies in response to new 
problems arisen from the equitization process, what we really see from the process of 
making equitization policies in Vietnam are interminable negotiations and bargaining 
among an increasingly wider range of bureaucratic agencies over different issues arisen 
in the process. Second, the sources for such pattern of bargaining and negotiations are the 
authority fragmentation and instability in the policy making process. Power has been 
fragmented mainly due to Doi Moi and subsequent reform measures whereas authority 
instability has been resulted from the tendency for bureaucratization and routinization 
within the State machinery in Vietnam. Third, the process of making equitization policies 
is thus slow and incremental in order to reach consensus among an increasing range of 
stakeholders in the process. As Lieberthal and Oksenberg put it in the case of energy 
policies in China, “a decision itself is composed of a series of reinforcing decisions”, or a 
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decision, even made by the top leaders, might just be a decision of the most tentative 
nature only.
261
 Also, the power structure in making equitization policies is not, by any 
means, stable. The emergence of new institutions in the process has resulted in increasing 
instability of the power structure, reflected through the maneuvering of these new 
institutions within the three streams of politics, problems, and policies. Finally, as the 
result of such unstable authority structure, the policy outcome can be the most 
unexpected and therefore difficult to predict.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section, Section IV.1, introduces the 
context of establishing the two above-mentioned funds to support the equitization process 
in Vietnam. Section IV.2 discusses the initial structure and performance of the two Funds 
whereas Section IV.3 focuses on the impact of these two funds on the equitization 
outcomes. Section IV.4 investigates the recent attempts to restructure the two funds and 
the impacts of these attempts on the bargaining and negotiations among different State 
actors involved in the issue, i.e. MOF versus local governments and MOF versus SCIC. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion in section IV.5. 
 
IV.1- The Context of Establishing Supporting Funds 
As was mentioned in Chapter I of this thesis, the equitization mandate was finally 
formalized by the Central State in 1996, despite a modest result of only five State 
enterprises that went through equitization during the experimental period from 1992 to 
mid 1996. The initial legal document to launch the formal equitization mandate – 
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Governmental Decree 28 issued in 1996 - was, however, not much different from 
Decision 202 in 1992 regulating the trial process. One of the key regulations that 
remained the same was that concerning the management of the proceeds collected from 
selling the State capital in the State enterprises (which is from now on referred as the 
equitization proceeds). Similar to Decision 202, all the remaining equitization proceeds, 
after paying expenses incurred in the formal equitization process, must be centralized into 
an account at the State Treasury and under the centralized management of MOF. This 
regulation, to a great extent, did discourage local governments and GCs from equitizing 
their State enterprises, as they gained nothing but lost all from the exercise. It thus was 
one among key factors contributing to a dismay progress of equitization during the period 





The central-local bargaining over the right to use the equitization proceeds thus started 
before the launch of a new Decree to regulate the equitization process in replacement for 
Decree 28. And finally in 1998, local States and GCs were entitled to retain and use 
equitization proceeds to support the SOE equitization process in their locations.
263
 Decree 
44 in 1998 to regulate the equitization process stipulated that the proceeds collected from 
equitizing the local State enterprises or 91-GC members, after paying the equitization 
expenses, would be used by the local states or the 91-GCs for the following purposes: (i) 
training and retraining in order to create new employment opportunities for employees, 
(ii) providing redundancy subsidies, and (iii) providing capital supplement for remaining 
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100 percent State-owned enterprises and equitized State enterprises. The dividends paid 
by equitized State enterprises to the State for its capital share, however, would still be 




The bargaining, however, did not stop there. One of the main concerns in the equitization 
process was how to settle the issue of redundant workers. This question is certainly 
critical to both line Ministries and local States. According to official reports, about 2,000 
State enterprises would go through re-arrangement and ownership transformation during 
the period between 2001 and 2003. Among these enterprises, about 220 State would close 
down or go bankrupt whereas another 1,550 would equitize or go through other measures 
of ownership transformation such as sale, contracting out, or lease. This large number of 
State enterprises expected to be re-arranged would thus probably create massive layoffs 
of redundant workers, imposing substantial burdens on the State networks of social 
welfare. It was estimated that about 250,000 to 400,000 redundant workers would be shed 
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 For one among such official reports, one can see the Plan of SOE re-arrangement and 
ownership transformation for the period 2001-2003 approved in the Third Plenum of the Ninth 
Party Congress in 2001, accessible at the website of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(www.vcp.org.vn) and also quoted in Le Hoang Hai, “Vai tro va hoat dong cua Quy ho tro sap 
xep va co phan hoa doanh nghiep Nha nuoc” (Roles and Operations of the Equitization 
Funds for  SOE re-arrangements and equitization), in NSCERD (various authors), Co phan 
hoa: Giai phap quan trong trong cai cach doanh nghiep nha nuoc (Equitization: Important 




The point of bargaining between different State agencies in the bureaucracy therefore 
evolved around this issue. Although Decree 44 in 1998 allowed local States to use 
proceeds collected from the equitization process to pay for severance costs, the issue now 





IV.2- Equitization Funds and Worker Redundancy Fund 
IV.2.1- Equitization Funds: Initial Structure and Operations 
To local States‟ request, Quy Ho Tro Sap Xep Doanh nghiep va Co phan hoa or the 
Funds for Supporting SOE Re-arrangements and Equitization (or Equitization Funds in 
short) were finally institutionalized in 1999 at three levels of the Central State, local 
States, and 91-GCs.
267
 The purposes of establishing these Equitization Funds were: (i) to 
provide training and re-training for redundant workers resulted from the process of SOE 
re-arrangement and ownership transformation in order to help them find new 
employment opportunities, (ii) to provide subsidies for those employees that voluntarily 
terminate their labor contracts or lose their jobs in the process of SOE re-arrangement and 
ownership transformation, (iii) to provide assistances to employees in equitized State 
enterprises who were unable to buy shares at preferential prices, and finally (iv) to 
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 According to the Prime Minister‟s Decision 177/1999/QD-TTg dated 30 August 1999. The 




provide additional capital to prioritized, remaining wholly State owned enterprises or 




In principle, the main sources for the Equitization Funds came from the proceeds 
collected from the process of SOE re-arrangement, equitization, sale, contracting, lease 
(or ownership transformation in general), and transfers from State Budgets to 
Equitization Funds of the same level. In particular, the Funds got their revenues mainly 
from the proceeds collected from selling the State capital in State enterprises under 
ownership transformation, the dividends and other collectibles from the State share in 
equitized and limited liability State enterprises, the proceeds collected from selling idle 
assets, not-in-use assets, liquidating assets, or bad debts which have been already cleared 
in the SOE value before ownership transformation, the proceeds collected from liquidating 
the State assets when closing down State enterprises, funds and assistances given by 
domestic and foreign individuals and organizations to support the SOE re-arrangement 




As mentioned earlier, the Equitization Funds was initially established at three levels. The 
central Fund was centralized into one account under the management of Minister of 
Finance. Line Ministries worked together with Ministry of Finance to develop the annual 
plan of using the Fund. Enterprises entitled with the right to use the Fund would 
implement thereof and report the final costs and expenses to MOF. MOF was also in 
charge of regulating the Funds nation-wide in order to assist the SOE re-arrangement and 
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equitization process, synthesizing and finalizing the annual operations of Funds nation-
wide. Transfers from the Central State Budget were also made to provinces and cities 
with limited collection of equitization proceeds. Provincial or centrally-managed 
municipal Equitization Funds (or local Equitization Funds in short) were deposited into 
accounts belonged to the Finance – Product – Price Department and under the 
management of the Chairmen of Provincial or centrally managed municipal People‟s 
Committees. The Heads of the Finance Department assist the PPCs in managing the 
Equitization Funds. Finally, the Equitization Funds at 91-GCs were centralized at a 
separate account of the 91-GCs, managed by the 91-GC Boards of Management. 91-GC 
Board of Management also approved the plan of using the Funds. The GCs‟ General 
Directors or Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) were in charge of implementing the plan 
and finalizing the spending with MOF. 
 
By 2001, there were one Central Fund, 61 local funds, and 17 funds at 91-GCs.
270
 A 
snapshot of the Equitization Funds‟ budgetary operations by October 2001 reveals that 
the Equitization Funds at all levels, surprisingly, were well-balanced or even recorded 
surpluses despite both Central State‟s initial expectations and local States‟ concerns that 
they might not be sufficient for covering equitization expenses. The main source of 
revenues for the Equitization Funds came from the SOE re-arrangement measures on 
ownership transformation or equitization in particular. Specifically, the proceeds 
collected from equitization, dividends paid on the State capital invested in equitized State 
enterprises or joint stock companies, and the proceeds collected from issuing additional 
shares in equitized State enterprises were the three main items that contributed  the most 
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to the Equitization Funds at all three levels by end 2001 (see Table 4.1 below). There was 
also variation in the main sources of revenues among different Equitization Funds of 
different levels: most of the sources centralized in big cities and provinces that possessed 








 Sources Total 





1 Revenues from SOE re-
arrangement measures 
and ownership 
transformations 790,863,445 206,747,278 394,200,338 189,915,829 
of which:     
- Proceeds from 
equitization 718,595,608 199,033,075 372,328,349 147,234,184 
- Proceeds from SOE 
sales and leases 2,614,320 0 2,614,320 0 
- Dividends paid for State 
shares  in equitized State 
enterprises 69,653,516 7,714,202 19,257,669 42,681,645 
2 Transfer from State 
Budget  873,400 0 873,400 0 
3 Other revenues (issuing 
additional equity shares) 142,529,948 130,735,500 11,259,394 535,054 
4 Total 934,266,793 337,482,778 406,333,132 190,450,883 
Note: * Approximate exchange rate of USD 1 is roughly VND 15,000.  
 
Regarding the expenditures, by the end 2001, the main items were financial subsidies for 
100 percent State-owned enterprises and re-investment into equitized State enterprises, 
accounting for almost 40 percent of the total expenditures at the three levels. In 
particular, local Funds have spent the biggest amount on subsidizing other 100 percent 




 quoted from Le Hoang Hai (2002), p.53, with author‟s translation and added calculations 
based on interviews with MOF officials during fieldtrips in Vietnam in 2007 
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State-owned enterprises, followed by the 91-GC Funds. Local governments also spent a 
major amount in investing into their equitized State enterprises as compared with the 
Central government and 91-GCs. Meanwhile, the prioritized expenditure item of the 
funds to subsidize redundant employees accounted for only 7 percent of the total 
expenditure (see Table 4.2). Although guidelines on the usage of the Equitization Funds 
at local and GC levels were stipulated by the central State, most of the local governments 
and GCs had high degrees of freedom in using the Funds, as these Funds were extra-




Table 4.2: Expenditures of the Equitization Funds by October 2001
274
 
(in VND thousands)* 
Note: * Approximate exchange rate of USD 1 is roughly VND 15,000.  
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 Author‟s interviews with MOF officials at the State Budget Department and a former SCIC 
staff during fieldtrips in Vietnam in 2007. For the detailed guidelines on the usage of the 
Equitization Funds at local and enterprise levels during this period, one can refer to 
Governmental Decree 44 in 1988 and Prime Minister‟s Decision 177 in 1999. 
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based on interviews with MOF officials during fieldtrips in Vietnam in 2007 
 
 Expenditure Items Total 





1 Training and re-training 11,944,090 4,098,501 5,856,051 1,989,538 
2 Subsidies for redundant workers 6,415,445 867,559 2,428,530 3,119,356 
3 Payments for social insurance 532,622 0 532,622 0 
4 Subsidies for poor employees to 
buy preferential shares 8,779,761 3,974,310 856,421 3,949,030 
5 Financial subsidies for State 
enterprises 149,044,142 23,684,687 65,243,119 60,116,336 
6 Investment subsidies for 
equitized State enterprises 43,681,014 1,717,883 37,955,408 4,007,723 
7 Equitization costs and other 
expenditures (to pay for the 
capital/equity mobilized from 
the issue of new/additional 
equity shares) 174,334,961 155,060,182 16,880,371 2,394,408 
8 Total  394,732,035 189,403,122 129,752,522 75,576,391 
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Interestingly, the Equitization Funds at all three levels recorded surpluses, i.e. the 
revenues were able to finance all expenditure items without any financial support or 
assistance from outside. Among the three levels, the largest surpluses came from the local 
Funds.
275
 This led to NSCERD to issue a reminder in 2003 to state enterprises in 
equitization process, urging them to make use of the Equitization Funds. By 2003, the 
remaining balance of the Central Equitization Fund stood at VND 200 billion which 
came mainly from the selling of State capital in equitized State enterprises and foreign 
aids. In order to benefit from the Equitization Fund, requesting State enterprises must 
submit a detailed plan on how they were about to use the Fund to solve their labor or bad 
debts issues to corresponding BERDs at line Ministries or local governments. In 2002, 
there were only 29 proposals sent to these Boards and thus only VND 27 billion from 
Equitization Funds were released. Within the first four months of 2003, this number 




State enterprises‟ limited use of the Equitization Funds to pay for their redundancy costs 
incurred in the re-arrangement and equitization process was due to a number of factors. 
First, most of State enterprises going through re-arrangement measures by 2003 were of 
small-scale and employed small numbers of workers, leading to small numbers of layoffs 
and redundant workers, as well as quite a few cases in need for training and re-training. 
Second, the ambiguity in the regulation on which remaining 100 percent State enterprises 
prioritized with capital supplement created room for the popular use of the Equitization 
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Funds for such purpose. According to various sources, many State enterprises that did not 
belong to the category that the State needs to retain 100% or controlling ownership were 




As mentioned earlier, Decree 44 in 1998 and Decision 177 in 1999 allowed only 91-GCs 
to set up their own Equitization Funds. This policy was allegedly the main reason why 
90-GCs did not want to transform the ownership pattern in their SOE members due to the 
fear of losing capital, reduced scale and thinner benefits.
278
 The establishment of 
Equitization Funds at 90-GCs level later on thus could be considered as a sort of “fence-
breaking” activities, in which initially some particular 90-GCs had requested to have their 
own Equitization Funds and the initiative was later on applied across the board to all 90-
GCs. As a result, in 2002, the Prime Minister issued a new Decision revising the rules 
regulating the establishment and management of the Equitization Funds – Prime 





IV.2.2- Worker Redundancy Fund: Initial Structure and Operation 
In addition to the various Equitization Funds at the central, local and GC levels, the 
Government in April 2002 decided to set up another Fund, namely Quy Ho tro Lao dong 
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Doi du or the Fund for Subsidizing Redundant Workers in SOE re-arrangement and 
Equitization or the Worker Redundancy Fund for short, under the management of MOF, 
to provide assistance to redundant workers during the SOE re-arrangement process 
during the period between 2002 and 2005.  
 
One of the main reasons for the establishment of such Fund, in addition to the existing 
Equitization Funds, was perhaps the concern among different State supervisors and State 
enterprises over the bulk of redundant workers that would be laid off after 2002, when a 
large number of State enterprises would go through either equitization or other re-
arrangement processes. According to an MOF official at the Department for Enterprise 
Finance, despite the surpluses recorded in the Equitization Funds at all three levels by the 
late 2001, these Funds would still not be able to cover the redundancy costs in the 
subsequent years.
280
 Again, as was mentioned above, about 2,000 State enterprises were 
estimated to go through various measures of re-arrangement and ownership 
transformation during the period between 2001 and 2003. This meant that in addition to 
about VND 4,000-5,000 billion needed to help clearing up the bad debt burden incurred 
in the SOE system, another amount from VND 3,000 to 5,000 billion would be required 
to provide subsidies to between 250,000 and 400,000 redundant workers being laid off in 
the process.
281
 Therefore, a total of about VND 7,000 to 0,000 billion would be needed 
during the period between 2001 and 2003 to cover all the costs incurred; meanwhile, the 
balance of all Equitization Funds by the late 2001 was only slightly above VND 500 
billion. Measures to raise the revenues for Equitization Funds, such as raising grants from 
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both domestic and foreign sources, were thus discussed widely among agencies in charge 




This explains why Quy Ho tro Lao dong Doi du or the Worker Redundancy Fund, in 
addition to attempts to raise more revenues for various Equitization Funds, was 
established in 2002 to seek to finance the same redundancy policies in the SOE re-
arrangement and equitization process as the Equitization Funds had done since 1999. 
The main sources of revenues for the Fund‟s were transfers from the State Budget, 
grants and aids from individuals and organizations, and other sources, among which 




Table 4.3: Worker Redundancy Fund: Revenues and Expenditures
284
 
Timeline State Budget 
transfer 
Expenditures  
End 2003 ~ VND 400 
billion 
Number of beneficiaries of the Fund 14,750 workers 
  Costs VND 41 billion 
End 2005 n-a Number of beneficiaries of the Fund 141,643 workers 
  Costs VND 4,415 billion 
End 2007 n-a Number of beneficiaries of the Fund 200,000 
  Costs VND 6,376 billion 
Note: n-a: data non-available 
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Redundancy Fund paid VND 4.415 billion to 141,643 redundant workers), Hai Phong 
People’s Committee, December 2005, access online at  
http://www.haiphong.gov.vn/ldtbxh/vn/index.asp?menuid=578&parent_menuid=578&fuseaction
=3&articleid=4783, and Minh Hien, “Giải pháp nào cho lao động dôi dư” (Which Solutions 






Governmental Decree 41 in 2002 stipulated different subsidy packages to redundant 
workers, depending on their seniority and contractual relationship with the company, in 
order to pay social welfare contributions to those reaching retirement ages and to 
finance training and re-training costs for those in need of finding new employment 
opportunities. In particular, the following workers can be benefited from the Worker 
Redundant Fund:  
(i) Workers who were still working at the SOE, but the company/enterprise 
could not assign them with appropriate positions during the re-
arrangement process, 
(ii) Workers who were officially on the SOE‟s list of regular workers but in 
fact not working at the point of time and the SOE could not assign them 
with appropriate positions during the re-arrangement process, 
(iii) Workers in State enterprises which were going through closure or 
bankruptcy, 
(iv) Workers who were officially on the list of regular workers of the State-
owned farms or plantations, were recruited before 21 April 1998, and 
were not working during the re-arrangement process 
(v) Workers who were working at the above-mentioned enterprises and 




The above-mentioned workers would receive subsidies from the Worker Redundancy 
Fund. For those that become redundant within the following four years after equitization, 
the equitized company (or joint-stock company) was in charge of paying half of the total 
redundancy costs, while the remaining half was covered by the proceeds collected from 




Table 4.4: Redundancy Packages offered by the Worker Redundancy Fund
286
  
Type of redundant workers Packages offered 
Workers with long-term labor 
contracts, having already 
reached the retirement ages 
(i) Entitlement of full pension scheme 
(ii) Subsidy of 3 monthly salaries and other extra 
subsidies 
(iii) Subsidy of 5 monthly salaries for 20 years of 
social welfare contributions and 0.5 monthly 
salary for any extra year of social welfare 
contributions. 
Workers with long-term labor 
contracts, not yet reaching 
retirement ages 
(i) subsidy of one monthly salary for each actual 
working year in the State sector 
(ii) one-time subsidy of VND 5 million 
(iii) subsidy of six monthly salaries in order to help 
finding another employment. 
Workers with short-term (1-3 
years) labor contracts  
(i) subsidy of one monthly salary for each actual 
working year in the State sector 
(ii)  subsidy of 70% of the salary for the remaining 
period under the labor contract, which should 
not exceed 12 months. 
 
According to sources from MOF, the average redundancy rate at State enterprises going 
through re-arrangement and equitization processes was about 20 percent of the total labor 
force. In some State enterprises, this rate can even go up to 40 percent or even 60 to 70 
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 Meanwhile, the State enterprises were often able to afford merely 3 to 4 
percent of the total redundancy costs. The Worker Redundancy Fund thus helped State 
enterprises substantially in paying the rest of the costs. Each redundant worker was 




Table 4.5: Snapshot about the picture of implementing Decree 41 in 2002 for 




Number of State enterprises receiving subsidies from 
the Worker Redundancy Fund 
2,697 State enterprises 
Total number of redundant workers as beneficiaries 
of the Fund, of which 
141,643 workers 
 (i) Number of permanent workers seeking early 
retirement upon reaching retirement ages 
15,080 
 (ii) Number of permanent workers losing their jobs 
and seeking new employment opportunities 
125,177 
 (iii) Number of temporary workers losing their jobs 
and/or seeking new employment opportunities 
1,007 
 (iv) Others  367 
Average value of subsidies received by a worker  From VND 27-28  million to 
VND 37-38 million 
Highest value of subsidies received by one worker Above VND 75 million 
 
IV.2.3- Equitization Funds and Worker Redundancy Fund: Working at the Same 
Time 
Due to the establishment of the Worker Redundancy Fund, revisions were made to the 
usage of the Equitization Funds in 2002. The Equitization Funds have since mainly 
covered the redundancy costs which were not covered by the Worker Redundancy Fund. 
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 data provided by Department of Enterprise Finance at MOF, quoted in Thao Lan (2005)  
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In particular, the scope of coverage of the Worker Redundancy Fund includes mainly 
those workers made redundant prior to or during the process of SOE re-arrangement and 
equitization, while the Equitization Funds cover redundancy costs incurred after the re-
arrangement and equitization process. For example, for those that become redundant 
within the following four years after equitization, the relevant Equitization Fund covers 





Equitization Funds now aims at providing support for the following activities: (i) 
subsidizing redundant workers during the SOE re-arrangement and equitization process 
who were not entitled to benefit from the Worker Redundancy Fund, (ii) subsidizing re-
training activities for redundant workers, (iii) supplementing the State capital in equitized 
State enterprises in order to maintain the necessary State share in these companies, (iv) 
supplementing capital to State enterprises in financial troubles to help them settle their 
overdue debts or contributions to the social security funds before the re-arrangement and 
equitization process, (v) subsidizing equitizing State enterprises with collected 
equitization proceeds insufficient to cover the equitization and re-arrangement costs, and 
(vi) finally, supplementing capital for 100 percent State-owned enterprises in need of 
technological modernization, competitiveness enhancement, and business 
development.
291
 Meanwhile, the sources for the Equitization Funds‟ revenues remain 
unchanged, which are (i) the proceeds collected from the SOE re-arrangement process, 
including equitization, sales, and business contracting-out, lease, (ii) 
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contributions/grants/aids from domestic and foreign individuals  and organization, as well 
as (iii) transfers from the State budget at all levels. The dividends paid by equitized State 
enterprises to the State share and the State capital withdrawn from equitized State 
enterprises and 100 percent State owned limited liability enterprises were distributed and 




IV.3- Implications on the Equitization Outcomes 
The establishment of different Funds to support the equitization process, namely the 
Equitization Funds in 1999 and the Worker Redundancy Fund in 2002, and their 
performances proved to play a significant role in accelerating the pace of equitization 
during the period between 1999 and 2006. If only five enterprises went for equitization 
during the trial period between 1992 and 1995 and about twenty five more in the 
following two years, the pace of equitization started to pick up in late 1998, making the 
number of State enterprises that went through equitization increased to an annual average 
of 200 State enterprises during the period from 1999 to 2002, in which the majority were 
local State enterprises.
293
 The process was further accelerated from 2003 with above 700 
State enterprises annually completing equitization in the following two years of 2004 and 
2005. More importantly, the number of local enterprises and GC members going through 
equitization increased significantly during the same period. More than seventy percent of 
the 1,500 enterprises completed the equitization process by the end 2003 were local 
enterprises whereas slightly above twenty five percent were members of either 90-GCs or 




 NSCERD (2002). By 2001, total number of local SOEs equitized was about 560 enterprises, 
while that of central SOEs was 240 enterprises.  
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91-GCs. As a result, most of provinces had finished equitizing their local State 
enterprises by 2004 and disbanded their Boards of Enterprise Reform and Development 
(BERDs) accordingly.
294
 By mid 2006, the number of equitized State enterprises was 
above 3,000, of which approximately 2,100 State enterprises were local enterprises, 270 




IV.4- Restructuring of the Funds and Local Responses 
IV.4.1- Worker Redundancy Fund 
The State‟s initial intention was to set up the Worker Redundancy Fund just for a limited 
period of time only, i.e. from 2002 to 2005. However, under the pressure from line 
Ministries, local governments, as well as GCs and other State enterprises, in the early 
2006, the Government agreed to extend the Fund until the end of 2007.
296
 However, it 
was estimated that about 95,000 workers would become redundant as the result of the re-
arrangement and equitization of about 1,800 state enterprises during the period between 
2007 and 2010.
297
 To deal with this issue, the Government consequently launched a new 
Decree - Decree 110 in June 2007. According to this Decree, the Worker Redundancy 
Fund is abolished; instead, the Equitization Funds at SCIC and GCs will be used to 
finance subsidies provided to redundant workers during the SOE re-arrangement and 
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equitization process since 2007. The nominal value of subsidy package enjoyed by 




IV.4.2- Equitization Funds 
Various sources from different State agencies pointed to the fact that the Equitization 
Funds in some provinces and centrally-managed cities were seriously misused. For 
example, according to a survey conducted by the Government Inspectorate in 2008, the 
equitization proceeds collected at a number of local authorities and GCs had not yet been 
deposited separately into the State Treasury‟s relevant branches, and thus, had no annual 
records of revenues and expenditures. Such malpractice led to the fact that the 
equitization proceeds were often lent to GC members and other state enterprises at 
preferential interest rates.
299
 Also, financial subsidies for 100 percent State owned 
enterprises and investment subsidies for equitized State enterprises were often cited as the 
most popular two items that local governments employed to manipulate their use of the 
funds.
300
 Perhaps this is the reason why the Equitization Funds were substantially 
restructured in 2004 following the launch of a new Decree regulating the equitization 
process in that year - Decree 187 in 2004. Local Equitization Funds were abolished and 
the proceeds collected from reforming local State enterprises would be channeled directly 
to the Central Fund. Subsidies for redundant workers or for supporting local, equitized 
State enterprises would be subsequently financed by the Central Equitization Fund. 
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If the main motive for establishing local Equitization Funds during the period between 
1999 and 2004 was to encourage local governments to equitize their State enterprises, the 
official reason for abolishing these local funds in 2004 was that most of provinces and 
big cities had completed their equitization process and thus would no longer need to keep 
the funds.
301
 The unofficial reason, however, as mentioned above, lies in the central 
government‟s desire to tackle the local misuse of the funds. Some scholars recently raised 
their doubts over the Central State‟s capacity to sustain such re-centralization effort since 
there have been a great number of local State enterprises which remain unequitized in big 
cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.
302
 It is certainly difficult to expect these local 
governments to continue equitizing their State enterprises while losing their share in the 
resultant equitization proceeds.  
 
For example, in October 2007, Hanoi was in the process of asking for permission to 
retain such Fund at the city. The main reason cited by Hanoi People‟s Committee was 
that the Fund had been very helpful in facilitating the equitization process in the city in 
the past and it would be even more necessary in dealing with post-equitization 
problems.
303
 At the same time, Hanoi transformed some of its equitized State enterprises 
into members of their 90-GCs, thus allowing it to retain the equitization proceeds as well 
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Interestingly, although the local Equitization Funds were already abolished in late 2004, 
the remaining balances of most of these Funds have not yet transferred up to MOF. This 
led to the Central State‟s issuing of an order, in the mid 2008, asking the concerning local 
governments to do so by the latest of October 2008.
305
 In response, ten provinces, Hau 
Giang, Ninh Binh, Ha Tay, Can Tho, Yen Bai, Lao Cai, Ha Nam, Ha Giang, Gia Lai, and 
Thai Nguyen, sent requests to MOF, asking for permission to retain the balance of their 
local Equitization Funds in order to finance capital supplement to their local, 100 percent 




IV.5- Who Has Managed the Equitization Funds? 
Despite the above-mentioned leakages at the local and corporate levels, the Central Fund 
has recorded a substantial surplus balance of about VND 3,500 billion (or around USD 
220 millions) by mid 2007
307. In the next three or four years‟ time, it is very likely that 
the Fund would grow even bigger as the deadlines for equitizing most of GCs and 
SOCBs are approaching. Initial estimates tell us that the net balance of the Funds could 




The fundamental question now is that who will be delegated to represent the State in 
managing the Central Equitization Fund. Initially, Ministry of Finance seemed to be the 
obvious, indisputable answer as it had been doing the job for years since 1999. No 
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objections were recorded from line Ministries or local governments, except some requests 
by Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City to retain the Fund at the city level. However, the turn was 
made in the early 2007 when the then First Deputy Prime Minister intervened directly in 
the scene, asking the Fund to be transferred into SCIC‟s hands and MOF to revise the 
new Decree, which was to replace Decree 187 in 2004, accordingly. Consequently, the 
revision process took MOF three more months to complete. Decree 109, launched in June 
2007, as a replacement of Decree 187 in 2004 to regulate the equitization process, 
stipulated that the Central Equitization Fund would be put under SCIC‟s management.309  
 
Table 4.6: Operations of the Equitization Funds by August 2007
310
 
Revenues VND billion Expenditures VND billion 
 7,500 (i) On redundant workers 1,000 
  (ii) On 100 percent State owned 
enterprises  
600 
  (iii)On Vietnam Airlines for guaranteeing 
the investment source for the flight 
fleet 
1,400 
  (iv) On COMINCO (Vietnam Coal and 
Minerals Group) for the bauxite project 
500 
  (v) On providing supplementary capital to 
SCIC 
2,217 
  Total expenditures  
Balance (+) 3,550   
 
In order to confirm its capacity to manage the Fund with the Central State, SCIC 
announced shortly after that its 2007 half-year profit of VND 400 billion and tax 
contribution of VND 30 billion. In so doing, SCIC has offered itself as a better 
mechanism in managing the State capital than the previous complex web of State 
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agencies that represented the State capital in enterprises. SCIC highlighted the fact that at 
least now the Central State was able to know how much exactly it got from investing into 
the SOE system. Before SCIC was established, no one, even Ministry of Finance, had any 
ideas about this figure as the gains of State capital were dispersed among a number of 
State agencies and authorities and thus often leaked away before they were channeled 
into the State Budget. The message from SCIC to the Central State was clear: if the Fund 




However, the fight between MOF and SCIC over the right to manage the central 
Equitization Fund did not end there, but was taken to a new level, as MOF accepted that 
SCIC could use the Fund, but within the legal framework set by MOF. In particular, 
SCIC could use only the balance of the Fund by the end of each year provided it has 
sound investment projects and get approval from the Prime Minister or MOF. 
Meanwhile, SCIC insisted on treating the Fund as a source of its own capital, and thus 
having freedom in using it. The bargaining finally ended in MOF‟s favor: from 2008, the 
Minister of Finance took over the post of SCIC‟s Chairman while one of his Deputies 
took over the General Director position. The incumbent SCIC Chairwoman, Madame 
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But the winner did not take it all. In exchange, SCIC was allowed to be recapitalized with 
a VND 10,000 billion top-up from its initial charter capital of VND 5,000 billions.
313
 
Such top-up, however, was too little compared to the expected value of the Central 
Equitization Fund that SCIC once dreamt of taking hold of. According to an internal 
source within SCIC, by late 2007, the Corporation had not yet been handed with the 
Central Equitization Fund. In fact, the Fund was still physically under the MOF by then. 
Being asked if managing such a huge amount of money would be a difficult task for 
SCIC, the source said that the Fund might be not that really big. However, according to 
external sources, the Fund promises to become a huge source of investment which would 
possibly worth up to tens of thousands billion VND, leading to complaints that such 
surpluses should be retained by equitized State enterprises for re-investment purposes 




It took the bureaucracy more than a year since mid 2007 – when Decree 109 stipulated 
the transfer of the Central Equitization Fund from MOF to SCIC – to come up with the 
final rules and regulations on the establishment and management of the Central 
Equitization Fund. The Prime Minister‟s Decision 113 in August 2008 announced that 
the Central Equitization Fund was to establish at SCIC and under the centralized 
management of SCIC. The Fund can be deposited into any account at the State Treasury, 
state owned commercial banks or joint stock banks.  
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The Fund‟s revenues would come mainly from the proceeds collected from the SOE 
equitization and re-arrangement process, post-equitization revenues which included the 
proceeds collected from selling the remaining State capital in equitized or otherwise 
transformed State enterprises and the proceeds collected from SOE employees on their 
borrowings from the State in order to buy shares at subsidized/preferential prices, 
transfers from Equitization Funds at the GC-level and other sources. Meanwhile, the 
Central Equitization Funds could be used for the following particular purposes: (i) to 
assist state-owned agricultural and forestry plants under the central management of line 
Ministries and para-Ministerial agencies, the local management of provincial or 
municipal People‟s Committees, or GCs‟ or economic groups‟ management to finance 
the redundancy policies during their equitization and re-arrangement process, (ii) to assist 
needy GCs, economic groups, and “parent” companies in financing redundancy subsidies 
in accordance with Decrees 109 and 110 in 2007, (iii) to top-up SCIC‟s legal capital in 
accordance with the Prime Minister‟s Decisions, and finally (iv) to invest into strategic 
projects, including the commercially-based infrastructural projects in accordance with the 
Prime Minister‟s Decisions.315  
 
Regarding the provision of additional capital to SCIC from the sources of the central 
Equitization Fund, the procedure requires an extensive role of MOF in evaluating and 
approving the SCIC‟s request before SCIC could submit its request to the Prime Minister. 
Similarly, MOF plays a close scrutinizing role in the use of the central Equitization Fund 
for investment purposes, while SCIC is mainly responsible for coordinating the 
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paperwork.  The Prime Minister is the one who decides on transfers among the Central 
Funds and Funds at GC level when substantial surpluses are recorded at the GC-level 
Equitization Funds in order to meet the need for capital in strategic, prioritized 
investment projects. MOF, again, is in charge of proposing the inter-Funds transfers, 
especially the transfers from GC-level Equitization Funds to the central Equitization 




In summary, the new legal framework launched in late 2008 allowed MOF to be mainly 
in charge of supervising the management and usage of Equitization Funds, including both 
the central Fund and corporate-level Funds. MOF seemed to be the one who made all 
important (and final) decisions, ranging from the usage of Funds for paying redundancy 
costs, topping up SCIC‟s legal capital, and financing important investment projects 
towards the transfers among the Central Fund and corporate-level Funds. Meanwhile, 
SCIC was entitled mainly with the right to manage and use the central Equitization Fund 
under MOF‟s guidance and supervision. For example, SCIC was in charge of managing 
and using the revenue sources of the Central Fund, supervising and urging State 
enterprises to transfer the proceeds collected from their re-arrangement process into the 
central Equitization Fund, disbursing the Fund to State enterprises and other economic 
entities during their re-arrangement process to finance redundancy policies and to assist 
financially training centers for redundant workers in accordance with MOF‟s decisions. 
SCIC was also responsible for implementing the Prime Minister‟s and MOF‟s decisions 
regarding the inter-Fund transfers, and submit the Fund‟s revenues and expenditure plans 
to MOF and the Prime Minister for approval.  





IV.6- Authority Fragmentation and Instability: Implications on the 
Macro Dynamics 
IV.6.1- Power Fragmentation in Making Equitization Policies 
The establishment and restructuring of different Funds, namely the Equitization Funds 
and the Worker Redundancy Fund, during the last ten years between 1999 and 2008, in 
order to support and accelerate the SOE reform process in general and the 
implementation of the equitization mandate in particular, highlight the role of inter-
bureaucracy politics in economic reform in Vietnam. In particular, we find that the 
authority to making equitization policies is fragmented between different State actors, 
requiring them to bargain and exchange resources with each other in order to reach 
consensus to move the process forward. The policy momentum thus has been sustained 
through a number of successive decisions rather than by only a single, central decision 
made by the top State leaders and the equitization process, as a result, has moved rather 
slowly with a number of twists and turns along the way. The initial effort of the Central 
State to centralize equitization proceeds failed to help enforce the implementation of the 
equitization mandate in line Ministries, local States, GCs, and, State enterprises. 
Equitization Funds for SOE Re-arrangement and Equitization and the Worker 
Redundancy Fund were subsequently established to channel resources downward to local 
States in exchange for accelerated equitization in these localities. MOF‟s recent move to 
re-centralize the Equitization Funds while abolishing the Worker Redundancy Fund has 
again caused a number of local reactions as well as new rounds of bargaining among 




IV.6.2- Power Instability and the Maneuvering of the Three Streams  
As was mentioned in Chapter III of this thesis, the tendency of bureaucratization and 
routinization in the making of equitization policies, reflected through, for example, the 
establishment and operation of the State Capital and Investment Corporation (SCIC) 
since 2006 to deal with post-equitization problems, has resulted in the wider range of 
actors involved in the process. As new institutions also require resources to survive and 
thrive, the power authority in making equitization policies would certainly be further 
fragmented on the one hand, and instable on the other hand. The second feature, instable 
power structure in making equitization policies, has further complicated the inter-
bureaucracy politics by throwing the dynamism factor into the picture.  
 
While was not involved directly into the scene of making equitization policies, SCIC 
managed to convince one among the top leaders of the Government that it should be 
assigned with the right to manage the Central Equitization Fund instead of the used-to-be 
indisputable MOF. As a consequence, the issue of who should be the one to manage the 
Central Equitization Fund suddenly became a problem in the early 2007 when a new 
Decree Draft to replace Decree 187 in 2004 was finally agreed upon among various 
bureaucratic agencies and about to be finalized by the Government. SCIC, in addition to 
MOF, thus became a policy alternative to solve the above-mentioned problem. The new 
Decree to regulate the equitization process – Decree 109 in 2007 – finally stipulated that 





IV.6.3- Authority Fragmentation and Instability: Interactions and Implications 
However, Decree 109 in 2007 was not the end of the story. As was mentioned in Section 
IV.5, instead of being the final decision on the issue of who would manage the Central 
Equitization Fund, Decree 109 triggered another round of bargaining and negotiations 
among relevant parties, i.e. MOF and SCIC, over the specific details of the deal. As a 
consequence, a number of follow-up policy papers were out only a year later, including 
the Prime Minister‟s Decision 113 in August 2007, Prime Minister‟s Decisions 1550, 
1551, 1552, and 183 in November 2007, to provide specific guidelines on the transfer of 
the Central Equitization Fund from MOF to SCIC. These follow-up policies clearly 
reflected that a compromise has been made between different State actors, mainly the 
Government‟s leaders, MOF, and SCIC, in order to gain consensus over such policy 
change.  
 
In summary, the process of making and revising equitization policies among various 
bureaucratic agencies has been characterized with authority fragmentation and instability. 
While authority fragmentation leads to continuous rounds of bargaining and negotiations 
among the above-mentioned actors over contentious issues in equitization in order to seek 
agreement over policy changes; authority instability often results in further fragmentation 
of power on the one hand and unexpected policy outcomes on the other hand. This has 
important implications on the future of making equitization policies. Slow and 
incremental, rather than radical, policy changes should be expected due to the authority 
fragmentation on the one hand; whereas it would be more difficult to predict the contents 
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Chapter V State-Enterprise Interactions in Equitization 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the interaction between the direct State 
patrons and their subordinate enterprises in implementing the equitization mandate in 
these enterprises. As was mentioned earlier in Chapter II, the bargaining and negotiations 
between the State patrons and their subordinate enterprises take place in a wider macro 
context of uncertain rules and regulations. In such an environment full of uncertainties 
and ambiguities, both the state patrons and enterprises face with a number of options 
rather than only one single choice. This, in turn, fosters the bargaining behavior in 
enterprises and their superiors in order to get their preferred strategies of equitization 
approved.  My main argument in this chapter is that reducing the State ownership is not 
the ultimate aim for those who initiated the equitization mandate. If the State patrons are 
the initiator of the equitization mandate, the actual pattern of equitization often seeks to 
strengthen their power rather than to bring about a real change in the ownership structure 
of the subordinate enterprises and their post-equitization performance. If the enterprises 
are the initiator of the equitization mandate, they often do so out of the fear of being 
taken over by bigger state enterprises. However, if possible, the equitized enterprises 
always opt for some retained State ownership in their post-equitization capital structure. 
In addition, the case study presented in this chapter also points to the fact that subsequent 
steps to reduce the retained state ownership in equitized enterprises (divesting) have been 
carried out incrementally for other purposes than the stated objectives of mobilizing 
capital from the private sector and improving the corporate governance for these 
enterprises. As a result, the equitization process, seen from the micro perspective, has not 
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moved in a “big-bang” manner, but gradually and incrementally in order to suit the 
interests of both the State patrons and enterprises which, unfortunately, hardly relate to 
any of the official objectives of equitization as stated in the state policies. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section V.1 briefly introduces the four enterprises 
selected for the case study. Next, Section V.2 describes in details the process of 
equitization taken place in these four enterprises. Section V.3 discusses the main findings 
from the cases and explores the implications of these findings on the equitization patterns 
and outcomes. Finally, the last section, Section V.4, ends the chapter with some 
conclusions. 
 
V.1- Introduction of the Cases 
V.1.1- Case selection and criteria 
While it might sound simple, the selection of cases and conduction of follow-up 
interviews have been extremely difficult in Vietnam. I have screened through a number 
of equitized SOEs, collected data about them, and made preliminary/informal talks with 
some of their management personnel. I finally came up with the four cases which are 
labeled according to their sector. For example, the first equitized SOE case was labeled as 
P1, whereas P stands for Printing, the sector that the SOE belonged to while number 1 
stands for the chronological number of the case in the total case studies. Similarly, M2 
and M3 are the two cases of equitized SOEs operating in the sector of mechanical 
engineering, while the fourth case, T4, worked in the transportation sector. 
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The above-mentioned four cases were selected based on the following criteria: (i) the 
level of State ownership and management, (ii) capital scale, and (iii) sector. Since I 
suspect that the interaction between the State patrons and enterprises is important to the 
equitization outcome, the four selected cases used to be subject to different levels of state 
management and thus under the control of different State patrons. In particular, in our 
case studies, while P1 was under the central State control, T4 was under a local 
government, whereas M2 and M3 were under the state management of a General 
Corporation. The hypothesis here is that different State patrons would have different 
preferred strategies of equitization and thus lead to different equitization outcomes in 
their subordinate enterprises. In other words, I would like to test the hypothesis that the 
closer the relationship between the state patrons and enterprises, the less progressive 
pattern of equitization is observed in equitized enterprises. 
 
The second criteria for selecting the cases here is their capital scale. The hypothesis here 
is that SOEs with large capital scales would find it more difficult to opt for more 
progressive patterns of equitization than small SOEs. Among the four selected cases, P1 
had the largest capital scale of above VND 10 billion while M3 and T4 were of small 
capital scale and finally M2 was the smallest.  
 
The third criteria for selecting the cases is the sectors that these equitized SOEs belonged 
to. The hypothesis here is that the more strategic sector that the equitized SOE belonged 
to, the less progressive form of equitization that enterprise followed. Among the four 
selected cases, T4 belonged to the most strategic sector, as it used to provide public 
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goods, or road construction and maintenance in particular. The three remaining cases 
were of less strategic sectors in the economy and thus were not prioritized to remain 
State-owned dominantly. 
 
V.1.2- Description of the cases 
The first SOE, hereafter referred as company P1, was a medium-sized company, working 
in the printing sector but under the central management of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MARD). Although being medium in its capital scale, P1 was 
still the largest company among the four cases, with the total charter capital of VND 14 
billion. The printing sector is considered rather important, but not strategic, by the State 
of Vietnam. However, since P1 did not belong to any main ministries in charge of the 
printing sector, i.e. Ministry of Industry for industrial printing or Ministry of Culture, 
Sports, and Tourism for printing of cultural and arts products, the enterprise was largely 
considered by its State patron, MARD, as belonging to non-strategic sectors. The 
implication of this is clear: it would be easier for the enterprises to be subjected to reform 
measures rather than to be remained in its status quo as a wholly State owned enterprise. 
P1 started preparing the equitization plan in 2003 and completed the transformation in the 
mid of 2004. P1 was also the company that I had the most interviews with various former 
and current managers. While talks with P1‟s former managers helped me understand 
better about the history of the company, interviews with current P1‟s managers and 
employees helped me link such history with the contemporary developments in the 





The second and third cases, hereafter referred as M2 and M3, were members of the same 
90-GC, the Agricultural and Irrigational Mechanical and Electrical Engineering General 
Corporation. This 90-GC was also under the MARD‟s authority. M2 specialized on 
providing construction and related services for irrigational works while M3 specialized 
on producing motors and related equipments for agricultural machinery. While the 90-GC 
was large in its capital scale, the two members in the case study had rather small capital 
scales of below VND 10 billion. The general sector, agricultural engineering, was 
considered important to MARD, but not that strategic to the whole economy. In addition, 
their modest capital scale would certainly make the equitization mandate more 
compulsory for these two companies. M2 started preparing the equitization plan some 
time in 2002 and completed the process by the early 2003. M3 started a bit later in late 
2003 and completed by the late 2004. I had several interviews with M2‟s technical 
manager cum the secretary of the company‟s first Shareholders Meeting in 2003. For M3, 
I worked mainly with the Chairman of the Labor Union at the company, who took part in 
the Board of Equitization and later on the Board of Management of the equitized 
company. In addition to the interviews, I managed to access to both companies‟ 
paperwork concerning the equitization plan, its implementation, and follow-up deeds. 
 
The final case, hereafter referred as T4, was a local SOE established by Hanoi People‟s 
Committee or the Department of Transport and Public Works. The company‟s main tasks 
were to provide road construction and maintenance services for the suburban region in 
northern Hanoi. For Hanoi, the general sector of road construction and maintenance was 
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considered strategic. However, since the company was assigned with providing the 
services mainly to the rural areas of the city, it, in fact, was not considered strategic by 
the city government. The company‟s size was also small, with only slightly above VND 
ten billion in capital. T4 was the latest to be equitized among the four companies: it 
started the preparation stage in 2004 and completed the process in mid 2005. I had 
several interviews with one of T4‟s managers cum member of the current Board of 
Management of the post-equitization company in charge of personnel and organizational 
matters. Similarly with the previous companies, I also had access to the company‟s 
paperwork concerning its equitization process. 
 
Table 5.1: Case studies in equitization: a Summary 
Company/Code P1 M2 M3 T4 












of MARD  
Directly under the 
supervision of 90 GC 





Directly under the 














Public Work  
Location of the 
company in the 





Important, but not 
strategic 
Important, but not 
strategic 




Medium (14) Very small (2.4) Small (6.8) Small (11) 
 
V.2- A Firm-level Analysis: Equitization Seen from Micro-Perspectives  
V.2.1- Case 1: Equitization of a Central, Independent SOE 
Company P1 is a printing company under the management of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MARD), established as early as in 1970 from the infrastructure 
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of a French-owned printing workshop set up during the colonization period in the early 
1900s. Similar to other SOEs at that time, the company was mainly in charge of printing 
books, newspapers, and other materials for the agricultural sector. The company‟s direct 
State supervisor was then Department of Propaganda and Education at MARD. Since 
1975, the company was moved to under the Institute of Agricultural Planning and 
Architecture at MARD, and thus switched to print geographical maps for the sector‟s 
specific needs. Also, during this period, the company started to print product “stamps” or 
labels for agricultural products such as tea or milk in accordance with MARD‟s 
assignment. From early 1980s, the company had extra activities (termed as Plan III in 
addition to the two official Plans I and II under the State mandate), allowing its workers 
to manually cut or fold the above-mentioned printed product stamps, labels, and 
packages. The then income from Plan III allegedly accounted for almost one fifth of its 
workers‟ total income.317 
 
Similarly to the Plan III carried out since early 1980s, Doi Moi in 1986 marked the 
beginning of another range of bold “fence-breaking” activities for P1.  Overtime working 
hours with higher pay-rate was a main source of extra income for the company‟s workers. 
The company laid off a number of redundant employees during this period, but rented 
them kiosks built in the front side of the company‟s building, so that these redundant 
workers could make a living by selling mainly construction materials and animal feeds 
and medicines whereas the company also earned extra revenues from the rents. Since the 
early of the 1990s, the company stopped renting kiosks to redundant workers and instead 
signed renting contracts with outside individuals and organizations. The income collected 
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from renting kiosks, and later on, office space, accounted for above 20 percent of 
company P1‟s total annual profit. The rest 80 percent came from the main production line 




Instead of being supervised by only one Department at MARD as before, starting from 
the early 1990s, P1 was under the direct management of Department of Planning and 
Investment at MARD in coordination with the Department of Finance and Accounting at 
MARD and Department of Enterprise Finance at MOF. The Department of Planning and 
Investment at MARD was responsible for the sectoral State management for P1, 
determining all State decisions relating to P1 in general and representing the State in P1. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Finance and Accounting at MARD regulated the financial 
and accounting system applied in P1 and the Department of Enterprise Finance at MOF 
oversaw the performance of the State capital in P1. As a result of such changes, P1 
needed to maintain relationships with a wide range of State agencies, which were not 
only various Departments at MARD, but also different bureaus and offices at MOF.  
 
Regarding the production activities, by the early 1990s, P1 no longer printed the 
agricultural maps, but focused on product labels and packages. The coverage expanded to 
other products rather than those of agricultural nature. However, the traditional customers 
in the agricultural sector, including key state-owned tea, milk, and tobacco producers, 
remained the biggest clients for P1. According the P1‟s management team, the company 
maintained a “good relationship” with their State direct supervisor since the early 1990s. 
In fact, MARD remained P1‟s State supervisor by name only as P1 exercised high degree 
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of autonomy in carrying its production activities. Also, since P1 had sufficient capital, as 
well as good access to capital for its business and investment needs, the label as a SOE 
under MARD just helped it little with financial issues. Finally, since the mid 1980s, P1 
was able to find its own clients without any support from MARD. In actuality, MARD 
played little role in the relationship between P1 and its suppliers and customers. 
 
The performance of company P1 before equitization had been quite satisfactory. The 
after-tax profits remained at an annual average from VND 1.5 to 2 billion during the 
period between 2001 and 2003, while the total company capital (including the State 
capital and own equity) was approximately VND 12 billion, making P1‟s ratio of after-




Regarding the equitization mandate, the issue was actually discussed within the company 
since as early as in the end 1990s, after the Government launched Decree 44 to accelerate 
the process. The then Director, approaching his retirement in about five years‟ time, 
however, was not interested in the issue, despite the fact that equitization might open an 
avenue for him to remain in his post beyond the retirement age.
320
 The mandate came 
back to P1 from MARD in early 2000s when, as mentioned earlier, the company just 
went through a fierce competition to choose a new Director. The finally-selected, new 
Director was in his late forties, graduated from the Hanoi University of Mining and 
Geology, and had almost twenty years working at the company from a junior manager to 
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 In an interview in September 2007, the then chief accountant of P1 recalled to me that she did 
mention this to the incumbent Director, but his attitude was very indifferent. Perhaps he had not 
come to perceive the importance of such an early equitization to his career by then. 
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the head of the main workshop. Despite the fact that he was not initially nominated by the 
former Director for the post, the new director won the votes from the majority of the 
workers at the company. One interesting development during this period is that MARD 
initially proposed that P1 merged into MARD‟s main printing and publishing company 
instead of being equitized. This merger proposal actually was not new, but was 
repeatedly proposed time and again by MARD. However, it became serious later on, as 
P1 had to make a choice between merging to remain wholly State-owned or equitizing. If 
P1 accepted the merger, it would be very likely that P1‟s incumbent director and 
management board lost their jobs in the new company, since the other state enterprise 
was much bigger and worked in the mainstream of the sector, and thus certainly had more 
power to remain intact.  
 
In order to avoid this merger plan, P1 therefore did have to “work” hard to persuade 
MARD to give it up and allow P1 to go ahead with preparation for equitization. The main 
reason that P1 used in order to persuade MARD was the fact that its field of business and 
production was totally different from that of the Agricultural Publishing House (name of 
the other company in the merger proposal) and thus the merger would do harm rather 
than good to both companies. Certainly not only logical reasoning might work that well 
in this case, but also the “good relationship” between the company and its State patron 
did.
321
 As a result, P1 was allowed to go ahead with equitization. It started to prepare the 
equitization proposal in end 2003 and completed the equitization process in mid 2004. 
The State capital at P1 was determined by a Valuation Board comprising of 
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representatives from MOF, MARD, and the company‟s Director at VND 14 billion (or 
approximately USD 1 million), increased by VND 2 billion in comparison with the actual 
value of P1‟s fixed assets at the point of valuation. This VND 2 billion increase was 
determined by the Valuation Board as the intangible value of the company derived from 
its high profitability and good reputation. 
 
The method of equitization provided another arena for bargaining and negotiation 
between P1 and its direct State supervisor - MARD. As usual, MARD‟s initial intention 
was to have at least 51 percent State share in the company‟s capital in order to maintain 
its grip on the company. However, the company director proposed an equitization plan in 
which the State only kept its 25 percent capital share. When being asked about why he 
chose that figure, the director explained 25 percent State ownership was the safest choice 
for his position to be secured at the moment. If the State share in the company was higher 
than 25 percent, or up to 51 percent as suggested by MARD, there would be no real 
change in the company‟s actual status and the possibility of State intervention into the 
company‟s daily activities would thus still looming over the post-equitization company. 
On the other hand, if the State share was lower than 25 percent, more shares would be 
sold to either the director‟s competitors within or outside the company, which would 
certainly put the director in the danger of losing the control power over the post-
equitization company. Another reason for not choosing a very low State share in the total 
capital, as explained by the director, was that the company might still need the State 
warranty (through MARD) if it wanted to borrow money from banks. Therefore, the rate 
of 25 percent State share was the safest choice for the incumbent director. It would help 
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him to remain in his seat in the post-equitization company on the one hand, and ensure 
that the post-equitization company could still enjoy various advantages from being 
partially owned by the State on the other hand.  
 
As a result, the company went through equitization by selling part of the State capital in 
together with issuing new shares, doubling the post-equitization capital level to VND 27 
billion. The structure of share ownership in P1 after equitization was as follows: the State 
owned 25 percent, the company‟s managers and employees owned 54.8 percent, and 
outside investors 20.2 percent. MARD initially represented the State in managing the 
State capital in P1 for the first two years after equitization. Since mid 2006, the State 
capital in P1 has been put under the management of SCIC. Company P1 planned to issue 
additional shares by end 2007, raising its total charter capital to VND 54 billion, in order 
to invest in buying two new printing machines for its current printing unit and launching 
a new printing factory. Its long term vision was to develop into a holding company 
model, with both direct and indirect investment in other printing factories in the region. 
 
V.2.2- Cases 2 and 3: Equitization of GC Members 
Both companies M2 and M3 were under the same GC before and after equitization- the 
90-GC for Agricultural and Irrigational Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. This GC 
was, in fact, the result of a merger between two 90-GCs, one in Ministry of Fishery and 
one in Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, in 1995 when the two Ministries 
together with Ministry of Forestry were merged into MARD. Basically, M2 provided 
construction services mainly for irrigational works in the countryside while M3 produced 
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agricultural machinery and equipments such as rice mills. Both M2 and M3 had very 
small capital scales and were not lying in the main line of business of the GC. The 
relationship between M2 and M3 and the GC was thus perceived by M2‟s and M3‟s 
employees and managers as mainly administrative-based rather than business-oriented. In 
fact, M2 and M3 were independent SOEs for a long period of time before they were 
added to the GC as its members in the mid 1990s. There are certain benefits that M2 and 
M3 enjoyed from being GC members. For example, from time to time, they participated 
in bidding for economic contracts under the GC name together with some other members, 
which, to a certain extent, did help them win the contracts. Or the GC guarantee was also 
needed in case M2 or M3 wanted to borrow money from banks. However, these benefits 
seemed marginal to both companies. Their managers clearly expressed that they 
considered themselves as autonomous entities from the GC.  
 
The equitization mandate came to M2 and M3 from its direct State patron, the 90-GC, in 
early 2003 and 2004 respectively, as stated in the GC‟s overall equitization plan. These 
timelines, according to sources within the two companies, were previously discussed and 
agreed among MARD, the GC, and SOE members. The pre-equitization value for both 
M2 and M3 were rather low, standing at slightly above VND 2 billion and VND 5 billion, 
respectively. Both figures, however, did not reflect the true value of the companies. In 
fact, most of the two companies‟ bad debts were cleared. Second, the value of a number 
of workshops and buildings constructed on the territory of the two companies was not 
counted into their pre-equitization values. And finally, the value of a joint-venture 
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In both M2 and M3, the State share remained dominant in the post-equitization capital 
structure. Sources from M2 alleged that the GC had violated the State policy of not 
keeping controlling shares in small SOEs of less than VND 10 billion in capital. After 
equitization, the State share in M2 was 51 percent while that in M3 was 52 percent. As 
the result, the relationship between the GC and the two companies after equitization 
remained the same patron-client relationship as before equitization. Moreover, the GC 
seemed to intervene more into the daily operation of M3 as the GC Deputy Director now 
actually replaced the incumbent Director in running the company on a day-by-day basis. 
He moved his office permanently to M3‟s building office and virtually signed all the 
company‟s paperwork. 
 
V.2.3- Case 4: Equitization of a Local, Independent SOE 
Company T4 was established in 1965 as a local, independent SOE under the management 
of the Hanoi People‟s Committee or the Hanoi Department of Transportation and Public 
Works in particular. The company was one among the four local state enterprises that 
provided the construction and maintenance of roads and pavements in Hanoi. T4 was 
responsible for the northern outskirt of Hanoi, or the construction and maintenance of 
mainly rural roads and public works. Another company was in charge of the southern 
outskirt, while the other two companies were in charge of the urban districts of Hanoi. 
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Among the four companies, T4 was the smallest, with a modest capital scale of VND 11 
billion (or approximately USD 0.7 million), as compared with the largest company of 
more than VND 100 billion. In spite of having a small capital scale, T4 has a rather 
complex structure with headquarter located in Hanoi and a number of offspring 
enterprises located in the outskirt of Hanoi.  
 
The first arena for negotiation and bargaining between T4 and its direct State patron did 
not come from the equitization mandate, but from a rather controversial decision made by 
the Hanoi People‟s Committee in the late 2003 and early 2004, asking the above-
mentioned four companies to merge into a wholly State owned Limited Liability 
Company. Such a merger would certainly be unfavorable for T4‟s incumbent director. 
The company was too small to compare with the remaining three and the director thus 
would be in no position to secure his presence in the Board of Management of the newly-
formed limited liability company. In resisting the merger plan, T4 and another small 
company in the group of four proposed equitization with the Hanoi Municipal People‟s 
Committee and the Hanoi Department of Transportation and Public Works. One of main 
factors that supported T4 in negotiating with the Committee was the close relationship 
that the company‟s incumbent director had with the Head of the Hanoi Department of 
Transportation and Public Works.
323
 Consequently, only the biggest company among 
above mentioned four companies transformed into wholly State owned Limited Liability 
Company while the rest three went through equitization. 
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Company T4 started the preparation for equitization in 2004. The second arena for 
bargaining between T4 and its State supervisor emerged during the valuation stage. The 
value of the company, standing at VND 11 billion, was higher than its actual value, 
according to internal sources within the company. The main reason for setting the 
company‟s value at VND 11 billion was to reach the minimal charter capital required for 
those wishing to do business in the real estate field. Again, the close relation between 
T4‟s director and the Hanoi Department of Transportation and Public Works had helped 
T4 to get approval from the municipal committee over such a high pre-equitization value.  
Table 5.2: Summary of the equitization process in the four companies
324
 
Criteria P1 M2 M3 T4 
Method of Equitization Sell part of the 
State capital in 
together with 
issuing new 
shares to the 
employees 
Issue new shares 
to employees 
Sell part of the 
State capital in 
together with 
issuing new 
shares to the 
employees 




Charter capital of the 
Joint Stock Company, in 
which 
VND 27 billion VND 5.14 billion VND 8.7 billion VND 11 billion 
- Percentage of the 
State share (%) 
25 51 52.69 0 
- Managers and 
Employees (%) 
54.8 49 47.31 85.45 




  284  
Number of labor 
redundant 
  123 150 
 
How much the State capital should be remained in the company after equitization was 
also another crucial issue. The threat of being taken over by the biggest company among 
the group of four would still loom over T4 if the State capital was to remain. Rumors 
talked about the possibility that the municipal committee would delegate the biggest 
company among the four, now transformed into a wholly State-owned limited liability 
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company, to manage the State capital in the rest three equitized companies. To avoid this 
situation, company T4, again, managed to persuade the Hanoi Municipal People‟s 
Committee to approve its equitization plan with zero percent of the State capital. The 
company completed its equitization process by mid 2005 with 90 percent State capital 
sold to the company‟s managers and employees while the rest 10 percent to outside 
investors through public auctioning. Among the other two companies that went through 
equitization at the same time with T4, one was also wholly equitized while the other one 
was equitized with a certain percentage of State shares which, as expected, was kept by 
the remaining biggest SOE in the group. 
 
V.2.4- Post-equitization Performance of the Four Companies 
Regarding the management personnel issues, the incumbent management teams remained 
the same in the four companies after equitization, except for M2. M2 is a special case as 
its management team was in transition while equitizing. The incumbent director before 
equitization approached his retirement and one of his Deputies was planned by both 
MARD and the GC to take over the post. However, the first General Assembly of the 
Shareholders hold after the M2 completed the equitization process voted for another 
Deputy to be the General Director of the company, which was later approved by MARD 
and the GC. Company M3 is also worth mentioning as the GC‟s Deputy General 
Director, being the Chairman of M3‟s Board of Management after equitization, literally 
took over the post of the company‟s incumbent director. The incumbent Director was 
asked to only focus on some unresolved issues in a joint-venture between M3 and another 
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partner in the early 2000s, while daily activities of the post-equitization company were 
conducted by the Chairman. 
  
Company T4‟s incumbent Director remained in his seat after equitization. He also 
performed the role of the Chairman in the Board of Management of the equitized 
company. Other members in the Board of Management were one Deputy Director, the 
Chairman of the Labor Union, the Chief Accountant, and the former Head of the Labor-
Salary Division, and two directors of dependent construction enterprises. Interestingly, 
sources from some members in the Board of Management revealed that they got their 
seats in the Board not with their own money. Instead, the incumbent Director cum 
Chairman had used the company‟s funds to purchase shares for them. He wanted their 
loyalty and support in return. As a result, despite the company‟s poor performance and 
failure to pay salaries to staff in time, none of the members in the Board raised their voice 
against the incumbent Director. 
  
Regarding the post-equitization economic efficiency and profitability, among the four 
companies, only company P1 performed better than in the past, with profit from its main 
line of production accounted for a larger part in its total after-tax profit. After 
equitization, P1 has moved its manufacturing units and offices to an industrial park in the 
southern suburb of Hanoi, while it formed a joint-venture with some private company to 
develop a real estate project in its former location on one of the busiest streets in Hanoi. 
The revenue from such real estate project has earned P1 about VND 1.7 billion annually 




The rest three companies (M2, M3, and T4) all had troubles in sustaining its main line of 
production. M2 and M3 relied substantially on the revenues collected from renting office 
space as their main production activities were barely able to cover the incurred costs. 
Company M2 completed the construction of a new office building after equitization and 
earned about VND 1 billion annually from rents (which accounted for about 30 percent of 
its total after-tax profits/revenues). Company M3 renovated the old office space and 
rented it to an automobile seller at the rate of VND 1.6 billion per annum for a period of 
six years. M3 was also on the process to work out with the GC over a plan to build 
another 9-storey office building within its territory and expected to earn a substantial 
portion of profit from this new real estate project. 
 
Company T4 was the worst performer among the four. The company relied solely on its 
main production line which in turn suffered substantially from the company‟s 
mismanagement. Unlike the other three companies who were entitled with land use rights 
for large areas of land in front of some of the biggest roads and highways in Hanoi, T4 
did not have any strategic locations and all its real estate development projects were still 
in the preparatory stage. As a result, the company was not able to pay its administrative 




V.3- Main Findings and Discussions 
V.3.1- Who Initiated Equitization and for What? 
We do not have one single answer for all four cases. If the enterprise is the one who 
proposed the equitization initiative most clearly in the case of T4, the direct State patrons, 
or the 90-GC, initiated equitization in the cases of M2 and M3. It is not very clear that 
who initiated the equitization mandate in the case of P1. However, it seems that P1 
shared, more or less, a similar experience with T4. The State patron did propose a merger 
plan first but was rebuffed by the enterprise, and then came the equitization initiative. 
This, interestingly, led us to an important finding about motives and purposes of those 
who initiated the equitization mandate. 
 
V.3.1.1- The Direct State Patrons as the Initiator of the Equitization Mandate 
For the initiator being the direct State patrons, would the purpose be to get rid of loss-
making, inefficient enterprises by divesting the State capital invested in these companies? 
The information from the above-studied cases hardly points to an affirmative answer to 
this question. As for the case of M2 and M3, I find that the 90-GC initiated the 
equitization mandate on these two enterprises with a clear purpose of intruding further 
into their operations and thus inserting even tighter control over them than it would be in 
the past. As a result, the 90-GC managed to apply a very similar pattern of equitization in 
both M1 and M2. The State capital in the two companies after equitization remained 
above 50 percent, creating legal avenues for the GC to participate in their Boards of 
Management. Such pattern of equitization allows the GC to replace the incumbent 
management team in M3 in controlling the company‟s daily activities. Similar outcome 
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should be expected in M2, as the GC‟s Director General was expected to become the 
Chairman of the company‟s Board of Management in 2008. Before 2008, the Chairman 
position had been held by the incumbent Director of the company.  
 
V.3.1.2- State Enterprises as the Initiator of the Equitization Mandate 
The next question would be: for the initiator being the state enterprises, then what would 
be their purposes? Would they really want autonomy from the direct State patrons and 
thus reduced to zero State ownership in their enterprises? Again, from the four cases, the 
answer to these questions is No. It is most evident in the case of T4, as the threat of being 
taken over by another state enterprise was so great that the incumbent director was driven 
to opt for the most pro-active form of equitization despite the fact that the company had 
been fed mainly by its State patron. All the State capital in T4 was sold to its employees 
and outside investors and none were retained by the State. In other word, the risk of being 
taken over would still loom over the company if any of State ownership was kept.  
 
P1, as was mentioned earlier, also faced the risk of being taken over by another state 
enterprise, but to a less extent than T4. The merger risk ceased once the merger proposal 
had been put down by MARD and the enterprise. It explains why the incumbent director 
of P1 chose to set the State ownership target in the post-equitization company at 25%, 
instead of opting for such vigorous elimination of the State ownership as in the case of 
T4. Interestingly, despite the fact that the company was highly autonomous from its State 
patron, its incumbent director hinted clearly that he still valued the State patronage over 




“Some State ownership means that you are still some “state enterprise”, not an 
entirely private company. It would help a lot. If you are an entirely private 
company, you are nothing in the State‟s and people‟s eyes. It causes troubles for 
your employees as well. When they get married, they need us to certify that they 
are still single and thus able to get married. However, sometimes the State 
authority does not trust our certification simply because we are a private 
company.”325  
 
Some State ownership retained in post-equitization companies, thus, is highly 
appreciated, not only because of the different social attitudes towards different economic 
sectors and components, but also, and mainly, due to different treatments by the State to 
these sectors. All in all, state enterprises have still been accorded more favorable 
treatment over the rest. That is also the main reason for P1‟s director to insist on keeping 
some State ownership in his company. Although the company has been doing well over 
the past two decades with little help from its State patron, it still might need the support 
from the State later on in case of difficulties. 
 
V.3.1.3- Implication on Equitization Outcomes 
The implication on the equitization outcomes is thus clear. Being the direct State patrons 
or enterprises, their first and ultimate purpose in initiating equitization was not to reduce 
the State ownership in state enterprises as set out in the policy papers. As a consequence, 
the expected outcomes of equitization, such as improved corporate finance or 
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mobilization of the private capital, have not yet realized during the equitization process. 
In addition and more importantly, the equitization process progressed just gradually and 
incrementally, instead of following the “big-bang” approach, in order to suit the interests 
of both the State patrons and enterprises.  
 
Slow and incremental equitization 
The State patrons, or the same 90-GC in this case study, used equitization as an effective 
means to consolidate their power rather than to let go their members. As a result, the 
pattern of equitization in GCs and their members was mainly to retain the dominant State 
ownership in these enterprises. Such pattern of equitization proved to strengthen the GCs‟ 
power substantially. First, equitization helped the GCs penetrate more deeply into the 
operations of their members who used to retain a greater degree of autonomy from the 
GCs before equitization took place. By representing the dominant State share in equitized 
members, GCs‟ managers and leaders often secured at least one position in these 
members‟ Boards of Management. Second, the equitization process brought about “real 
money” for the GCs. GCs were allowed to use the equitization proceeds collected from 
the process of equitizing their members for different purposes at their disposal. The 
equitization proceeds indeed become a source of finance for GCs to invest into 
establishing new subsidiaries, mostly in form of shareholding companies or one-member 
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As for the case of M2, the Board of Management has recently discussed to seek to reduce 
the State ownership from the current level of 51 percent to less than 50% in order to 
avoid the status of “state-owned-enterprise” and to be classified as “private company”. 
The reason for such move is due to the requirement for a number of international donors 
to give priority for private companies in bidding for infrastructural projects sponsored by 
them. The dominant State share in M2 has prevented the company from participating and 
winning in a number of such bidding. However, it seems that some internal transfers have 
been made during the process as well: the GC‟s Chairman would also assume the 
Chairman post in M2 while the reduced State ownership (of about 2 to 3 percent) would 
be transferred directly to M2‟s incumbent director. Meanwhile, no recent plans about 




Again, when enterprises initiated the equitization proposal, it did not automatically mean 
that these enterprises wanted autonomy from their State patrons. In most of the cases in 
my study, only enterprises facing severe threats opted for equitization. While they chose 
equitization, their preferred strategies were often involved the retaining of some State 
ownership rather than to privatize the companies fully. 
 
Official objectives of equitization unmet 
As was mentioned above, since both State patrons and enterprises implemented the 
equitization mandate not for the purpose of reducing the State ownership and improving 
the corporate governance, as the case study shows us, these objectives have yet been 
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achieved in the equitization process. Among the four cases, only P1 seemed to fare better 
after equitization. However, P1 did perform very well in the past and it is all possible that 
the seemingly improved performance might be due to different accounting and reporting 
practices used by the post-equitization company. Meanwhile, company T4, after being 
fully privatized, performed the worst and has currently been on the brink of bankruptcy. 
The correlation between equitization and post-equitization performance and corporate 
governance is also not clear in M2 and M3. M3 provides us an interesting case, as the 
more intruding role of the GC into the company‟s activities after equitization, in some 
aspects, has brought more works and contracts from the GC to the company and, 
according to the observation of one M3‟s manager, this has improved the company‟s 
revenue slightly. However, no clear improvements in both M2 and M3 have been 
observed, as their main lines of production remained the same and the only activity that 
seemed to increase their post-equitization revenues and profits was renting office space.  
 
V.3.2- Government-Enterprise Bargaining and Contributing Factors 
V.3.2.1- Factors Shaping Enterprises‟ Bargaining Power in Equitization 
From the four above-studied cases, the two following key factors have emerged as 
substantially shaping SOEs‟ bargaining leverage in their negotiations with the State 
patrons over the implementation of the equitization mandate: the SOEs‟ de facto 
autonomy and their connections with the State agencies. It should be noted that the de 
facto autonomy is not the same with the official managerial autonomy granted by the 
SOE Laws or any legal documents enforced by the State, but defined as the actual 
independence and freedom enjoyed by the SOEs in managing its daily activities in 
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relation to both their direct and indirect State supervisors. The de facto autonomy, thus, is 
dependent on a number of sub-factors/variables, such as the SOE‟s size, location, 
business performance, and strategic position in the sector. The second factor, the political 
connection, is defined as the level of closeness between the SOE managers and their State 
patrons. The case study points to a correlation between the two above-mentioned factors 
and the outcome of negotiations and bargaining between the SOEs and their State patrons 
over the implementation of the equitization mandate. In particular, the higher degree of 
de facto autonomy an SOE possessed, the better bargaining leverage it would enjoy and, 
thus, the more favorable equitization outcome it would potentially achieve. Similarly, the 
closer the political connection between the SOE and its State supervisor, the easier for the 
SOE managers to get their supervisor to approve their strategies and plans over the 
equitization mandate.  
 
Among the four cases, company P1 appears to have the highest degree of de facto 
autonomy from its State supervisor. In fact, P1 had attained an increasing degree of de 
facto autonomy over time due to a combination of various factors. The overall de jure 
liberal environment for SOEs, especially since the launch of Doi Moi in the latter half of 
the 1980s, certainly granted P1, as an SOE, increased autonomy in its daily operations. In 
addition, the company‟s main production activities did not lie in the main sectors under 
the State management of MARD, thus creating even more room for P1‟s managers to 
maneuver. As a result, P1 had literally conducted its business with little guidance from 
MARD since the late 1980s. It managed to find its own sources of inputs, market its 
products and technology on a market-competitive basis, and to serve its own clients. Last 
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but not least, the company‟s good performance helped it substantially in financing as well 
as seeking sources to finance its investment projects. The company seldom asked for 
capital top-ups from the State Budget but preferred to borrow from banks to finance its 
investment projects. The good financial record, according to P1‟s Director, made P1 a 
value customer of many banks. This allowed the company to choose banks and loans 
with the best terms and conditions. Such high level of managerial autonomy attained by 
P1 has been somehow conflated by its managers to the de facto ownership right. In fact, 





Coming back to the equitization process in P1, the high degree of autonomy helped P1 
considerably in persuading MARD to give up the merger plan and to approve the 
equitization plan prepared by the company. However, it should be noted the high degree 
of de facto autonomy alone might not be enough if P1 had not possessed a good 
relationship with its State patron. The high degree of de facto autonomy, in fact, does not 
automatically mean that P1 was absolutely safe from the State interventions. This fact 
was clearly mentioned in the author‟s interviews with P1‟s managers during her fieldtrip 
in 2007. In order to get its equitization plan approved by the State patrons, P1 had 
managed to maintain “good relationships” with a rather wide range of involving State 
agencies, among which, to name a few, are not only various Departments under MARD 
but also MOF and the Municipal People‟s Committee in Hanoi.  
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The case of company T4 provided a rather contrasting picture to P1. Unlike P1 which 
managed to attain a high degree of de facto autonomy from its State patrons, T4 relied 
heavily on their State supervisor – the Municipal People‟s Committee of Hanoi and its 
functional Department of Transportation and Public Works in particular. Half of the 
company‟s annual revenue, about VND 3 billions, came from the projects of road 
maintenance assigned by the Municipal authority. Therefore, in the case of T4, it is the 
close political connection, not the high degree of de facto autonomy, which played a 
crucial role in helping the company to escape the merger plan and subsequently to secure 
its plan of fully privatizing the company. In addition to the allegedly close relationship 
between the company‟s incumbent Director and people at the Hanoi Department of 
Transportation and Public Works, internal sources in the company pointed to the 
spending of a few billions of Vietnamese dongs by the company‟s Director during this 
period in order to work things out with the necessary State patrons.  
 
In the remaining cases of M1 and M2, both the de facto autonomy and political 
connection were not significant, and thus had much less impact on the bargaining 
leverage for the two companies. The legal status of being GC members limited the de 
facto autonomy of both M1 and M2 to a great extent. The 90-GC, the direct State 
supervisor of M1 and M2, proved to have strong grips on their members and thus totally 
replacing MARD in playing the role of the State in these two companies. In other words, 
the GC, after various corporatization waves during the 1990s, had become another 
administrative layer between its member companies and MARD. The relationship 
between the GC members, such as M1 and M2, and MARD, as the official State 
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supervisor in these companies, thus became weaker. Limited autonomy from the GC in 
couple with loose connection with the higher State agencies, therefore, resulted in 
unfavorable bargaining leverages for both M1 and M2 in their negotiations with the 90-
GC. As a result, the 90-GC managed to apply a very similar of pattern in equitization in 
both M1 and M2.  The State capital in the two companies after equitization remained 
above 50 percent, creating legal avenues for the GC to participate in their Boards of 
Management. Such pattern of equitization allows the GC to replace the incumbent 
management team in M3 in controlling the company‟s daily activities. Similar outcome 
should be expected in M2, as the GC‟s Director General was expected to become the 
Chairman of the company‟s Board of Management in 2008. Before 2008, the Chairman 
position had been held by the incumbent Director of the company.  
 
Table 5.3: Summary of factors shaping the equitization in the four companies 
Criteria P1 M2 M3 T4 
Size (capital scale) Medium Small Small Small to Medium 
Strategic Location Yes (less) Yes  Yes No 
Financial performance Good Average Average Average (Less) 
 National/Local 
Priority 
No Yes (Less) Yes (Less) No 
Degree of Autonomy  High Low to Medium Low to Medium Low 
Political connection Medium Low to Medium Low to Medium High, close relationship 
between the incumbent 
Director and the head 
of the State patron 
agency 
 
V.3.2.2- Implications to the Outcome of the Equitization Process 
As mentioned in the previous section, the multiple case study conducted in this thesis 
pointed to a correlation between the degree of de facto autonomy and political connection 
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possessed by the equitized company and the company‟s bargaining leverage in 
negotiations with its State patrons over the implementation of the equitization mandate. 
We now investigate further the impact of such correlation on the outcome of the 
equitization process. Among the four cases, the equitization process in P1 and T4 
proceeded in a manner that was in favor for the companies. Most of proposals from the 
two companies over various equitization issues were eventually accepted by their State 
patrons. The equitization outcome, thus, led to a less percentage of State shares in both 
companies after equitization. The State share in P1 was 25 percent while that in T4 was 
nil.  
 
On a contrary, when the de facto autonomy and political connection possessed by the 
SOE were insignificant, its bargaining leverage was also considerably limited. As both 
M1 and M2 were under the tight control of the GC, they had little leverage in bargaining 
with the GC over the implementation of the equitization mandate. The equitization 
process for these two companies, consequently, proceeded in an unfavorable manner to 
both of them. After equitization, the State retained a dominant share in both companies, 
which paradoxically allowed the GC to intervene to a greater extent into their operations. 
Equitization thus became a legal tool for the GC to penetrate into their members‟ 
operations and activities. This is clearly illustrated in the case of M3 whose incumbent 
management team kept their seats after equitization but the GC‟s managers de facto 




V.4- Government-Enterprise Interactions in Equitization 
The actual implementation of the equitization mandate at the enterprise-level is more 
complicated than the simple assumption about the collaboration between the State 
patrons and their subordinate enterprises in resisting the equitization mandate. What we 
have seen from the case study is that both State patrons and state enterprises have 
different preferred strategies of equitization surrounded by the different specific contexts. 
The State patrons often initiate the equitization mandate on their subordinate enterprises 
if this helps strengthen their fiscal position and power. On the other hand, state 
enterprises resort to equitization as a means to avoid the risk of being taken by other 
entities, often bigger state enterprises of the same sector. These enterprises are often 
small in capital scale and belong to non-strategic sectors of the economy. However, state 
enterprises that opt for equitization, if possible, would still prefer to keep at least some 
State ownership in their post-equitization capital structure. How much is the actual state 
ownership retained in an equitized enterprise is, however, determined by bargaining and 
negotiations between the enterprise and its State patron in their very specific context of 
equitization. As is found in the case study, the ability for enterprises to get their preferred 
equitization strategies approved by the State patrons depends on a combination of factors, 
including, but not limited to, the enterprises‟ autonomy from and closeness with their 
State patrons, the sector they belong to, as well as the strategic location of the enterprises 
in the eyes of their State patrons.  
 
As a consequence, the equitization process in Vietnam has moved slowly and 
incrementally in order to suit the interests of both enterprises and their State supervisors. 
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By 2008, or more than a decade after the formal equitization was enforced, only about or 
even less than one fifth of the State ownership in the state enterprise system was sold to 
enterprise employees and outside investors.
329
 The remaining 80 percent was still in the 
hands of the State. Also, as the interests of both the State patrons and their subordinate 
enterprises have not been always the same with the official objectives stated by policy 
papers, the actual equitization process taking place at the enterprise level often seeks to 
cater these interests rather than to reduce the State ownership in the state enterprises 
system, to mobilize capital investment from the private sector, and to improve the 
corporate governance in equitized enterprises. 
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The contemporary approaches to economic reforms in Vietnam have been looking 
through the lens of policies versus process or State versus Society. For example, Vietnam 
researchers following the rational statist approach view the formal equitization program 
as a rational search for the best policies to deal with the SOE problem. Despite policy 
irrationalities, resistances, and delays, the underlying assumption of this approach is a 
strong, dominant role of the rather unified and coherent State of Vietnam in the overall 
process. Meanwhile, researchers following the “reform as a process” approach posit a 
heavier weight to the role of local states and SOEs and a less significant role to the 
central State and its policies. While largely ignoring the role of the State and its policies 
in the formal equitization process, “reform as a process” theorists detect a pattern of 
collaboration between State patrons and their subordinate enterprises in resisting the 
equitization mandate.  
 
The author of this thesis, while not arguing that the above-mentioned approaches are 
wrong, finds that both approaches tend to view the equitization process in Vietnam 
through their polarizing lenses. The rational statist approach examines the process purely 
as policy developments and thus pays exclusive attentions on the role of the State in the 
process. The “reform as a process”, meanwhile, focuses mainly on the micro interactions 
between State agencies and enterprises to fight against the equitization mandate. What 
distinguishes my approach in this thesis is that I combine both of these above-mentioned 
perspectives into one common framework of analysis. Instead of focusing on either the 
policies versus the process or vice versa, I try to look at the impacts of both policies and 
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process, and their interactions on equitization. In so doing, I argue that policies, process, 
and their interactions have contributed significantly to the slow and non-linear 
implementation of the equitization mandate.  
 
The dual dynamics model – the analysis framework introduced in this Thesis is 
composed of the three main theoretical approaches, i.e. the Fragmented Authoritarianism 
model, theories on government – business interactions, and the Garbage Can theory. The 
dual dynamics model analyzes the bargaining and negotiations among various 
bureaucratic agencies over the making/revising of equitization policies at the macro level 
(the macro dynamics) and between the State patrons and their subordinate enterprises 
over the actual implementation of the equitization policies at the micro level (the micro 
dynamics). While Chapter IV investigates the macro dynamics by using the combined 
framework of the Fragmented Authoritarianism model and Garbage Can theory, Chapter 
V investigates the micro dynamics within the combined framework of theories on 
government-enterprises interactions and the Garbage Can theory. In the following, we 
start with a recap of the main findings of Chapters IV and V on the above-mentioned 
dynamics. We move on with an analysis of interactions between these two dynamics and 
their implications on the equitization process. The theme of gradualism in Vietnam‟s 
equitization is then re-visited. Some further notes on the dual dynamics model in 
equitization are also presented. A brief discussion about the future of the equitization 




Recap on the Dual Dynamics in Equitization 
As was pointed out in Chapter IV of this thesis, authority fragmentation and instability 
have fostered bargaining behaviors among various State actors involved in the making 
and revising of equitization policies. A wide and increasing range of State agencies have 
been engaged in continuous bargaining and negotiations over contentious issues in 
equitization policies in order to seek consensus over policy changes. As a result, policy 
changes are often incremental and slow in implementation. Also, the maneuvering of 
both new and old institutions among the three streams of politics, problems, and policies 
has resulted in unexpected policy outcomes rather than those predicted by the 
Fragmented Authoritarianism model. 
 
Meanwhile, at the micro level, as was pointed out in Chapter V of this thesis, different 
preferred strategies, different interests, and motives have led the State patrons and their 
subordinate enterprises to engage in bargaining and negotiations over the actual 
implementation of the equitization mandate. In particular, the State patrons only preferred 
to equitize their subordinate enterprises if such a move helps to strengthen their fiscal 
position and power, as in the case study of the 90-GC for Agricultural and Irrigational 
Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. On the other hand, state enterprises also resorted 
to equitization as means to avoid being taken over by other entities, often bigger state 
enterprises of the same sector. The pattern of equitization should help these enterprises to 
avoid being taken over on the one hand while also allow them to retain some State 
ownership in their post-equitization capital structure. How much is the actual state 
ownership retained in an equitized enterprise is, however, determined by bargaining and 
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negotiations between the enterprise and its State patron in their very specific context of 
equitization. As was found in Chapter V, the ability for enterprises to get their preferred 
equitization strategies approved by the State patrons depends on a combination of factors, 
including but not limited to, the enterprises‟ autonomy from and closeness with their 
State patrons, the sector they belong to, as well as the strategic location of the enterprises 
in the eyes of their State patrons.  
 
Also, as the interests of both the State patrons and their subordinate enterprises have not 
been always in line with the official objectives stated by policy papers, the actual 
equitization process taking place at the enterprise level often seeks to cater these interests 
rather than to meet those official targets of reducing the State ownership in the state 
enterprises system, mobilizing capital investment from the private sector, and improving 
the corporate governance in equitized enterprises. The actual pace of equitization at the 
micro level is thus slow and incremental. 
 
Macro-Micro Interactions in Equitization and Implications 
As was pointed out earlier in Chapter II, the macro and micro dynamics are not separated 
from each other but combine to create a “vicious cycle” in the making of equitization 
policies in Vietnam. Here, let us take a closer look at the interactions between the above-
mentioned dynamics as well as their impacts on the equitization process. 
 
The slow and incremental implementation of the equitization mandate at the micro level 
often triggers new rounds of bargaining and negotiations over policy changes at the 
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macro level to seek to speed up the process. As was seen in Chapter IV, the delays in 
implementing the official equitization mandate during the late 1990s had fostered the 
Central State to offer a number of fiscal incentives for both local governments and GCs 
to accelerate the equitization process in these localities. In particular, local governments 
and GCs were allowed, starting from 1998, to keep the proceeds collected from the 
equitization process at local enterprises and GC members and to use them almost entirely 
at their discretion. In addition to such decentralization of the Equitization Funds, another 
Fund, the Worker Redundancy Fund, was also established in the early 2000s to provide 
subsidies for redundant workers resulted from the equitization process.  
 
However, not all policy changes at the macro level are passed easily. Authority 
fragmentation and instability has led to protracted negotiations and bargaining among an 
increasing range of State actors involved in the process. Policy changes, in turn, are thus 
often slow and incremental too. The direction of policy changes is sometimes also 
difficult to predict. Such a dynamics at the macro level has resulted in a unique 
environment of legal framework regulating the equitization process: ambiguous and 
unclear rules and regulations. And such environment has created significant impacts on 
how State patrons and subordinate enterprises formed their own strategies in equitization 
at the micro level. As was discussed in Chapter V, the State patron for GC members, the 
90-GC for Agricultural and Irrigational Mechanical and Electrical Engineering was the 
one who initiated the equitization process in its member enterprises, M2 and M3. And 
while initiating the equitization in its members, the 90-GC chose to sell less than half of 
the State ownership in both member enterprises. This pattern of equitization marked a 
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striking difference from the common exercise/practice among other State patrons such as 
local governments or line Ministries. Both local governments and line Ministries, such as 
the Hanoi Municipal People‟s Committee and MARD in the case study in Chapter V, 
initially tried to avoid equitizing their enterprises at all costs; however, when equitization 
finally became unavoidable, they did not insist on keeping dominant State shares in 
equitized enterprises. What are the factors that caused different State patrons to embark 
on different equitization strategies? An examination of equitization policies during the 
period between 2002 and 2006, when the equitization process of all four enterprises in 
the case study took place, reveals to us important policy changes that might pose different 
impacts on different State patrons. 
 
For example, before 2002, as was mentioned in Chapter IV, only local governments and 
91-GCs were allowed to set up their own Equitization Funds. As a result, most of 90-GCs 
were reluctant to equitize their members since they gained nothing from the practice. 
Some 90-GCs started requesting the Government to allow them to set up their own 
Equitization Funds and actually got the approval. This had led to the issuance of Prime 
Minister‟s Decision 174 in 2002 that allowed Equitization Funds to be established at 90-
GCs as well. Such policy change was thus one main reason for the 90-GC for 
Agricultural and Irrigational Mechanical and Electrical Engineering to initiate the 
equitization process in M2 and M3. In fact, equitization brought back “real money” to the 




In addition to the Equitization Funds issues, policy changes regarding the State 
representation in post-equitization enterprises with some State ownership also affected 
the manner the State patrons formulated their preferred equitization strategies. Before 
2004, all the State patrons were delegated to manage the remaining State share in 
equitized enterprises. However, since 2004, line ministries and local governments have 
been asked to transfer this right to the State Capital and Investment Corporation (SCIC) 
while GCs have still been allowed to exercise this right in their equitized members. Such 
policy change explains why the 90-GC in the case study, while initiating equitization in 
its member enterprises, chose to keep at least half of the State ownership in these 
enterprises. On a contrary, initially both MARD and the Hanoi Municipal People‟s 
Committee tried to avoid the equitization mandate as much as possible but when it came 
down to equitization, how much of the State ownership remained in equitized enterprises 
then did not bother them much. In fact, as in the case of T4, the local government of 
Hanoi even accepted to let go the whole enterprise. 
 
In summary, the slow and incremental implementation of the equitization mandate at the 
micro level has been fed back to the macro level and thus triggered new rounds of 
bargaining and negotiations over possible policy changes. In turn, policy changes, as a 
product of the macro dynamics, then have had impacts on both the State patrons and their 
subordinate enterprises in forming and/or revising their preferred equitization strategies. 
This macro-micro interaction has created a sort of “vicious cycle” within the equitization 




Macro-Micro Interactions: a “Vicious Cycle” 
 
 
As a consequence, the overall equitization process in Vietnam has been characterized as 
slow and non-linear. By 2008, i.e., more than a decade after the formal equitization was 
enforced, less than one fifth of the State ownership in the state enterprise system was sold 
to SOE employees and outside investors. The remaining over eighty percent ownership of 
the SOE system was still in the hands of the State.
330
  However, the pace of equitization 
was not always slow, but featured with two accelerated periods between late 1998 and 
2002 and between 2003 and 2006. 
 
Vietnam’s Equitization and Gradualism Revisited 
Now we return to the very first question posed in the beginning of this thesis, i.e., where 
is the location of the Vietnamese equitization process in the world map of privatization? 
It is surely not a case of “big-bang” privatization as was witnessed in Russia and other 
former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Then, is it a case of “gradualism” in 
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addition to the Chinese experience? To some certain extent, equitization, or the 
Vietnamese version of privatization, fits as a case of gradualism. The State of Vietnam 
had moved very cautiously in launching the equitization program. It took at least five 
years since the term equitization was first coined for the pilot equitization program to be 
implemented and almost a decade for the formal equitization mandate to be approved. 
Among the four main SOE reform measures, equitization came the latest, after all the 
other three measures failed to solve the basic problems of the SOE system – high ratios of 
bad debts, low productivities, and inefficiency. The fact that the State agencies shied 
away from giving a concrete definition of the term “equitization” also points to a 
gradualist approach in equitization, as it contained equitization as an economic measure 
only in order to foster the socialist developments in Vietnam and defused any link 
between equitization and possible political reforms to denounce socialism. An analysis of 
various equitization policies over time might also point to gradualism in the 
policymaking process, in which the State carefully designed the policies with gradual and 
incremental changes in different periods/stages of the equitization process. The 
consequence of such gradualism is clear: the overall equitization has been sluggish, 
despite some recent periods of acceleration in the pace of equitization.   
 
But this is not the whole story of Vietnam‟s equitization. A deeper analysis, as conducted 
in this thesis, reveals to us an alternative explanation to the observed gradual equitization 
process in Vietnam. By applying the dual dynamics model in investigating the policy-
making process in equitization, the author of this thesis finds that the two seemingly 
parallel sets of bargaining – the inter-bureaucracy bargaining and the State patron-
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enterprise interaction, taking place in two separate stages – policy formulation/revision 
and policy implementation/feedback, have interacted with each other. These interactions 
are the main factors behind the slow, but non-linear, motion of the equitization process in 
Vietnam. My investigation of the inter-bureaucracy politics at the macro level points to 
both authority fragmentation and instability. As a consequence, policy changes in 
equitization have been often delayed and incremental not because of there were some 
coherent rational State setting such a slow pace but due to non-stop bargaining and 
negotiations among an increasing range of actors to search for consensus over these 
changes. Regarding the micro dynamics, instead of the collusive behavior of both State 
patrons and state enterprises in resisting the equitization mandate as often asserted by the 
“reform as a process” theorists, I find that, in fact, State patrons and enterprises did have 
their own preferred equitization strategies and these strategies were not necessarily 
coherent in most of the cases. Given the macro condition of unclear rules and regulations, 
such differences nurtured, again, the bargaining and negotiations between the State 
patrons and their subordinate enterprises over the actual implementation of the 
equitization mandate at the micro level. Interestingly, the motives behind these strategies 
were not often the same as the objectives stated in macro policies, i.e. to reduce the State 
ownership in the SOE system and thus to improve the corporate governance in these 
enterprises. As a consequence, the actual implementation process of the equitization 
mandate at the micro level moved slowly and incrementally in order to suit the interests 





Further Notes on the Dual Dynamics Model: An Agenda for Future 
Research 
As was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the dual dynamics model largely 
ignores the role of different elitist leaders and their ideology on the equitization process 
in Vietnam. In particular, due to the increasing tendency of bureaucratization and 
routinization of the Party works, the model simply assumes the conflation between the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and the State/Bureaucracy and thus does not discuss 
their separate roles as well as interactions on the making of equitization policies. In fact, 
it is widely observed that all the negotiations and bargaining among various state 
agencies have been taking place within a broader context of parameters set by the VCP. 
Also, most of government officials taking part in these negotiations and bargaining are 
Party cadres and thus significantly influenced by the Party guidelines and directions 
regarding equitization. While the dual dynamics proves to be more efficient in explaining 
the dynamics of the equitization process in Vietnam, i.e. the “non-linearity” feature of the 
process, a study on the role of the VCP and its leaders would help explain better the 
overall gradual pace of the process over the past decade. Hence, a follow-up analysis on 
the roles of elites and their influence on the equitization process is therefore worth doing, 
and would complement significantly to the understanding about the factors that shape the 
trajectory of the equitization process in Vietnam.  
 
An analysis of elitist politics would also contribute significantly for comparative studies 
on privatization in Vietnam and say, China. A quick review of current literature on 
comparing China and Vietnam points to the following observation. Although the two 
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countries are considered as moving gradually in privatizing their state-owned enterprises, 
China still seems to fare faster than Vietnam and to have a more cohesive and consistent 
strategy of privatization.
331
 Hence, while the dual dynamics model helps explain the 
similarities in these two countries, a comparative study on elites and their roles in the 
equitization process in Vietnam and China is expected to explain why privatization in 
China seems to fare faster than that in Vietnam.  
 
Another interesting point about Vietnam‟s equitization is that the authority structure has 
been shifted during the process. In particular, equitization has brought about resources 
and power for a number of new actors involved in the process, such as 90- and 91-GCs or 
the State Capital and Investment Corporation (SCIC). For examples, as has been 
mentioned, GCs and their transformative variants recently found equitization as effective 
means to consolidate their power by accessing to resources created during the process on 
the one hand and further penetrating into their members‟ activities on the other hand. 
These tendencies have also been observed within SCIC. These giant corporations, 
interestingly, with their increased economic power, have been seeking vigorously to 
further strengthen their autonomy from the bureaucracy. Recent efforts by the central 
State to tighten its control over the GCs, through, for example, launching a new Decree to 
regulate the GCs‟ activities and operations, faced with fierce resistances from GCs, 
signaling an even tougher enforcement process if the Decree was to be issued 
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 A deeper examination on how equitization has become a means for power 
consolidation in these new institutions is therefore extremely necessary for the current 
scholarly on equitization in Vietnam. 
 
Future of Vietnam’s Equitization: a Conclusion 
What will be the future for the equitization process in Vietnam? Perhaps there would be 
no single answer to this question. In 2006, the newly selected Prime Minister, Mr. 
Nguyen Tan Dung, announced the intention to accelerate the equitization process and 
target to complete the equitization process by 2009, one year earlier than the previous 
deadline of 2010. As was mentioned in Chapter I, also in 2006, Prime Minister Nguyen  
Tan Dung issued a Decision to dictate the schedule and detailed deadlines for the 
remaining GCs and state-owned economic groups to complete the equitization process. 
Will these political commitments be firmly realized? Policymakers at MOF seemed to be 
optimistic about the future progress of equitization. Although the equitization process has 
been delayed substantially so far, as some of them admitted, these officials strongly 
believed that with rational policy changes and improvements, the process will be guided 
efficiently in the future. Meanwhile, most of researchers whom I met and interviewed 
during my fieldtrips in Vietnam predicted that it would be extremely difficult for 
Vietnam to reach the above-mentioned targets in equitization by 2010, let alone by 2009 
as committed by the Prime Minister.
333
 In fact, the equitization process of a number of 
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GCs and state-owned economic groups has been delayed, causing a halt in the process 
during the period between 2006 and mid 2009.  
 
Now it is time to come back to the question of what will be the future for equitization in 
Vietnam. It will surely not be a case of “big-bang” privatization as in Russia and the 
former communist countries in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, unless it is headed by 
some necessary political upheavals. Vietnam‟s privatization process would be likely 
more or less similar to the Chinese privatization route: gradual and incremental, seeking 
continuity within the process rather than break-away. What‟s more in Vietnam perhaps is 
that it will be a bumpy road in which delays and deviance in policy formulation and 
implementation might not be purely stemmed from the reform ideology but also, and 
mainly, from the policymaking process itself. This reflects the enlarging role of the 
Bureaucracy, in comparison with the Party, in the making of economic policies, and thus 
the increasing tendency of bureaucratization and routinization in the equitization process 
within an environment stirred by various forces of decentralization and re-centralization 
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avoid the closed-door 
equitization, and to attach 
(i) to transform SOEs 
that the State does not 
need to keep 100% 
ownership into 
enterprises of multiple 
ownership, to mobilize 
capital from domestic 
and foreign investors 
in order to enhance the 
financial capability, 
reform the technology 
and corporate 
governance in order to 
strengthen the 
efficiency and 
competitiveness of the 
economy; (ii) to ensure 
the harmonization of 
State‟s, enterprises‟, 
investors‟, and SOE 
employees‟ interests; 
(iii) to ensure 
information disclosure 
and transparency 






and 25 (1997) 
Decree 44 (1998) Decree 64 (2002) Decree 187 (2004) Decree 109 (2007) 
contribution into the 
national economic 
growth. 
ownership role of SOE 
employees and other 
shareholders, to 
strengthen the investors‟ 
supervision upon SOEs, 
and to harmonize the 




the equitization process to 
the development of 
capital and securities 
markets. 
market principles, to 
avoid the closed-door 
equitization, and to 
attach the equitization 
process to the 
development of capital 
and securities markets. 
Scope Only SOEs of small 
and medium size, in 
which the State does 
not need to retain its 
100% State 
ownership, and are 
profitable 
SOEs that the State 
does not need to retain 
100% State ownership 
All SOEs that the State 
does not need to retain 
100% State ownership, 
regardless of their 
production and business 
performance/outcomes. 
All SOEs that the State 
does not need to retain 
100% State ownership, 
including GCs, SOCBs, 
and State-owned financial 
institutions, independent 
SOEs, self-accounting 
dependent members of 
GCs established by the 
State, or dependent SOE 
members of GCs. 
 
List of SOEs that the State 
needs to retain 100% 
ownership will be 
determined by the Prime 
Minister for each period.  
 
Conditions for SOEs 
(i) independent SOEs 
established by line 
Ministries and local 
governments; (ii) 
Parent companies in 




Banks); (iii) parent 
companies in “parent-
child” complexes; (iv) 
independent members 
of GCs established and 
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eligibility for equitization: 
SOEs must still have State 
capital (excluding the 
value of land use rights) 
after deducting the value 
of unused assets, assets 
waiting for sales, loses, 
value reductions, public 








of GCs; and (vi) 100% 
State owned limited 
liability companies 
Means (i) remain intact and 
issue new shares; (ii) 
sell part of the state 
capital; and (iii) 
separate a part of the 
enterprise for 
equitization 
(i) remain intact and 
issue new shares; (ii) 
sell part of State capital; 
(iii) separate a part of 
the enterprise for 
equitization; and (iv) 
sell off all State capital 
(i) remain intact and 
issue new shares; (ii) sell 
part of State capital; (iii) 
sell off all State capital; 
(iv) means (ii) and (iii) 
together with issuing new 
shares 
(i) remain intact and issue 
new shares; (ii) sell part of 
State capital or sell part of 
State capital together with 
issuing new shares; and 
(iii) sell all of State capital 
or sell all of State capital 
together with issuing new 
shares 
(i) remain intact and 
issue new shares; (ii) 
sell part of State 
capital or sell part of 
State capital together 
with issuing new 
shares; and (iii) sell all 
of State capital or sell 
all of State capital 






 Enterprises of less than 
VND 10 billion in State 
capital determine their 
value upon approval of 
their direct State 
The State supervisor of 
the equitized SOE will 
set up a Valuation 
Committee to evaluate 
the enterprise value with 
For enterprises of at least 
VND 30 billion in value, 
the valuation need to be 
taken by evaluating 
agencies such as auditing 
(i) SOEs whose assets 
value at VND 30 
billion or more, or 
whose State capital 
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supervisors; Enterprises 
of VND 10 billion or 
more in State capital 
will be valued by MOF 
in cooperation with 








investment banks, either 
domestic or foreign. The 
responsible State agencies 
will decide the selection 
of the evaluation agencies 
based on the list approved 
by the MOF.  
Enterprises of less than 
VND 30 billion in value 
do not necessarily to hire 
evaluating agencies to 
determine their value. In 
this case, the enterprises 
will determine their value 
themselves and report to 
the responsible State 
agencies for approval.  
The SOE valuation file 
needs to be submitted to 
MOF and responsible 
State agencies for 
approval.  
billion or more, or who 
are in favorable 
locations must hire 
evaluation agencies 




evaluation agencies, or 
investment banks to 
evaluate their values 
before equitization 
certified in the List 
published by MOF, 
subject to approval 
from the Steering 
Board of Enterprise 
Equitization; (ii) other 
SOEs are allowed to 
determine their value, 
subject to approval 




Asset method, based 
on booked values 
Asset method, based on 
booked values 
Asset method, based on 
booked values; but other 
methods are also allowed 
upon MOF approval as 
(i) Asset method, based on 
booked values; and (ii) 
Discounted-Cash-Flow 
(DCF) method; or (iii) 
(i) Asset method, (ii) 
DCF method; (iii) 
other methods at 
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well. other methods subject to 
MOF‟s approval 
MOF approval. The 
enterprise value 
determined by other 
methods must not 
lower than that 






 No mentioning, 
implicitly understood as 
not included in the 
valuation of SOE assets 
before equitization. 
(i) For land rented 
for SOEs working in 
real estate and 
infrastructural services, 
the value of land use 
right will be included in 
the value of the SOEs 
before equitization. 
(ii) Otherwise, the 
land use right will not be 
included in the 
enterprises‟ value. SOEs 
in this case will be 
assigned with the land, 
or will rent the land 
from the local 
governments based on 
the rates stipulated by 
the local government.  
(i) For land that 
equitized SOEs are 
currently using for 
building their own 
offices and 
manufacturing units, for 
agricultural and forestry 
production, for fishery 
production or salt 
production (including 
land assigned by the 
State with or without 
land use fees), the 
equitized SOEs are 
allowed to choose 
whether to rent the land 
or be assigned with the 
land in accordance the 
Land Law.  
 
- In case the equitized 
SOE chooses to rent the 
(i) if the enterprise was 
assigned with the land 
use right for the land it 
is currently using, the 
value of land use right 
will be included in the 
enterprise‟s value 
before equitization: (ii) 
if the enterprise rents 
the land from the local 
government on the 
year-by-year basis, the 
value of land use right 
is not included in the 
enterprise‟s value; (iii) 
if the enterprise rents 
the land from the local 
government on a long-
term basis (paying the 
rent once for the whole 
renting period), the 
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land, the value of land 
use right is not included 
in the pre-equitization 
value of the enterprise  
 
- In case the equitized 
SOE chooses to be 
assigned with the land, 
the value of land use 
right is included in the 
pre-equitization value of 
the enterprise.  The land 
use right will be priced 
by the 
provincial/municipal 
authorities based on the 
actual market price.  
 
For land assigned by the 
State to SOEs for 
commercial purposes 
(constructing private 
houses for sale or rent, 
building infrastructure for 
transfer or rent), the value 
of land use rights will be 
included in the pre-
equitization value of the 
enterprises.   
is included into the 
enterprise‟s value 
before equitization. 
The local governments 
are the ones who 
set/determine the value 
of land use rights in 
their localities in 
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IPO 
methods 
   (i) direct share auctioning 
for SOEs selling shares of 
less than VND 1 billion in 
value, (ii) share auctioning 
at intermediary financial 
institutions for SOEs 
selling shares of more 
than VND 1 billion in 
value. For SOEs selling 
shares of more than VND 
10 billion, the auctioning 
will be organized at 
securities trading centers 
in order to attract 
investors. 
(i) open auctioning; 
(ii) underwriting; or 
(iii) direct negotiations 
Who are 







individuals only; the 
pilot sale to foreigners 
subject to PM‟s 
separate decision 
Vietnam-based legal 
entities and individuals 
(including overseas 
Vietnamese); the sale to 
foreign organizations 
and individuals subject 
to PM‟s separate 
decision  
Any legal investors 
(either Vietnamese or 
foreign institutions and 
individuals), foreign 
investors are allowed to 
buy up to 30% of the 
company‟s legal capital 
in certain 
sectors/industries 
(i) SOE employees; 
(ii) strategic investors 
(producer and provider 
of SOE inputs, 
consumers of SOE 
products, or those having 
long-term, strategic 
interest and benefits 
associated with the 
equitized SOE, allowed 
to buy up to 20% of the 
shares sold to outside 
investors under 
preferential prices; and 
(i) domestic investors 
without any limits; (ii) 
foreign investors 
without any limits, 
except those in List C 
(Decree 108/2006/ND-
CP dated 22 
September, 2006); (iii) 
strategic investors, 
subject to decisions 
made by the Steering 
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(iii) other investors. 
Shares sold on open 
auctioning to outside 
investors must not be less 
than 20% of the 
company‟s charter/legal 
capital (in addition to 
shares sold to strategic 
investors and SOE 
employees under 
preferential prices).  
 
Preferential shares sold 
to SOE employees will 
be 40% less than the 
average auctioning 
prices. Preferential 
shares sold to strategic 
investors will be 20% 
less than the average 
auctioning prices. Shares 
sold to other investors 
will be priced at the 
average of all successful 





(i) at the office of 
equitized SOEs; (ii) 
(i) at the office of 
equitized SOEs; (ii) 
At the office of equitized 
SOEs or through 
SOEs are required to 
conduct open auction of 
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places through nominated 
commercial banking 




system or financial 
companies; and (iii) 
securities centres 
financial intermediaries. 
The equitized SOE is 
responsible for the sale of 
shares to its employees 
and their inputs‟ 
producers and providers, 
while intermediary 
financial institutions are 
responsible for the sale of 
shares to outside 
investors, through either 
share auctioning or 
underwritten issuance of 
shares in accordance with 
MOF‟s guidance. In case 
the amount of shares is 
small or else, the SOE 
might be allowed to 
conduct the share 
auctioning in its own. 
shares whose value is at 
least 20% of                                                                                      
their Charter capital; the 
open auction takes place 
at SOEs‟ office (if the 
value of shares of less 
than VND 1 bil.) and at 
financial intermediaries if 
the values of offered share 
is more than VND 1 bil. 
For those SOE offering 
more than VND 10 bil in 
shares, the auction will be 
held at securities centres. 
underwritten issuance; 
and (iii) direct sale
based on negotiations 




SOE managers and 
employees can buy up 
to 20-30% of 
enterprise value 
Each institutional 
investor is allowed to 
buy up to 10-20% of the 
total issued shares; 
while each individual 
up to 5-10%  
Foreign investors are 
allowed to buy shares up 
to 30% of the SOE‟s 
Charter capital in total; 
outside investors are 
allowed to buy at least 
30% of the total issued 
shares 
(i) strategic investors 
eligible to buy up to 20% 
of the total shares at 
preferential prices (20% 
less than the average 
auctioned price); (ii) 
employees eligible to buy 
up to 100 shares for each 
working year at 
(i) strategic investors 
and other investors are 
allowed to buy not less 
than 25% of the legal 
capital, not less than 
half of which should 
be sold to other 
investors; (ii) labor 
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preferential prices (40% 
less than the average 
auctioned price) 
allowed to use official 
funds (belonging to the 
unions) to buy no more 
than 3% of the legal 
capital. These shares 
are kept by the Labor 
Union at enterprises 
and are non-
transferable; (iii) no 
preferential prices for 
strategic investors, but 
employees enjoy 60% 





Ministries and PPCs 
select SOEs for 
equitization and report 
to NSCE, MOF, and 
MPI for supervision; 
GCs select member 
SOEs for equitization 






equitization plan and 
SELECTION: Line 
Ministries and PPCs 
often select and approve 
SOEs for equitization; 
GCs select SOEs and 
report to PM for 
approval; SCs select 
SOEs and report to line 
Ministries and PPCs for 
approval;  
APPROVAL of 
enterprise value: MOF 
approves of enterprise 
value (for those of more 
than VND 10 billion in 
SELECTION: Line 
Ministries and PPCs 
often select and approve 
SOEs for equitization; 
GCs select SOEs and 








enterprise value) and 
DECISION to 
SELECTION: Line 
Ministries and PPCs often 
select and approve SOEs 
for equitization; GCs 
select SOEs and report to 
PM for approval; non-
compliance and non-




valuation taken by 
Valuation Rating 
Agencies approved by 
MOF for SOEs of more 
SELECTION: Line 
Ministries and PPCs 
often select and 
approve SOEs for 
equitization; GCs 
select SOEs and report 
to PM for approval; 
non-compliance and 
non-implementation 
subject to penalties 
EVALUATION of 
enterprise values: 
valuation taken by 
Valuation Rating 
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DECISION to 
transform SOE into 
JSC: For SOEs of 
VND 3-10 bil. in State 
capital or member of 
91 GCs: PM (through 
NSCE); for SOEs of 





equitization plan and 
DECISION to 
transform SOE into 
JSC: PM for SOEs of 
more than VND 10 bil. 
in State capital; Line 
Ministries and PPC for 
SOEs of less than VND 
10 bil. in State capital. 
transform SOE into 
JSC: Line Ministers, 
PPCs‟ Chairmen 
SUPERVISION of the 
whole process: 
NSCERD and MOF 
than VND 30 bil. in their 
assets; self-evaluation  if 
less than VND 30 bil., but 




equitization plan and 
DECISION to transform 
SOE into JSC: Line 
Ministers, PPCs‟ Chairs; 
SUPERVISION of the 
whole process: NSCERD 
and MOF. 
MOF for SOEs of 
more than VND 30 bil. 
in their assets; self-
evaluation  if less than 
VND 30 bil., but 




equitization plan and 
DECISION to 
transform SOE into 
JSC: Line Ministers, 
PPCs‟ Chairs; 
SUPERVISION of the 
whole process: 





Managed centrally by 
Ministry of Finance 
for non-current 




The proceeds collected 
from selling State 
capital after deducting 
the equitization costs 
will be used by PPC 
(for local independent 
SOEs), MOF (for 
central independent 
SOEs), and 91 GC 
Board of Management 
for the following 
purposes: (i) training 
The proceeds collected 
from equitizing central, 
independent SOEs will 
be transferred to the 
Central Equitization 
Fund for SOE re-
arrangement managed by 
MOF, from local, 
independent SOEs to 
local Funds managed by 
PPCs, and from GC 
members to GC Funds.  
The proceeds collected 
from equitizing SOEs 
(including the proceeds 
collected from selling the 
State capital in SOEs and 
the surplus collected from 
issuing additional shares 
in equitized SOEs) will be 
used for the following 
purposes: 
 
(i) Covering the 
(i) In case part of 
the State capital in the 
SOE is sold: the 
proceeds will be used 
to (1) pay for 
equitization expenses 
and redundancy costs, 
and (2) be transferred 
to the Equitization 
Funds for SOE re-
arrangement at either 
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and retraining for SOE 
employees; (ii) 
redundancy subsidies; 
and (iii) providing 
capital for prioritized 
SOEs or investing into 
equitized SOEs. 
The dividends paid by 
equitized SOEs to the 
State capital share will 
be transferred to (i) 
State Budget for 
equitizing the whole 
SOEs, or (ii) the direct 
supervising SOE in 
charge of managing the 
State capital in the 
equitized enterprise in 
case equitizing part of 
the independent SOE. 
equitization costs 
(ii) Assisting equitized 
SOEs to implement 
policies for their 




costs and re-training 
(iii)being transferred 
to GCs or independent 
SOEs in case the 
equitized SOEs are 
their dependent 
members. GCs or 
independent SOEs 
will use the proceeds 
to assist their business 
activities or pay for 
redundant workers in 
their SOE members.  
(iv) Being transferred 
to the Equitization 
Fund of SOE re-
arrangement and 
equitization at MOF in 
case the equitized 
SOEs are GCs or 
independent SOEs, in 
are GC members or 




(ii) In case new 
shares are issued in 
order to increase the 
SOE‟s legal capital: 
the capital surplus 
will be used to (1) pay 
for equitization 
expenses and 
redundancy costs, (2) 
be left in the SOE in 
accordance with the 
ratio of new shares to 
the total legal capital, 
and (3) be transferred 
to the Equitization 
Funds of SOE Re-
arrangements at either 
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order to invest into 
SOEs that the State 
needs to retain 100% 
ownership but in 
capital deficiency, or 
equitized SOEs in 
which the State needs 
to keep controlling 
shares but does not 
have adequate amount 
to do so, to assist 
equitized SOEs in 
solving redundancy 
issue, and finally to 









 Not yet established  The Equitization Funds 
will be used for the 
following purposes (in 
chronological order): (i) 
providing 
assistance/subsidies to 
redundant workers during 
equitization, (ii)  
assisting the re-training 
of workers in equitized 
SOEs, (iii) investing into 
 (i) An Equitization 
Fund for SOE Re-
arrangement is 
established at SCIC to 




legal/charter capital in 
accordance with PM‟s 
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equitized SOEs to 
maintain the controlling 
share of the State in these 
SOEs, (iv) providing 
capital to SOEs in 
financial difficulties 
before equitization to pay 
for social welfare 
insurance for their 
workers, (v) providing 
liquidity for indebted 
SOEs in sales, and (vi) 
providing capital to 









in accordance with 
PM‟s decisions. 
(ii) Equitization 
Funds established at 
GCs, economic 
groups, or parent 
companies are used to 
(1) assist the re-
arrangement process at 
their SOE members, 
(2) supplement their 
legal/charter capital 
upon approval from 
their State supervisors, 
and (3) invest into 
business development 
in accordance with 
PM‟s decisions. 
 
The PM makes 
decisions on  (1) 
establishment, 
management, and use 
of the Equitization 
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transfers among Funds 
at SCIC, GCs, groups, 
and parent companies, 
and (3) investments 
using the Equitization 
Funds into crucial and 
strategic projects upon 
MOF‟s proposals. 
 
MOF decides the rules 
and regulations on the 
management and 
usage of the 
Equitization Funds at 




usage of proceeds 
collected from 
equitization. 







Ministry of Finance 
(General Department 
of State Capital and 
Assets Management) 
Line Ministries, PPCs 
and 91 GC Boards of 
Management (in 
consultation with MOF) 
Regulated in Decree 
73/2000/ND-CP dated 
December 2000, 
basically unchanged in 
comparison with Decree 
44 
(i) the representation of 
the State capital in 
equitized SOEs will be 
regulated by the current 
legal framework on the 
management of State 
capital in enterprises (or 
Decree 73/2000/ND-CP 






managing the State 
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dated December 2000); 
(ii) in case the equitized 
SOEs do not belong to the 
category that the State 
need to keep controlling 
shares, the State 
representative in these 
SOEs will decide the 
further divestiture of State 
capital in these SOEs in 
accordance with the 
current legal framework 
and in relevance with the 




(iv) Line Ministries 
and PPCs (1) report to 
the Prime Minister to 
decide on the 
delegation of State 
representatives in 
equitized economic 




ownership in equitized 
SOEs, (3) transfer the 
right of representing 
the State capital 
ownership in 
necessary equitized 
SOEs to SCIC, and 
thus cooperate with 
SCIC in delegation of 
State representatives in 





(i) for equitized SOEs: 
50% profit tax 
exemptions for the 
first two years and 
some other benefits; 
(ii) for SOE managers 
(i) for equitized SOEs: 
eligible for preferential 
treatment stipulated in 
the Law for Domestic 
Investments or 50% 
profit tax exemptions 
(i) for equitized SOEs: 
eligible for preferential 
treatment stipulated in 
the Law for Domestic 
Investments or 50% 
profit tax exemptions for 
In addition to the 
incentives offered in 
Decree 64, equitized 
SOEs are also eligible for 
certain preferential 
treatments if they choose 
No more preferential 
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and employees: 
eligible to buy a 
certain portion of 
shares at preferential 
prices and/or in credit 
and to keep their job at 
the equitized SOEs (if 
not, able to enjoy 
severance benefits) 
for the first two years 
and some other 
benefits; (ii) for SOE 
managers and 
employees: to buy 10 
shares (of VND 
100,000 each) for each 
working year at 30% 
discount, … 
the first two years and 
some other benefits; (ii) 
for SOE managers and 
employees: to buy 10 
shares (of VND 100,000 
each) for each working 
year at 30% discount, … 
to list in the stock 
exchange according to the 













(Chairman of the 




standing Deputy Chair 
is one Deputy Minister 
of Finance, non-
standing Deputy Chair 
is Deputy Minister of 
Labor, Invalids, and 
Social Affairs, and 
one Member from the 
Labor Association): to 
supervise the whole 
The role of NSCE is not 
mentioned any more in 
this Decree. Main State 
agencies responsible for 
the SOE equitization 
thus are: Ministry of 
Finance, other line 
Ministries, PPCs, 
Boards of Management 
for 91 GCs and 90 SCs 
Establishment of 
NSCERD, however, with 
main function of helping 
the Prime Minister in 
directing, supervising, 
and enforcing State 
agencies in implementing 
the equitization mandate 
in accordance with the 
current rules and 
regulations.  
 No mentioning about 
NSCERD anymore, 
inclusion of SCIC into 
those State agencies in 
charge of 
implementing 
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equitization process 
on the behalf of the 
Prime Minister and his 
cabinet. 
 
 
 
